

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

A Psycho-Analytic View

of Society

by

PRYNS HOPKINS

M.A., PH.D.

Honorary Lecturer in Psychology, University College, London

author of

“Father or Sons? a Study in Social Psychology,” etc.

London

GEORGE ALLEN AND UNWIN LTD

FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1938

All rights reserved

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
UNWIN BROTHERS LTD., WOKING

To FAY

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
PREFACE	9
I. THE PSYCHOLOGIST AND THE MODERN WORLD	13
II. THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY	23
III. THE ROOTS OF SOCIAL ETHICS	54
IV. THE NEEDS OF MANKIND	74
V. MAN AND CRUELTY	96
VI. MAN AND VIOLENCE	115
VII. MAN AND HIS BREAD	132
VIII. MAN AND HIS POSSESSIONS	153
IX. MAN AND HIS CHILDREN	175
X. MAN AND HIS SENSORY ENJOYMENT, I	209
XI. MAN AND HIS SENSORY ENJOYMENT, II	228
XII. MAN AND HIS KNOWLEDGE	242
XIII. THE ROAD TO HAPPINESS	261
INDEX	281

PREFACE

THE apes are, in a way, wiser than we reflective humans. They find paradise in their tree-tops because, not being philosophers, it has never occurred to them to give any anxious thought to paradise. Whether as quarrelling individuals or as self-forgetting members of a clan excitedly pursuing a goal in common, they function whole-heartedly—and are content. By contrast, we men have absorbed with our mother's milk those sometimes antagonistic yet inseparably linked elements of culture—intellect and morals. During our first lessons in cleanliness, good temper and truthfulness, there is seared into our infant souls the attitude that the welfare of our fellows has a higher claim on us than the satisfaction of selfish pleasures. We may respond when Nietzsche or Stirner calls on us to proclaim our egoistic independence; but as surely as we snatch pleasure and power at the cost of our fellows' welfare, a cruel little super-ego (or conscience or angel or devil) gleefully throws a wet blanket on our capacity to enjoy them.

The unconscious mind never grows up, but still thinks in terms of whether mother and father will love their child who behaves so naughtily: and love is craved by the soul of the most hard-boiled adult. So our happiness is dependent on our understanding that there is friendliness or goodness in the universe. But we can attain the peace which comes of trusting the "scheme of things entire" only if we can get evidence of goodness in parts of it to offset some of the impressions of indifference and evil we are bound to get elsewhere.

The technique for producing evidence that goodness is present consists in our functioning with graciousness in all life's relationships. This implies, to be sure, a manifestation of enlightenment, self-command, mellowness, thoughtfulness, liberality, and compassion. A tall order, indeed! But as a considerable degree of its attainment is the preliminary to our being allowed to see much of the goodness of the

world, we would best enquire at once how some persons do attain it.

The answer is that graciousness is gained at the price of *whole-hearted* submission to such disciplines as the case requires. Our relations to ideas are an opportunity for intellectual discipline. Our relations to present company are an opportunity for discipline in subordinating personal impulses to good taste and good manners. Our relations towards children afford the opportunity for developing insight into their psychology. Our sex-relationships are a field for us to exercise thoughtfulness; our economic relations, for practising liberality; and our political relations, for showing compassion and justice. Here, indeed, is the point at which a large measure of reconciliation can be effected between, on the one hand, our cravings for individuation and for personal ends; and, on the other, the demands upon us of the collectivity and of the social movements of our time. But what is all I have here said more than the sermonizing to which those scorned creatures, the moralists, have long treated us? Advice easy to give but hard to follow! Has a psychologist no more practical suggestions to make?

In this book I shall try to prove that the answer is—yes! The reason *why* we are half-hearted in our duties is a psychological one. It is the same reason that makes us who love peace stand in impotent isolation whilst war-makers create their political “axes” or lets us allow starvation to exist side by side with rotting surplus. It is the same reason that makes us frightened of “depopulation” even while we are wondering how to support our millions of unemployed, or makes us bring up our children emotionally incompetent to manage their affairs although we slave to leave them a “competence.” It is the reason that makes us tolerate smoke in our homes and litter and hoardings in the cities on which we have spent fortunes to beautify, and allows some of us to gamble our all on the creed or philosophy taught us by our parents without so much comparison with other beliefs as we should exercise in choosing a hat. The reason for such inconsistencies is that our logic is perverted by repressed

complexes. All through human history, man has been groping after ways of exhuming from the graveyards of his forgotten memories the macabre closeted skeletons that terrified him. Dreams, plays, art, the confidence of friend to bosom friend and confessions to priests have had a little usefulness in this way. Far more potent than these is the modern therapy called psycho-analysis.

But I am not hopeful that many will flock to the analytic clinic who have not first tasted the abyss of suffering. Until then, they lack purpose enough to drive them through the years of mortifying treatment. The multitude will either shirk the trials that might give their lives meaning or will take up with some fashionable nationalist fanaticism of the day, which for a time does seem able to make men face up to certain responsibilities, but ends by turning them into brutes and the cat's-paws of brutes.

I should like to acknowledge help received from my dear wife in simplifying this book, from Mr. R. Douglas Paul for his revision and condensation of my earlier draft, and from Miss M. De Hulsters and others for care in typing the manuscript.

CHAPTER I

THE PSYCHOLOGIST AND THE MODERN WORLD

MAN has had his attention directed to his social problems times without number in the last few years, and however serious those difficulties may be, it is not the essence of my purpose in this book to call his attention to them once again. Whatever view he may take of his problems, and however amazed he may be by their complexity, they can have bewildered him very little less than the spate of literature which they have produced.

One after another, eminent men in every walk of life and of all nationalities have expounded the problems, have analysed them, and have expressed a view how they might be cured.

It has been the economists who have played one of the leading rôles in this scene, and we can at least put it on record that if the layman is ignorant of what it is that makes his life difficult, his livelihood uncertain, and his return for his labour beggarly, it is no fault of theirs. But social reformers of every creed and of none have pressed hard on the economists' heels. Their contributions to the elucidation of what is wrong with the world have provided, indeed, almost as much controversy as have the causes of the troubles. And these are only a few of the many people who have sought to put the world straight. A very cursory review of the literature of the last ten years alone reveals a quite staggering number of books, pamphlets, and articles devoted to the troubles of mankind.

That those troubles are desperate and urgently needing solution no one will doubt; that they can be solved few will deny; but how they are to be solved is a very different question. The layman has concluded that the cures for our troubles are bewilderingly numerous. They cannot *all* be the right ones; some of them, quite obviously, are contradictory. But I at least hope that he may have noticed the relatively small attention

which has been devoted to what is after all the principal factor in all these problems—Man.

We have been told what man *ought* to do, what man *ought* to think, and how man *ought* to behave. Yet few, very few authors have stopped to consider whether the lines of conduct they have laid down for their fellows are lines of conduct which their fellows can follow. In other words, while immense energy has been devoted to the task of discovering by what means man may save himself, but little has been spent on the vital question of whether it is in man's nature to employ the means suggested, or whether he is capable of profiting by the advice offered him. Unless he is, then much of what has been written about his problems will be mere verbiage. Whatever the right panacea for our ills may be, it is certain that it will involve a great deal of effort on the part of man himself; and if, for a variety of reasons, man may be incapable of that effort then the panacea will never be tried.

Now it is often asserted that a painfully large number of panaceas fall within this category. How often is the stock reply to the persuasive arguments of Socialism, for instance, the bald statement: "All very nice, but you can't change human nature," and although I for one would never subscribe to such a view, I do recognize what so many of our would-be reformers too easily forget, that human nature can only be changed very slowly, and at the price of taking well-directed pains; and that, until it is changed, there are some things it will never do. It is pertinent to tell a man who is being chased by a bull that he should run faster, but if he has a wooden leg, or is already running as fast as he can, the advice is a little silly. Few of our problems are as simple as this, but unfortunately many of the solutions proffered for them are. How nice if man would "run faster"! Not only his willingness to do so has to be taken into account. Appeals to self-interest or moral persuasion may stimulate his willingness; they cannot affect his ability.

To answer the question, "what is man *able* to do?" is the main justification of this book, which is partly an exploration

of human nature, undertaken to discover what we may expect of man. To answer that question it is necessary to find out what man is and what are the mainsprings of his behaviour; secondly, to discover how he himself may be changed and how his motive powers may best be controlled or directed; thirdly, to make sure (and this problem is only partly to do with man's nature) to what ends his energies ought to be directed.

The first two tasks are the tasks of psychology; the third, the task of the social philosopher. But without the help of the psychologist the last cannot get far. Such a statement seems so obvious that it is hard to understand how it is ever overlooked; yet it is so. The attitude of the world to psychology is undergoing a rapid change; in every walk of life its aid is being solicited with increasing frequency. Still for the most part it remains true that to the mass of mankind, from politicians to publicans, it is a science of little account.

Before going directly into the question, it can be pointed out there are two definite lines of approach to the problem. The first, and the older, is the approach through metaphysics, the approach of Plato and of Kant. The second, and more modern, is the approach through the sociological sciences.

In the excellent text on ethics which Professor John Dewey wrote some twenty-five years ago in conjunction with Professor Tufts of the University of Chicago, the former supplied that approach to ethics which will be the essential one of these pages—the psychological approach.

That this approach to the problems of the world is increasingly popular cannot be doubted. In his address to the American Psychological Association in 1929, Professor Cattell presented interesting statistics on the topics covered by the published contributions of members and associates. He took his data from the summaries of those given in *Psychological Abstracts*. From January 1927 to July 1929 these contributions totalled over nine thousand. What a variety of topics was covered is shown by the fact that these included 128 on biometry and statistics, 332 on heredity, 1,210 on mental disorder, 564 on childhood

and adolescence, 951 on educational psychology, 474 on industrial and personnel problems, 1,174 on social functions of the individual and many others. Psychology has, it is clear, proved its usefulness in fields ranging from metaphysics to advertising.

In his statement, Professor Cattell says that in America:

The 893 psychologists hold positions in 393 different educational and other institutions. There are no fewer than 45 at Columbia, of whom 34 are members and 11 associates; Minnesota ranks next with 24, followed by Harvard, Pennsylvania, Yale, Chicago, Cornell, Stanford, Iowa, Ohio State, Michigan, New York, and the Johns Hopkins, which are the institutions with which ten or more psychologists are connected.

That gives some idea of the enormous extent to which this new science has already won its place in the universities of the United States.

Although these figures relate only to America, similar statistics are available for most countries of the world. The growth of psychology as a subject of academic study has indeed been phenomenal, and although this growth is partly to be explained by the fascination of the study itself, as I hope later to show, it has also partly been conditioned by the increasing use to which the science is put by the modern world.

Indeed, the demand for psychology has led to grave dangers, and to serious abuses, from which the good name of the study has suffered.

The enormous efforts which have been expended on its popularization have not always been as valuable as they have been enthusiastic. They have resulted too often in the production of that dangerous weapon—a little knowledge—and have encouraged the appearance of innumerable “psychologists,” whose only claim to the title has been their voluble ability to impose on their hearers. The charlatan invades every field of science, but psychology is particularly open to such invasion. These charlatans may be convinced themselves that they have

something to offer; too often they are actuated merely by financial gain. In America especially there are an amazing number of cults of a shady sort.

Distressing as this may be, it is in no way the fault of psychology. The full usefulness of this young science is as yet scarcely explored; but even more remarkable, what it can already teach us is by no means widely appreciated, in spite of (and often because of) the efforts of popular writers.

Yet the very existence of these writers—and their numbers increase yearly—proves how widespread is the interest in psychology. Apart from the fact that modern art and modern literature are influenced to an enormous extent by it, its phraseology is in current use amongst a growing number of the population. The “psychological” novel may indeed be largely responsible; but clearly that novel would never have won its position in the literature of to-day unless it had been concerned with subject matter that was popular, or its style, in which generally its psychological flavour is chiefly found, were opposed to the tastes of the majority of readers.

In spite of this widespread concern with and interest in our science, in spite of the uses to which it can be put, and of the success which has already attended its application, it is still considered too much as a closed subject; as a subject, that is, to be treated in isolation, and one which illuminates nothing beyond itself. Yet it is a matter of merest common sense that there is no activity of man which is beyond the scope of psychology. Whether he be playing games or building empires, man remains man, and his human nature is the chief determining factor in his activities.

It is strange, therefore, that so few attempts have been made directly to relate his various efforts to his human nature. Books without number have been written on various aspects of his psychology; practically none on to what extent and in what direction his nature can be used. And that, after all, is the crux of progress. The “tools” of reform are the men and women of the world; until their possibilities are fully under-

stood, they cannot be used without great danger. For while human nature can aspire to heaven, it can be, and too often is, as fickle as a feline's affection and as dangerous.

Yet, in these days, the man who is expert in no subject at all and least expert in his understanding of human nature, is frequently acclaimed as a prophet, if with sufficient vigour he announces a new plan of salvation for his fellows. That this is so is regrettable; it is itself a fact about human nature which we should be well advised to study.

Let me explain in more detail. Since the war, the world has seen the rapid growth of a large number of political theories, some of which, such as Communism and Fascism, have won the support of huge numbers of men and women. What has been most remarkable about these mass movements has been less the nature of the goals towards which they were directed, than the intensity of enthusiasm with which they were embraced by their followers. Now although Fascism and Communism are utterly opposed to one another (and indeed their followers spend most of their energies attacking the adherents of the opposite doctrine) each is believed to be the one and only truth by the people who accept it. A Fascist is as sure of the correctness of his beliefs on how to run the State as he is of his belief that the square root of nine is three. Likewise a Communist is as convinced of the truth of his utterly different beliefs on how to run the State as he is of his belief that three times seven is twenty-one.

But how differently are these mathematical and these political beliefs held! In defence of the latter, the Communist or the Fascist is willing to suffer martyrdom and death, or even more willing to inflict death on such as are mistaken enough to deny them; but I have yet to hear of a man willing to face the concentration camp, torture, or the firing squad in defence of the proposition that the three interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, or of a man willing to inflict these unpleasantnesses on anyone so mistaken as to say they were not. It is one of the most interesting of the facts revealed by

history that the intensity of man's beliefs is in inverse ration to the degree to which those beliefs are susceptible to proof. The more intensely it is held, the more problematical the tenet seems to be.

I am not saying that all beliefs which are intensely held are false, but only that intensity of conviction is not a guarantee of truth. The point need not be laboured. But it is clear that some false beliefs have been and are embraced with deadly enthusiasm. (Fascism and Communism cannot both be right.) It becomes at once highly important to discover why they should be so held, for until that question is answered the task of putting the world to rights is likely to remain undone.

This is only a rather graphic illustration of man's irrationality. In every walk of life, in every occupation, he displays the same tendencies. Sometimes his attitude has a vitally important social effect, as in the case of Communism or Fascism. At other times it is more personal. That most of us neglect sources of pleasure which are harmless and legitimate is easily observed. As a rule, this fact is dismissed as just due to lack of acumen on our part. Recent psychology has shown, however, that such is far from the case; many, if not all of us, are in the position of houses divided against themselves, with one party jealous of the other's prosperity.

Many universities in the United States have introduced what they call orientation courses. Their intention is to give new students some idea of the problems which they will be called upon to face—problems of physical and mental health, recreation, studies, human contacts, etc. Part or the whole of such courses is usually placed under the supervision of the department of psychology, largely because these courses have in many cases been expanded from attempts to help students whose difficulties in their studies were so often traceable to emotional conflicts. At University College, London, a course on "Aids to Academic Success" was organized by Professor Spearman, and carried on first by him and latterly by me.

Excellent results have been obtained from such courses. Indeed, they might well be further broadened in scope. Somewhere lately I read that:

A committee of undergraduates of Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J., suggests that a course on "How to Live" should be added to their curriculum. This course would include personal hygiene, the fundamental principles of psychology, and the duties of fatherhood.

I cannot believe that students are alone in feeling such a need. Millions of people to-day are bewildered by life's complexities, and the belief that this need is widespread is one of the factors which have led to the writing of this book.

My purpose, then, is not solely analytical. I have already tried to show that mankind is in almost as crying a need for a psychological study of the many theories of salvation which have been offered to him as he is in need of salvation itself. But man has his own personal problems, and I shall hope in the course of the following chapters to show how many of these will yield to psychological methods of cure. I do not wish it to be thought that in my view psychology is the only source of wisdom. I say that it is an integrative as well as a normative science, and that the man who disregards it in human affairs does so at his peril.

The fine, broad sweep of the unfettered intellect is possibly man's most powerful, as it is his most noble, weapon, and I for my part would be the last to minimize its achievements, whether in social or in personal problems. Rationally conceived and freely acknowledged motives play a vital part in our lives, and it is my certain belief that only by enlarging their scope enormously will the world progress. But such motives do not actuate us all the time; indeed, they actuate us distressingly seldom. They are crushed by impulses, smothered by emotions, destroyed by prejudice. Yet the causes of our impulses, our emotions and our prejudices are too often utterly neglected. There are strong psychological reasons for supposing that

many of the motives which most powerfully influence our actions remain outside our primary conscious recognition.

The human race has been trying for fifty thousand years to solve its various problems on a conscious basis. Perhaps the present is a crisis in its history. For it is beginning to recognize that many of its problems are not external, and to be solved only by methods based on the belief that human beings are wholly rational, and it is turning to the underlying, hidden motives that make man behave irrationally. The very fact, of course, that these motives are unconscious creates great difficulty, because thus we do not know what our problems are, and not knowing what they are, we are not in a position properly to understand them.

Yet a beginning has been made, and this book is an attempt to point mankind more surely to the road along which, in my opinion, salvation is to be found. For this reason, it is almost immaterial whether the views I express, or the dogmas I enunciate, are true; the major part of my purpose will be fulfilled if these pages stimulate the interest of a wider number of people in the proper appreciation of psychology, and its place in the modern world.

Naturally, I believe that what I have to say is both true and vital. I myself fail to see that the queer conduct of my fellow-men—numerous instances of which I have set out in later pages—is capable of any other satisfactory interpretation than the one I offer. But it is clear that no one can approach these problems without defining his attitude, and it is, in consequence, necessary for me to set out in some detail what attitude I adopt and why. This I have tried to do in the next chapter.

The remaining part of the book is largely self-explanatory. It will, I hope, have already become clear that I have two main themes. The first of these is frankly social and revolves around the questions (a) to what goal is man marching? (b) by what means will he reach it? The former question resolves itself into an ethical problem and accordingly I have

devoted Chapters III and IV to its discussion. The latter is psychological, since it involves an analysis of the way in which man behaves; for this purpose I have made a number of rough classifications of the various aspects of his life, and Chapters V to XII I have devoted to a detailed consideration of what light the behaviour of man in his various activities throws upon the problem of his nature and how far it can help us to decide which is the surest way of persuading man to save himself.

My second theme is interwoven with the first. And in our consideration of man in his various activities, I am concerned not only with pointing out what psychology can teach the politician and the reformer of man's nature, but also with the personal troubles and difficulties of man as an individual, and in his relations with his fellows.

Nor is this by any means the least important feature of social reform. No society, however well-governed, can be a good society if its members as individuals are not both happy and healthy. And to the solution of the problems of happiness and health, modern psychology has made invaluable contributions.

Finally, in my concluding chapter, I have tried to give effect to the conclusions I have endeavoured to establish earlier in the book, including hints towards the more ambitious task of pointing the first steps towards a new world. The present work introduces what is to me a realistic approach to the fundamental problems of our world. It is not put forth as a complete guide to the millennium; indeed, I shall in a subsequent work point out that it mainly indicates the importance of the second out of several stages towards that, its precedent being disillusionment with purely mechanistic endeavours, and its immediately successive stage being a discipline in the ameliorative or revolutionary skills of a half dozen fields, with the still further stages indicated. But it does hint at first principles—the neglect of which has for so long left the world a place of misery and hopelessness for so many of its peoples—principles which alone, in my view, will put us on the road to escape the nemesis which hourly threatens civilization more darkly.

CHAPTER II

THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY

PART I

IT has been said by a contemporary wag that psychology is the science of inventing new and difficult ways of discovering what everybody knows already. No psychologist need really be affronted by such a quip, for it embodies a very important grain of truth.

Every intelligent man who has taken the trouble to study himself and his fellows with any care is in some degree a psychologist, and to that extent the science of psychology is only doing precisely and in much greater detail exactly what he is doing. If this were the whole story then little more need be said; but it is very far indeed from being such. It amounts really to no more than the simple statement that all science is based primarily on observation. Now the power of observation, and the faculty of asking why, do not seem remarkable accomplishments. Yet upon them have been built the great triumphs of the human intellect, the knowledge which man has won of the universe in which he lives, and of himself. And psychology, in cheerfully admitting that it, too, relies upon such accomplishments in its task of finding out how man behaves, is saying only that it uses the same means as astronomy, physics, or chemistry in their tasks of finding out of what the universe is made, and how it works.

If such were the worst criticism that could be levelled against the science, it could easily be disregarded. There are, unfortunately, however, a number of other criticisms which have also to be taken into account. Some of these criticisms are indistinguishable from prejudices, but they are not confined only to the common man; they are too frequently most fiercely held by people whose intellectual qualifications in other matters

make their opposition more serious than would otherwise be the case.

One of the chief of these objections is the well-known complaint that the most prominent of all schools of psychological thought, the school of Dr. Freud, describes man as a sexual maniac, incapable of acting except along just the lines determined by his crude physical appetites. I shall postpone consideration of this widely-held complaint until later in this chapter.

Another objection that is almost as prevalent is of a more subtle kind. It can be stated in this way. Physics and chemistry, so it is asserted, are sciences which progress in an ordered manner, steadily building up a body of knowledge which is accepted by every physicist and every chemist. On the border-land of their progress are found a number of hypotheses put forward as tentative explanations of the new facts which cannot be resolved within the existing body of agreed knowledge. These hypotheses are always held tentatively, and not until one or other of them has been tested and checked beyond cavil is it accepted as knowledge.

How different, it is pointed out, is the case of psychology! Far from there being a body of agreed knowledge, there is scarcely one fundamental principle on which all psychologists agree. There is said to be no science of psychology; but only numerous psychologists and their pet theories, and for every school which asserts one thing, another can be found to deny it.

Such, in brief, is the criticism: a criticism which no conscientious psychologist can afford to disregard, for, until it is answered, he is in no position to play the doctor to his fellows. Any attempt on his part to put the house of the world to rights is likely to be met with the retort that the world would be more convinced of his qualifications to undertake the task if first he set his own house in order.

My answer to the objection is twofold. In the first case, whether or not it describes psychology accurately, it certainly flatters physics and chemistry beyond belief; the internal

dissensions which are complained of in the case of psychology are to be found in any science. It is simply a matter of degree, a matter determined both by the age of the science, and by the subject matter with which it deals. Psychology is one of the youngest of the sciences, and its subject matter, as I shall explain later, presents peculiar difficulties. I cannot here attempt to recall the acute dissensions which have, at one time or another, in their histories, riven such sciences as astronomy, physics, and chemistry from top to bottom. I would instance only the slow and painful triumph of the Copernican theory over the geocentric theory of the universe, and the triumph of the Relativity theory over the Newtonian, a triumph even to-day not universally accepted. More directly I would point to other comparatively modern sciences, such as biology and economic and political sciences. Can these, either, present a completely united front to the world? Is psychology, therefore, to be condemned out of hand, and its teaching disregarded as so much nonsense? Finally, is the matter of all the sciences and philosophy, even, to be condemned because most philosophers spend a great deal of their time painfully destroying the theory that another philosopher has more painfully built up?

For these and many similar reasons into which I have not space to enter, I conclude that any attempt to dismiss psychology on the ground that it speaks not with one tongue but with many, is an attempt which, if successful, would invalidate not only psychology, but also in its early stages every science man has studied.

In the second case, my answer to the objection takes a different form. Let us admit, for argument's sake, that the schools of psychology are numerous and rivalrous; it does not follow that they are all false. No scientist or certainly no psychologist would claim that his theories contained the whole truth; that they answered every one of the questions relating to his subject-matter, or accounted for *all* the facts. At most, he would claim that they answered more questions and accounted for more facts than any other theories he knew. His body of

theory, in other words, successfully accounted for a great number of things, and because it did not account for everything, that was no reason why what it *could* teach us should be disregarded. If he was right in assuming that his body of theory was the most successful of those in the field, and that it had been fully vindicated by experiment, then to that extent his theories become scientific facts and can be accorded the status of knowledge.

I hope to show in the course of this book that one of the current bodies of psychological theories, namely, that which is associated with the name of Freud, falls within this category, and that it accounts most successfully for the phenomena psychology studies. In so far as I am successful in this, then I shall have provided an answer to the objection; I shall have vindicated a body of agreed psychological knowledge and destroyed the premise on which the objection rests.

Most of the other objections to psychology turn out on examination to be a variant of the two I have already stated, and I cannot examine them here in detail. But there are two more which I would like to answer in passing. The first is the irritating complaint that by its obscure terminology psychology makes mystery where there is none. Now upon every science is imposed the necessity of inventing a new language for itself; this language is generally composed partly of specially coined words, and partly of words in common use; these latter are invariably given a restricted meaning. Without the use of this special phraseology which is made as precise and accurate as possible, no science could progress very far or very fast. The terms are symbols, used as a convenient shorthand method of referring to principles or phenomena which otherwise could only be described at great length.

Such a language, however essential to the science, is to an extent foreign to the public; but the public cannot blame science for being obscure, if it will not take the trouble first to learn a little of the language in which it is spoken. But with psychology a special difficulty has arisen; the popularity of the

science has resulted in the use of its language by hosts of untrained amateurs, and the confusion and obscurity which people are wrongly led to attribute to psychology are, in fact, to be found partly in the statements and assertions which these amateurs so freely make.

The last of the objections which I propose to consider serves as a useful introduction to the science of psychology itself. It is briefly that psychology cannot make up its mind what it is studying; that while some psychologists maintain that the science reveals how our minds work, others assert that since our behaviour can be satisfactorily explained without the necessity of introducing the notion of mind at all, there is no reason to assume that minds exist.

Now this is merely throwing into relief a fundamental dichotomy that is to be found in every one of the vital sciences, a dichotomy that for two thousand years and more has been one of the major bones of philosophical contentions. In plain language, it is simply the question of whether man is a machine, or is something more than a machine.

Advocates of both these points of view are numerous; and although in my estimation the controversy is resolved, I am aware that it is still an open subject to many. Philosophy is still divided in its attitude; this in spite of the fact that the influence of vitalism in one form or another, as evidenced in the works of Bergson and of Whitehead, has tended to weight the scales against the nineteenth century view that a happy solution of man's behaviour and of man's difficulties was to be found simply by treating him as a complicated machine, which could be made to behave in any way desired by the application of appropriate stimuli.

Such a problem cannot obviously be discussed in a few lines, and it is a problem which is scarcely germane to my argument. I can only hope to indicate briefly the attitude which at various times has been taken towards it by psychology, and to explain in more detail the conclusions which have been reached by representative modern psychologists.

For this purpose it is necessary to attempt a very sketchy review of the historical development of the science. I have already said that psychology is one of the youngest of the sciences. Such a remark requires qualification. Psychology as a study of human nature is as old as thinking man himself, and the works of Plato and Aristotle are treasure houses of valuable psychological information. But the attitude of both these great thinkers was almost entirely theoretical, and this attitude remained until the late nineteenth century.

Theory is of immense importance, but without the basis of practical experiment it can never be more than theory, and it was not until Wundt in 1879 set up at Leipzig the first psychological laboratory that psychology as a science can be said to have begun.

This is not to say that the earlier thinkers can be disregarded. Their approach, on the other hand, has been as instrumental in determining the modern features of the science as any other factor. It is only necessary to relate Plato's theory of amnesia to Freud's unconscious to see how very closely new patterns resemble old forms.

But, none the less, modern psychology is very different from the body of thought, half-superstition, half-inspired guess-work which represented the average psychological background of the pre-scientific era.

It is to be remembered that seventeenth-century science, whether physical or vital, was influenced to an immeasurable degree by the work of Galileo or Harvey. What the former had done in the case of the universe, the latter had done in the case of the human body. Harvey's work on the circulation of the blood may, indeed, be held to have set the fashion for the vital sciences for the next two hundred years; only that man was a scientist who began his work in the firm belief that the human being was indistinguishable from a machine, except in the complexity of his organization. *

It is easy to trace this attitude in most of the thinkers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Descartes, it is true,

decided that a substance which he called the soul interfered *in some cases* with the purely mechanical functioning of the body. But the fact that he never chose to explain on what grounds he maintained that human beings had souls, while animals (as he as roundly maintained) had not, and were, in consequence, automata, demonstrated only the extent to which religious conventionality could impose on the finest thinkers in those days. It told us nothing about the soul.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Hobbes, a man of much tougher fibre, should dispense with such a superfluous encumbrance as the soul, and should attempt to explain all behaviour in terms of physical motion, and of nothing else. He was doing what Descartes lacked the courage to do in such completeness—applying the triumphant laws of physics to human beings.

This attitude is to be found again in the work of J. P. Pavlov and of J. B. Watson in the present day. But although its success was to an extent quite spectacular, it left many things unexplained; and many other things it appeared to explain too well. As early as the middle of the eighteenth century, a reaction had set in, a reaction which represented a fundamental breakaway from the earlier “material” psychology. This reaction began with the insistence upon mental as opposed to physical features; but it suffered from a similar limitation. Hobbes and Descartes, by attempting to reduce all behaviour to one simple law of physical causation, had grossly over-simplified their problem. Those who followed them did no better. They asserted that all psychological phenomena could eventually be reduced to mere association between mental states or images. This was only to over-simplify the problem in another way.

But their theory gained ground, and by the end of the nineteenth century “associationist” psychology, if not undisputed ruler of the field, was the most influential view.

It is to be noted that both the “mechanists” and the “associationists” were still largely content with theory. They were content, that is, to rely almost entirely for their facts upon memory and common observation, and it is scarcely

surprising that the inevitable revolt from this tradition should have been concerned more with the methods than with the conclusions of psychology.

I have already referred to Wundt's psychological laboratory at Leipzig, which was set up in 1879. This was a revolutionary breakaway from the existing and quite haphazard methods of collecting psychological data; but Wundt was not alone in his reaction. Darwin's work in biology had provided an immense number of new facts for the consideration of psychologists; but the most astonishing influence on the development of the science was to come from the work of Charcot, Pierre Janet, and Sigmund Freud, men who were not in their origins psychologists. They were doctors, who specialized in the study of mental unbalance. From their labours in this field was gradually evolved a body of knowledge that was destined to have more influence upon the development of psychology than any other factor.

We see, then, that as the nineteenth century entered upon its last phase, traditional psychology, whether of the mechanistic or associationist pattern, was exposed to three novel and powerful forces, the centrifugal tendency of which is only beginning to be checked by a fourth. In the first place, Wundt and his followers, borrowing a page from their brother-scientists, the physiologists, were busily conducting precise and detailed experiments upon the matter which psychology studied, and recording new and often astonishing scientific information about such diverse facts as sensory perception and the persistence of memory.

In the second place, the biologists, led by Darwin and Galton, were making equally astonishing discoveries about the behaviour, the development, and the nature of a living organism. Whether psychologists liked it or not, such well-attested discoveries could not be disregarded, and the grist for psychology's mill mounted steadily.

Thirdly, the psychiatrists under Janet and Freud were amassing knowledge of an utterly revolutionary sort. The study

of abnormal people was in a chaotic state before they commenced their work, but within a few years they had reduced it to such scientific order that it became one of the most promising of the contemporary studies. From their conclusions, however, it was obvious that they were doing much more than delving into the causes of insanity; they were, in fact, opening up an entirely new exploration of human personality, normal as well as abnormal, and it soon became evident that they had as much to say about psychology generally as anyone else.

It was not to be expected, either, that the older schools would accept all these new influences without a struggle, or that a satisfactory synthesis could be made from all these divergent studies. Nor indeed did one emerge. It soon became clear that some of the schools were obviously studying what appeared to be quite different fields; that while one was concerned with what may be called the mechanical functioning of behaviour, another was concerned with the motives of behaviour. The old problem of man as a machine, or as something more, was really being perpetuated in a new and much more scientific way.

By the beginning of this century, however, these divergent lines of study had crystallized out into a number of separate schools reasonably clearly defined. Nor has the last thirty odd years seen any diminution of their numbers; rather have they increased, but at least the later additions have arisen as the variations of some older theme. Particularly has this been the case with the later analytical schools, where Jung and Adler have, in effect, broken away from Freud's essential premises and method, but retained less essential parts as substitutes for the more essential.

Fourthly and finally, however, the centrifugal tendencies of the recent historic forces noted above have stimulated some determined attempts to bring psychology again into a synthesis. Not counting early efforts of Rivers and others to effect a compromise between the analytic schools, which was bound to fail, because it failed to recognize that Adler's and Jung's revolts were essentially attempts to retract insights which Freud

had won with much pain, we may note three attempts in particular. One is Dr. R. Money-Kyrle's *The Development of the Sexual Impulse*, which endeavours to explain psychoanalytic viewpoints in behaviouristic terms. The second is Professor F. Aveling's *Psychology: the Changing Outlook*. Most important of all is Professor Charles Spearman's *Psychology Down the Ages*. This in one volume reviews the entire field of psychology, and then, in a second one, proffers a scheme. Within the frame of this, whatever shall be proven sound in all schools can not only be embraced, but brought into an orderly arrangement under six great laws.¹

This very brief and quite inadequate sketch of the major lines of development in recent psychological thought has, I hope, made clear that if psychology has still a long way to go, it is already a very active and virile body of thought. And although the full meaning of all it can tell us of ourselves may not yet be evident, psychology has discovered enough to justify its claim to the status of a science, and to silence criticism both of its methods and of its conclusions.

What those main conclusions are, I shall indicate in the second part of this chapter, with special reference to the work of Freud, which, as I have previously said, is to form the principal background of this book.

¹ These laws, worked out by him on an experimental and mathematical basis some years, are named retentivity, fatigueability, constancy of output, comative control, primordial potency, and noogenesis (the three-fold law governing quality of output as against quantity as determined by the preceding). To explain them further here would be irrelevant to our purpose.

PART II

IT was many years ago that two physiologists—an American, Jacques Loeb, and a German, Max Verworn—individually carried out experiments which seemed to them to demonstrate that the action of animals, or at least of the lower orders of animals, are just as automatic as those of any piece of machinery. They submitted various worms and crustaceae, which they had placed in a tank, to such stimulations as light, heat, chemical infusion from a given part of the tank, and gravitational pull. Some of these creatures rotated themselves to face always a particular stimulus or to turn away from it, and then put into motion their swimming *apparati*, much as a sunflower rotates so as always to face the sun. Loeb called this action a tropism; Verworn, a taxis-mechanism. And such movements, they claimed to show, were entirely automatic; the worm turned for the same reasons as an engine's wheel turns, because it must.

It soon became clear that human beings, at least in certain of their actions, also behaved in a very similar manner. It is a well-known fact that fingers are removed quickly and quite automatically from the neighbourhood of red-hot pokers. Such an action is not even initiated by the brain; the fingers are withdrawn from contact actually *before* the sensation of heat is registered in the cortex. Another example is the blink, which occurs even in spite of our will to prevent it, and even though we know that an intervening glass partition protects us whenever an object threatens to enter our eye.

Such actions are called reflexes. By a reflex, psychologists mean muscular action following automatically upon the presentation of some stimulus. Most reflexes are in the first instance innate, or birth-given. It is a natural thing, for instance, for the mouth to water when food is on the tongue; but the same reflex can be transferred to, or as it is called, conditioned upon, some stimulus other than the natural one. The Russian physiologist, Pavlov, in experiments which have become classic,

demonstrated that the salivation reflex could be transferred from taste or smell of food as stimulus to something remotely resembling it as the ringing of a bell which had regularly been the signal that food was coming.

If this was so in the case of salivating, was it also the case with other actions? Many experiments have been conducted to find out how far the idea can be carried; the conclusions they have established are highly controversial. While it has become clear that many of our actions have evolved to what they are through conditioning, it is not by any means clear that all our actions can be *ultimately explained* by conditioning.

But these experiments powerfully reinforced the arguments of the American professor, J. B. Watson, who had revolted violently against the conceptions of the older psychology. He insisted that it was useless to study such phenomena as consciousness, if psychology was ever to be made a science; he felt (following here Kapt) that science could only deal with what can be measured. The intangible factors, he felt, were not susceptible of definite study, nor could its observation yield any scientifically valuable results. Instead, he substituted the study of behaviour, and his school of psychology, known as behaviourism, has in America attained a prominence in the public eye that comes near to rivalling that won by psycho-analysis.

I cannot here enter into a full account of Watson's researches, or of the development of his theory. It can most simply be stated as an attempt to explain all behaviour, however complex, in terms of reflex action simple or conditioned, without reference to consciousness, to emotion, to sensation, or to any other essentially psychological, as opposed to physiological, factors. It is not necessary for him to deny the existence of such factors; he is content to assert that a study of them can teach us nothing reliable about how a human being behaves, or why he behaves in that way. As theory, behaviourism is coherent; but it is far from covering the whole.

Watson's great work has been done on child psychology,

and to-day nearly all texts of baby-training are based upon the simple reflex; but this plan, valuable as it is in elementary months, breaks down quickly in practice after the first year. It then becomes plain that a child is no mere machine. Refractoriness about lending himself to such training may indeed become his chief weapon for asserting his personality against the forces of his environment. The attempt to dispense with any references to the steam that drives the human machine has to be given up.

As I pointed out earlier in this chapter, the older psychology was at once too static and too inclined to make mental cross-sections of the mind. It was interested chiefly in the intellectual processes, and scarcely at all in the orectic (feeling and willing) processes.

Now, it is difficult to disregard the orectic aspects of psychology; particularly is it difficult to disregard those instances of complicated behaviour in all forms of life, which appear to spring from urges or tendencies towards a desired end. An example is the tendency of a bird to build a nest after it has mated. Moreover, it is to be noted that such tendencies are not learnt from experience, for the young bird who has never acted in such a manner before will mate and build its nest, with all the assurance and efficiency of a bird who has done so for many seasons.

These tendencies are called instincts; an instinct can be defined as a birth-given or innate urge to react to a particular situation in a particular and complex way. For some time it was held that instincts typified the lower animals, whereas man was moved to his actions by reason. Professor William James broke down this tradition. He regarded man as possessing a rather greater number of instincts than any of his more lowly brethren, and drew up a list of them. The fashion, having been thus set, was followed by many other psychologists, each drawing up a list according to his own predilections.

No academic psychologist has contributed more to the study of instincts than Professor Wm. McDougall, whose champion-

ship of a vital principle in human conduct, particularly against the behaviourists, has won him widespread admiration. McDougall regards the instincts as not completely blind. He postulates for each one not only a tendency to act, but also a tendency to take an interest in a given class of objects, and to feel in a particular way about them—the last state being called an *emotion*. He has stressed the conative or striving aspects of thought, and has insisted on the purposive nature of behaviour. This is clearly to assert that living organisms are influenced by teleological as well as ontological forces, that they are dragged from in front as well as pushed from behind. Now a machine acts ontologically; it acts, that is, in accordance with the law of cause and effect, and its movements in the present are determined by stimuli applied in the remote or immediate past. But no machine can respond to a stimulus not yet existing: a stimulus such as a goal or an aim to be realized in the future. In so far as living organisms do strive to realize such ends, and in so far as such strivings determine their behaviour, then clearly living organisms are radically different from machines.

McDougall's school, which is most often known, because of its insistence on purpose, as the purposive or hormic school, has been of profound service to psychology, if for no other reason than that it has drawn attention to the importance of the orectic processes. But recent psychological research has tended to raise the doubt whether instincts, in the rigid sense of the word, really exist at all. It seems at least that most of those tendencies which have been called instincts in the past are post-natal habits built upon vague inherited action-tendencies.

In the revolt against the purely intellectual conception of psychology, the greatest leader has been Dr. Sigmund Freud. As I have already said, he began, not as a psychologist at all, but as a doctor. His interests lay mainly in the study of the nervous system, its structure and its diseases. And he was led gradually, first by his contacts with the great J. M. Charcot at the Salpêtrière in Paris, and later by his work with Josef Breuer, to realize that at the bottom of an enormous number

of cases of neurosis was some past disturbance in the patient's emotional, and particularly sexual, life.

Freud had been experimenting with hypnotism as a method of probing into the patient's mind, for it had been found that under hypnotism the subject could recall events which were literally forgotten in his waking conscious. Dr. Breuer and he discovered that these forgotten events were very often the causes of future emotional disturbances in the patient, and that if they were recovered by the memory of his waking self, in a number of cases the disturbances tended to disappear.

It began to be clear that those philosophers and psychologists who had postulated that a part of our thinking was carried on unconsciously were correct. In particular, Herbart had been so, when he went as far as to discuss mental conflicts within this region; but Freud rapidly left far behind all these vague guesses which had been made by philosophers.

He soon abandoned the hypnotic method in favour of a conscious "talking out" process, retaining only those features of the discarded method which required a patient to recline comfortably and to relax completely. Thereafter the patient was asked to talk about whatever occurred to him, the only rule being that he kept nothing back. "If what comes up is trivial, tell it just the same," said the physician; "if it is embarrassing, let it come out."

Freud quickly noticed a recurrent phenomenon; time and again he was able to detect certain resistances on the part of the patient to exploring certain memories, resistances which became the fiercer the more he tried to break them down. It was obvious that there was some force at work in the patient's unconscious—a force which Freud eventually called the censorship—that imposed itself between these hidden thoughts, feelings, desires, or whatever they might be, and the patient's consciousness.

This method of talking-out a patient's complexes proved to be of immense value, but very slow. The resistance of the censorship was often very trying to both physician and patient;

and it was in seeking to improve the method that Freud, with a typically brilliant flash of genius, realized the value of dreams in his investigation. During sleep, it appeared that the censorship was less active; thoughts or phantasies in slight disguise were then permitted to reach the upper mental strata. By concentrating the talking-out method on the phantasies and events which happened to a patient in his dreams, Freud found he was able to proceed very much faster. The root of the emotional disturbance was laid bare much more quickly and easily.

The next phenomena which Freud encountered were of immense importance in the development of the theory of psycho-analysis, as his particular school of psychology soon came to be called. Freud noticed that some of the patients he had cured began to come back to him after a few years suffering from a similar neurosis. This suggested that the mere unearthing of a particular event in the patient's early emotional life was insufficient to cure the neurosis to which it had (so it was thought) given rise. And confirmation of this doubt had been furnished by certain very remarkable cases Freud had treated. In these cases, the patients had been women, and in each Freud had been rather surprised to discover a similar story—a story of a violent sexual assault upon the patient by an older male relative, while the patient was still a child. Freud had sought for outside confirmation of these stories, and he had been able to prove that in most cases they were quite untrue. Yet their importance in the patient's emotional life was clearly profound. He concluded that the "memories" of these imagined events, since they could not relate to fact, related to childish day-dreams. Now day-dreams, it is notorious, are born of unsatisfied desires. These stories then furnished evidence not of what *had* happened to the patient, but what the patient as a child *had desired* to happen.

If this were so, then clearly it confirmed his growing certainty that long-buried but emotionally disturbing events were not in themselves enough to explain the neurosis. Time and again he had been led back to sexual phenomena in the patient's

infancy, and he could no longer doubt that very early sexual life had a vitally important bearing on the neurotic's present state of mind. (From this discovery it is easy to see how Freud arrived at his theory of infantile sexuality, a theory which has claimed so much popular attention and disapproval.) It was, however, now equally clear that a too inconsiderately frustrated *desire*, and not a forgotten memory of a particular *happening*, was the cause of the patient's trouble.

Of this latter point confirmation was again forthcoming. Some of Freud's female patients, as the analysis approached its conclusion, began to exhibit every symptom of being in love with the physician himself. He was frequently confronted by situations so difficult and embarrassing as to discourage an investigator from further researches into the nature of neuroses. Freud's perseverance was, however, undaunted, and he began to see that one effect of the analysis which resuscitated a repressed childish desire, was to revive the desire in a new guise; it was transferred to another object. This "transference" is one of the most vital of the discoveries of psycho-analysis, and its importance in human development cannot be overestimated. Its importance to Freud in the early days of his research was that it led him to realize much more clearly the way in which cures could be effected. Once the particular repressed desire in the patient's unconscious was established, it remained necessary only to transfer it to a different object, to find, that is, a new outlet for its expression, and an outlet not in conflict with the accepted standards of the patient's adult life, in order to exercise its effects. Freud's success in this field offered the most emphatic confirmation of the correctness of his observations and conclusions. He was able to effect the most remarkable cures, and thus to demonstrate the soundness of the reasoning on which he had based them.

Long, however, before all these detailed observations had been worked out, Freud had realized that he had lighted upon something of much greater general interest than a method of treatment for neurosis. He was in process of building up an

entirely new general psychology, promising a measure of genuine scientific achievement, in striking contrast to what had so far been recorded in this field. It appeared as though the psychology of motives, in danger of dying from a surfeit of theory, had at last found its facts.

Freud's later work, and the work of the disciples who have followed him, make this seem more than ever likely, and to me and to all those who have undergone analysis, nearly certain; but the present very slight account of the historical background to Freud's theory is, unfortunately, all I can find space for in this book. It does, I hope, give some indication of the patient years of labour, research, and detailed observation which lie behind Freud's conclusions, however startling they may be.¹

¹ The detailed record of these early years, as well as an elaborate account of the development of psycho-analysis, is to be found in Freud's first books, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900); *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901); *Wit in Relation to the Unconscious* (1905); and in his essay on *The History of the Psycho-analytic Movement* (1914).

PART III

THE remainder of this chapter I shall devote to a short summary of Freud's theory of psychology, not in its relation to the cure of mental disorders, but as an analysis of human nature.

It will not have escaped the attention of those who have followed my argument that as between a normal person and a neurotic there is only one difference. The normal person has happily found outlet for those childhood desires, the violent suppression of which produced such disturbances in the abnormal person. In his books, *Psycho-pathology of Everyday Life*, and *Wit in Relation to the Unconscious*, Freud demonstrates that no one is wholly free from complexes of one sort or another. He analyses, with a wealth of impressive detail, an enormous number of everyday mental phenomena, such as slips of the tongue, instances of humour, lapses of memory, and so on, and shows how clearly each one of these can be related to suppressed wishes or thwarted impulses of which the victim is quite unaware. Here, once again, is evidence of this active force of repression arising from conflicting mental states; and it follows that it is not the existence of a mental conflict which distinguishes a neurotic from a normal person, but the manner in which he deals with it.

The common criticism of psycho-analysis that a study of the insane can never teach us anything of the sane can therefore be answered first by pointing out that in actual fact it does; and, secondly, by showing, as Freud has shown, that sane and insane are not two fundamentally different conditions, but merely comparative terms recording degrees of difference in a fundamentally similar condition.

The proper understanding of that fundamental condition must begin, according to Freud, with the very earliest years of the child. At birth, each of us is equipped with a number of basic urges or conative drives, which might usefully be called instincts, had not that word acquired a significance that would

attribute more to these urges than one is entitled to postulate. Freud himself uses the noncommittal German *Es* (meaning "it") which has been rendered into English as *Id*. The *Id* then consists of a series of primitive, innate strivings with which each person is initially provided; these can be divided into two groups: In the first group, called *ego* impulses (or sometimes self-preservative impulses), are all those well-known action-tendencies such as hunger, thirst, etc., whose workings are as direct as they are forceful. In the second group, which Freud calls the *libidinal* impulses (the *libido*), are all those strivings which are of a definitely sexual type.

It is to the understanding of this second group of impulses, and of the part it plays in human psychology, that Freud's work has contributed so much. In postulating the existence of definitely sexual urges in the child at birth, Freud is cutting right across the traditional view that sexuality is a phenomenon that appears only at puberty and matures in adult life. Secondly, Freud denies that the sexual impulse of adult life is in the least a simple and single force; it is, on the other hand, a highly complex organization elaborately developed from the *libido* over many years of childhood and adolescence.

This *libido* can be analysed roughly for convenience's sake into six distinct sets of impulses. The first three are auto-erotic, or self-regarding, and are distinctly associated with erotogenic zones of the body. If we number as (1) the *ego*-impulses, then the *libidinal* are (2) digestive tract erotisms, consisting of the *oral* impulses connected with the activities of the mouth, such as infantile sucking, and the *anal* impulses connected with the working of the anus in defaecation and *sadistic* and *masochistic* impulses, those impulses associated with the infliction of pain on others or seeking pain at the hands of others, and (3) the impulses connected directly with the *urethral* and *genital* zones.

The remaining three sets of impulses are not specifically related to erotogenic zones and all but the first are allo-erotic, or other-regarding. They are (4) *narcissistic*, or self loving,

and *scopophilic* and *exhibitionistic* impulses which prompt us to look or be looked at; (5) homo-sexual and hetero-sexual impulses. To all these must be added (6) *antagonism* springing from fear or from jealousy. From these main impulses are derived a series of less clearly defined impulses that are to be found in every stage of later development.

Each of these types of impulses plays an enormous part in the early life of the child, and their exercise is accompanied by feelings of pleasure that are purely erotic. This pleasure is generically the same as, although less intense than, that experienced by the adult in sexual intercourse.

It is idle to deny that Freud's classification of so many instincts as *sexual* has provoked much opposition. I have pointed out how very different is his conception of the sexual impulse from the traditional view and, although from the account I have given of Freud's work on neuroses it is possible to see how he may have *reasoned* to such premises, it is not to be thought that the evidence for his assertions consists in high-flown deductions from his observations. The light thrown by the investigation of pathological disturbances upon the fundamentals of human psychology made it plain that sexual feelings and interests in the child were a part of his normal psychic life, though certain of their possible effects might not be, and investigations of a range of cases which showed every appearance of normality confirmed this. This indirect evidence from the retrospective analysis of adults was corroborated by the direct evidence of analysed children; and external evidence, collected outside the sphere of psycho-analysis, has since added its weight.

It has been found, when children have been systematically observed, that ordinary caresses, such as stroking, can evoke erections in boy infants within their first few weeks. All doctors, nurses and mothers know that children, both boys and girls, are sometimes found to masturbate; this habit is commonly thought to be rare and abnormal and, in any case, to have nothing to do with psychology. But scientific study has now

proved that it is by no means rare, and that it starts at far earlier ages than had been supposed (e.g. in the first year); whilst mere common sense, noting the excitement produced, the cultivation of the habit and all the evidence of intense feeling connected with it, can no more doubt that this is a part of the child's psychological predisposition than that his play with his toes and his hands is so.

Finally, anthropological evidence has shown that where children are not carefully and elaborately kept away from sexual knowledge or stimulation they express the liveliest sexual interests, and even play the most involved sexual games as a matter of course from the earliest age. Malinowski's first-hand observations, incorporated in his *The Sexual Life of Savages*, established beyond all question the existence of infantile sexuality. It has also been proved by other anthropologists, notably by Roheim, in his report on his recent expedition to the centre of Australia, which not only gives an account of children, even of four years old, at distinctly erotic and sexual play, but also provides photographs showing a variety of what more civilized communities would call perverted actions, that can only be explained as survivals into adulthood of childhood sexual play and actions.

When we consider all these facts, it can no longer be doubted that there is such a thing as child sexuality. It is much more difficult to refute these arguments than it is to maintain that the prevalent objections to their admission are rather due to the repression of all sex, in the objectors themselves—a repression that has its roots in their own experience as children.

The existence of infantile sexuality makes the old adage, "The child is father to the man," true in a degree never imagined, and the broad picture which psycho-analysis has provided of the child's psychic life has furnished an invaluable key to the understanding of human nature. As we have seen, not only have all kinds of quite different disturbances in pathological cases been found to lead back to that same broad picture; but also normal adults have been analysed with the

same findings; and it has also been found that the "normal" world is full of similar phenomena—in folklore, anthropology, religion, and even daily life. In daily life, they occur in mild forms which no one notices; in religion they are not even considered as disturbances, but as right and desirable and sometimes even peculiarly wonderful! We meet with endless such cases from St. Simeon Stylites down to hysterical medicine men.

Bearing these facts in mind, it becomes highly important properly to understand the development of the child. This development—which, in fact, means the shaping of his whole personality—is determined obviously by the way in which his libidinal impulses find expression.

I do not wish it to be thought that Freud, or any psycho-analyst, neglects or attempts to diminish the part played in psychological development by *ego* impulses. They are obviously of immense importance; but it is to be noted that the function and the nature of these impulses are by no means fully understood as yet. Moreover, as is equally obvious, their expression is attended with far fewer restrictions than and hedged with none of the emotional attitudes which attend the expression of libidinal impulses. In consequence, their rôle is in a very real sense simpler and less in need of explanations. They act directly and immediately—a child in danger of falling clutches a chair, a child in want of food cries—and their thwarting results in immediate disaster. While a child's tendency to splash its food over the table may be slowly checked and corrected, its desire to eat is seldom thwarted. If it is, the child simply dies. That, in most cases, great pains are taken in the task of controlling and directing the more irresponsible and anti-social expressions of the child's *ego* impulses, is a matter of merest observation. A mother will expend almost infinite patience and gentleness in teaching a child to eat or drink correctly. How different is the case with the expression of the libidinal impulses! The first signs of a child's interest in its genital region produce a violent parental reaction; there is little gentleness or patience

here, and it is not to be wondered at that the child experiences far more difficulty in properly adjusting his libidinal impulses than he does in adjusting his equally important but—in the eyes of his parents—less reprehensible *ego* impulses.

For these reasons, the almost exclusive concern of the psychoanalytical school of psychology with the libidinal impulses, is completely justified; but it is only fair, in passing, to emphasize that the common misrepresentations of Freudian psychology as a body of thought which attributes a sexual motive to everything, has no shadow of justification.

Returning now to the subject of infantile sexuality; it is quite obvious that full and free expression of every impulse in a child is something which society does not tolerate. Indeed, a large part of a child's early years is taken up with learning—and often very painfully learning—which things it must not do. In normal cases, by the age of five the child has reached a stage when, according to the views of its parents, it has become a "well-behaved" infant. It has discarded (at least publicly) most of those habits which stamp a baby as lacking in taste and manners; it no longer sucks its finger loudly and with obvious satisfaction; its embarrassing interest in its excretory processes has disappeared; its tantrums whenever it was checked or corrected have given place to docility; its perverse habits of destroying the most cherished bric-à-brac in a home have been replaced by a growing sense of tidiness; and its distressing anatomical experiments on flies, spiders, puppies, and kittens have turned into gentle affection towards all little things. In other words, the child has been changed from a vicious little savage into a serene member of society. And society, or at least the child's parents, have profited in time and temper. But what of the child?

Those impulses which at one time, and so imperiously, urged the child to its wayward courses cannot just have disappeared. He was born with them, and they formed the most powerful part of his emotional make-up. They have simply been repressed. Now psychological repression is a very

different thing from mere self-control. A man who controls his ill-temper in face of his wife's persistent affability at breakfast is behaving as a rational being; he is well aware of the ill-temper, he is indeed acutely aware of it, but he consciously prevents it from usurping control of his behaviour.

Repression, on the contrary, involves no conscious process of control at all—or at least, not necessarily. The child is repeatedly confronted by situations in which, while the impulses urge him to do X, his experience warns him that the doing of X is likely to result in consequences so painful as quite to overshadow the pleasure which the doing of X might yield. He is also aware, perhaps, in a vague way that for reasons which he cannot understand, the doing of X will cause pain to his mother or father, as well as bring punishment.

He is at once torn by conflicting desires; and out of this and similar conflicts repression is born. Exactly how it takes place is not clearly understood; but it is well established that the adjusting psychological mechanisms eventually drive the suppressed desire entirely out of consciousness, and that therefore the force we have already referred to as the censorship effectively prevents its reappearance in consciousness.

This is but one of the reasons why repression may occur. Many of the impulses, urges, and desires of a child are intrinsically of a conflicting nature. Their expression frequently leads to fears and difficulties, from which he finds it easiest to escape by repressing, that is disowning and shutting out of his conscious mind the desires which create the trouble.

Unfortunately, however, it is a pure illusion that one in the least gets rid of desires in that way. They continue to act in all kinds of indirect ways as forces which, because *unconscious* now, are also uncontrollable. Sometimes they affect conscious conduct in all kinds of disguised or partial or attenuated forms. Sometimes in consciousness there appears the very opposite of the repressed wishes, in the form of an attempt to hold them in check at all costs, though an attempt which (we often discover) cannot be taken at its face value.

To summarize the foregoing, we may say that when antagonisms between desires are sufficiently acute, the more difficult or troublesome fades away from one's consciousness. Yet it still carries on its own existence. And it affects our conduct while it is unconscious. If the idea is not a simple one, but compounded of many thoughts or feelings, it is known as a *complex*. Complexes may be called sentiments gone wrong—their place in a neurotic symptom is like that of sentiments in a normal personality. Neurosis may be explained as a condition where complexes exist that, being incapable of integration into a harmonious character-whole, express themselves symbolically in the form of "symptoms."

The solution, by way of repression, though in a rough way it works, is far indeed from disposing of the matter. The matter cannot, indeed, be disposed of. Those conflicts are an unalterable part of the child's experience and history, and his later experience cannot help inheriting the stamp of the earlier.

To say simply, however, that the matter cannot be disposed of requires qualification. Some of the strong desires of childhood may become naturally "conditioned" in the same way as Pavlov's famous dogs were conditioned to salivate at the sound of a bell, instead of at the sight and smell of food. Emotional interests in this or that object may gradually be attached to utterly different objects; what might formerly have been called vulgar curiosity we may now call a spirit of scientific enquiry, but the motive power behind each is the same. Thus may grow up an immense number of new and "dignified" interests powered entirely by the "disreputable" urges of our childhood. But in these cases, provided the new interests adequately supply the need for outlet of the original urge, our emotional problem is solved, and no complex is likely to be formed. The mechanism has been satisfactorily re-adjusted to a new environment; it has not been crippled and thwarted by self-expression.

The process of evolving a new outlet for the expression of a primitive desire is known as *sublimation*. I have already referred in passing to the fact of "transference." This principle,

sometimes known as displacement, appears to operate very extensively. Freud himself maintains that it is at the basis of all the major intellectual pursuits of civilized man; that it is, in fact, the basis of all art, all science, and all religion.

Its operation can be shown simply, although not quite accurately, by an illustration: A young man has a normal and healthy interest in a young woman; but one day, as is the way of young men, he may develop a new interest in a motor-cycle, and for a time his interest in the young woman may become utterly submerged. His world, which previously revolved round her person, now revolves only under the wheels of his new machine; she has no place in his thoughts, and no part in his activities. So much does he become centred in his new pursuit that it is impossible to resist the conclusion that the urges or desires which previously provided the energy for his activities in her direction have themselves been diverted or *transferred* to motor-cycling.

In the case of motor-cycles, such transference may be, and generally is, temporary, but in many other cases, both in young children and in adults, transference may be permanent. Exactly why it should occur is another of those questions which could only be answered, if at all, from a deep knowledge of the particular circumstances; that it does occur is, however, a matter of record. Sometimes it is to be explained on the basis of readjustment of interests. Again, in many cases of emotional stress, it is a well-known fact that a strongly developed interest in some utterly unrelated subject proves of service in that we "take refuge" from our troubles in a different world; thus a thwarted child, whose whole life is one long limitation, is behaving in only a less effective way when he constructs an elaborate daydream world, than the unhappy grown-up who forgets his professional troubles in a passionate interest in his garden.

The most significant fact about transference, however, is not so much its usefulness in providing an escape from mental conflict or emotional stress, as its power to fasten to the new

interest the energy which has been attached to those superseded. In addition, the conflicts or the desires which are left behind are gradually, and quite unwittingly so far as the subject is concerned, relegated to the unconscious. Thus a man's interest in astronomy may gradually oust from his mind all his previous concern with religion or art, and he will pursue his new study with the enthusiasm that he previously devoted only to the old.

It is necessary to note in passing that Freud uses the word sublimation in a more narrow sense than I have here. For him, it relates only to those cases in which there is displacement in infantile eroticism. I have used it here in a more general sense, because it is not possible in this book to enter into a sufficiently detailed account of exactly how repression, sublimation, and transference co-operate to develop and mould the character of the growing infant, to justify its restricted meaning.

By the time the child has reached his fifth year, when, as I have already said, his character has become moulded to his environment, the various psychological adjustments he has made have been very numerous. With luck, he will have avoided building up many serious complexes, but it is at once obvious that his attitude towards his parents must have become involved.

To simplify the matter, let us take the case of a male child and his mother. She is at once the protector and the provider of his young life; she cherishes, comforts, and loves him. He feels towards her a growing tenderness and affection which it is only possible to class as erotic. She is at the same time the being who thwarts him, restricts him, corrects him, and punishes him; and because of these activities he hates her. His attitude is, in other words, double or *ambivalent*; but, except in quite abnormal cases, love is easily the predominant feeling; and, because of it, he has been able to effect many repressions which otherwise might have proved impossible.

What is true in the case of his mother is also true, but in a far more complex way, in the case of his father. The boy both loves and hates him, and here especially, his feelings are intensified by the emotion of jealousy. The boy resents the

claims which his father makes on his mother's time; he looks upon him as a rival for her affections.

Freud's researches have shown that by the age of five the child's libidinal impulses have become integrated. Their initial disconnected expression has gone, and they have been resumed into a hierarchy in which the definitely sexual impulses connected with the genital regions are predominant. This integration precedes, and, indeed, prepares the way for, an extended period of quiescence, which Freud calls the "latency period." Thereafter, the genital impulses do not become active again until the approach of adolescence.

But this integration (which has been partly achieved by the operation of family discipline and other factors leading to repressions and displacements) has an immense bearing upon the emotional crisis through which the child is passing, in relation to its parents. A situation has been reached in which the boy's sexual jealousy desires his father's destruction. The situation is exactly comparable to that of Oedipus in Greek mythology. Oedipus was the unhappy youth who, with no conscious intention to do so at all, killed his father and married his mother. It is for this reason that Freud has aptly named this the Oedipus situation.

Its importance in the development of the child is overwhelming; according to how he solves this situation will his adult life be easy or otherwise. Against his jealousy, it must be remembered, are opposed many factors, not the least of which are his love and admiration for his father. This admiration breeds emulation, for to the child the father is the all-powerful, all-knowing ideal.

The conflict is always acute, and frequently disastrous; but normally the child's "better" feelings triumph over his libidinal impulses, which become repressed. The act of repression, however, can only be effected by a power which is stronger than they are, and the child finds this power by adopting as his own the restraints and prohibitions imposed by his parents. Thus is evolved what Freud calls the *super-ego*, by means of which

he is able to lock into the unconscious the disruptive, libidinal impulses by which he was formerly dominated.

It is not too much to say that the child thereafter becomes a different being. In his consciousness are left only "aim-restricted" impulses, his tenderness towards his mother and his father, and so on. But this change has been effected only at the price of driving into the unconscious most of the concomitants of the *libido* and much of his *super-ego* besides. To this fact may be attributed the extremely vague and disjointed memory which most people retain of their earliest years; few conscious memories carry us farther back than our fifth year. These lost "memories" have been made a sacrifice on the altar of our respectability.

To round off this very short sketch of childhood development, it is necessary to add that the situation which obtains in the case of a boy also obtains, but with the roles of the parents reversed, and in a slightly more complicated but less intense way in the case of the girl. Such is then known as the *Electra* situation.

It has now, I hope, become easier to see how vitally important are the first years of an individual's life to his subsequent development. All the mass of conflicting desires, urges, impulses, thoughts, and wishes which have yielded to the forces of parental discipline and other facts, and have been buried in the unconscious, are still operative factors. They continue to influence behaviour in an immense variety of ways, some of which are fairly obvious, some of which are subtle, some of which are, frankly, so astonishing as to provoke utter disbelief and even ridicule when, discovered by the penetrating methods of psycho-analysis, they are published.

In so far as the repressions have not resulted in too morbid complexes, in so far rather as the individual has effected a satisfactory sublimation or made a successful transference, this trying process may be accounted successful. But the seeds of acute misery in adult life may have been planted during this time unless this has been done; excessive repressions in childhood cause terrible neuroses in later life.

I am very well aware that this chapter does no sort of justice to the science of psychology in general, nor to the theory of psycho-analysis in particular. I plead that I alone must be the judge of what is, and what is not, strictly germane to my purpose in this book, and that this book is not, in any sense of the word, a text-book of psycho-analysis, or even a review of psychological progress. I have arbitrarily selected my position, and I have, also arbitrarily, defined it within the limits of usefulness to my main theme. But as I recognize that I have treated as proven much that is still theory, have left unexplained much that may be obscure, have neglected more that may yet prove of immense value to psychology, I desire to make some slight amends by assuring any readers who have been interested, or any other readers who have been made indignant, by this short account, that I am under no delusions as to its limitations. I can do little to pacify the indignant reader except to refer him to the rest of this book which will, I trust, make plain my purpose, and make pardonable my series of omissions in this chapter.¹

¹ For the interested reader I can at least do this—recommend him to a study of the following books:

The most exhaustive account of the early history of psychology is Brett's, but (except for its misinformative account of analysis) a satisfactory shorter one is G. Murphy's. The recent history is best handled systematically by J. C. Flugel's *A Hundred Years of Psychology* and topically by C. Spearman's *Psychology down the Ages*.

As a general introduction to the various schools of psychology, including a concise account of psycho-analysis, I would refer him to Professor R. S. Woodworth's *Contemporary Schools of Psychology* (Methuen), 1931. For a more detailed study of psycho-analysis, I would ask him to consult, besides the books of Freud already mentioned (see footnote on page 40), Anna Freud's introduction to *Psycho-analysis for Teachers* (Allen & Unwin), 1931, and J. C. Flugel's *Introduction to Psycho-analysis* (Gollancz), 1932.

CHAPTER III

THE ROOTS OF SOCIAL ETHICS

IN this chapter I wish to discuss some subjects that are of vital concern to the ordinary man, but are seldom thought about except by philosophers. I am concerned with the problem on the answer to which the whole of our moral endeavours must hang; namely, the problem as to what is the goal at which man ought to aim, and as to which of the desires and needs he seeks to satisfy are good.

Such a discussion must be undertaken by anyone who conscientiously seeks to contribute to the betterment of human relationships, and although, at first sight, it may seem to many people to involve a consideration of the obvious, or, to others, to smack too much of sophistry, it is not one that can be avoided here. Only by carefully considering these problems can one decide with any honesty upon a moral yard-stick, and without a moral yard-stick that can stand the test of rigorous criticism, the writer on social ethics is as foolish as that type of motorist who scarcely thinks of where he wants to go, or of whether it is a suitable place to go, but only of how quickly he may get there.

Before I begin on such a discussion, however, I wish to offer a word of warning to those (and my experience tells me they are many) who, misled by much superficial nonsense that is talked by ill-informed people about the discoveries of psychology, have come to believe that that science has knocked the bottom out of morality, and paved the way for a return to that world of licence which, as the wise old Hobbes was among the first to see, gave man a life that was "nasty, brutish, and short."

It must be confessed that some psychologists have rather added to this misunderstanding for, in their determination to preserve a proper detachment in their studies, they have taken

little recognition of popular labels, such as vicious or virtuous, and the impression has accordingly been spread that such scientists can see no difference between right and wrong.

Such an impression is, of course, unfounded, and is based upon that well-nigh universal failing—a refusal to distinguish between analysis and judgment. Yet it is idle to deny that psychology is profoundly influencing ethics, and, indeed, I for one hope that it may continue to do so with ever greater effect. It is influencing ethics, primarily, in the number of actions which it refuses to condemn; it is also influencing ethics because *tout comprendre* generally implies *tout pardonner*. But nothing it has discovered or ever will discover can destroy the social necessity for ethical judgments or detract from the validity of those which are valid.

In the last chapter I outlined a sketch of the machinery which operated in man, and endeavoured to give a slight account of why man sometimes behaved in what is called an abnormal manner. I tried to show how what we call character is formed, and how, if from some cause, the machinery is interfered with, the most unpleasant consequences may result until it is put right. A man, in other words, may become what we call irresponsible and perform acts of which society highly disapproves. In such circumstances, we can scarcely call the offender a criminal. To admit that is not the same thing as calling society wrong for disapproving of his action. In this instance, psychology has clearly shown that not all people who offend against the social code could, with advantage, be beheaded or sent to life-long imprisonment, but it has not either condemned or approved the social code itself.

Again, I tried to show that modern psychological research has furnished scientific evidence for the fact (which, after all, most of us know) that we often call good what we desire, rather than desire what we call good, and condemn what we dislike, rather than dislike what we ought to condemn. Put in another way, it simply illustrates that the motives people often profess for their actions are not, in fact, always the real

motives which underlie them. The real motives, as we have seen, may be deeply buried unconscious urges of which the victim is quite unaware. In such cases, it is clear that certain actions or beliefs may be determined not so much by moral perceptions as by personal idiosyncrasies—in which category we must include those psychological factors which operate unconsciously. It would be unwise, therefore, to attach the same importance to a moral judgment which we suspect is so determined as to one that is not; psychology, therefore, bids us beware of accepting at its face-value any and every profession of morality.

Such a warning from such an authority is all to the good, but again it does not affect the validity of ethics. Indeed, it is not difficult to see that psychology, in disentangling much that is spurious in our moral beliefs, has emphasized rather than detracted from the importance of ethics. It has helped us to understand our desires, and it has laid bare many of our motives; it has, in fact, cleared the stage for what are—from a social point of view—the more pertinent problems, namely, as to which desires and which motives are to be encouraged in ourselves and which resisted. It has, furthermore, shown us some of the consequences of thwarting certain of our desires, and in so far as those consequences are good or bad (a question psychology is not called upon to answer) has helped us to decide how far restraint should be carried.

Psychology, we may conclude, is of the greatest possible service to ethics. It is not, and cannot be, a substitute for ethics. And were every problem of psychology solved, the problem “How ought man to behave?” would not be among them.

We can then expect only valuable *guidance* from psychology in our endeavours to answer such problems as: “How ought man to behave?” “What ends ought to be promoted?” We cannot expect psychology to furnish complete answers.

These two questions have agitated the minds of men ever since they first began to think, and they have been the special study of religious leaders and of philosophers for countless

centuries. But while the latter have attempted to answer them by seeking to establish first of all what meaning we can attach to the word "good," the former have, on the whole, been content to assume that the word "good" was perfectly meaningful to themselves and to everybody else.

Now it is one of the best attested facts of history that the conception of what is good varies enormously from age to age and from place to place. It has been said by a contemporary wit that if one is born in London, one grows up to believe automatically that Jesus Christ was the son of God, and that it is wicked to have more than one wife at a time; but if one is born some eight hundred miles to the east, one grows up to believe in an equally automatic way that Allah is God, that Mahomet is His Prophet, and that one may have four wives.

Such a variation in moral and religious belief is merely illustrative of the general principle that there is almost nothing thought wrong to-day which at some time in the past has not been approved, and scarcely anything approved to-day which at some time in the past has not been condemned.

Is it then possible, in this welter of conflicting ideas, to disentangle any single factor or to assert of it that this and this only is the one good? In my view, only a very wise or a very foolish man will dare to answer that question confidently, either one way or the other. It is a question which has engaged the attention of philosophers for thousands of years, but it is one which their deliberations do not appear to have brought measurably nearer a solution. The prevalence and the popularity of such tags as *De gustibus non est disputandum* and *Chacun à son gout* illustrates how widespread is the notion that final judgments are illusory. Yet, strangely enough, this acceptance of the idea that any attempted objective judgment is waste of time is often found most strongly held by an individual who believes fervently that in one or another matter he has himself found a timeless and universally correct solution. Thus a man who is most humble in his aesthetic

judgments, asserting that only personal preference determines whether Beethoven is a better composer than Bach, or Vermeer a better painter than Rembrandt, will at the same time make the most downright condemnation in moral matters and attach to his judgments that objective validity the possibility of which in the matter of aesthetics he has humbly doubted.

Amidst so much confusion it is indeed difficult to see clearly. I have pointed out that no social reformer is being either honest or helpful unless he first clearly defines and successfully defends his conception of the goal at which humanity should aim. I have pointed out that philosophers have failed, despite years of search, to formulate a definition of this goal which has won universal acceptance. I have pointed out that social morality varies with place and with time; and I have pointed out, finally, that the individual man entertains two conflicting beliefs in the matter—the first that, generally speaking, all judgments reveal only personal preferences; and the second that, individually speaking, he himself knows what is objectively right in at least one subject.

I have no space here impartially to review the multifarious answers which, during man's history, have been propounded to the question "what is good?" I can, having made clear some of the many difficulties that lie in the path of anyone seeking that answer, only sketch very roughly what seem to me to be two main ethical theories. The first of these is found principally in the world's great religions. It may be described as the "will of God" theory. Each one of us, so this theory asserts, is furnished with an "inner voice," as Socrates called it, or a "conscience," as Christians call it, which determines for us what we *ought* to do. We disobey it at our peril; for most religions make provision for a scheme of rewards and penalties, not necessarily in this life, but more generally in a life hereafter, when we shall receive our due, the good being rewarded and the wicked punished. Such rewards and punishments, however, are incidental to the essentials of this theory, the

critical contention of which is that our inner voice is a God-given faculty, enabling us clearly and distinctly to perceive what is good and what is evil.

Moreover, the Good on this view becomes indefinable, unless such a definition as "the Will of God" is thought to be something more than tautological. It is pointed out, for example, that if Good means anything at all, it must mean an ultimate; it is, in fact, the final value *in terms of which* we pass judgment on acts and objects which are not themselves final. Thus we say that a man or an action is Good; we cannot say that Good is a man or an action. If anyone asserts that X is good, we first think what we know about X and then what we know about Good, we confirm or deny the assertion. But it is quite clear that no one who agreed with the assertion, for example, that the Archbishop of Canterbury was Good would therefore in future think that the words "Archbishop of Canterbury" and the word "Good" were synonymous. One could not assert, at least meaningfully, "That's an Archbishop of Canterbury shot" when a football player scores a goal.

We only identify, then, a man or an action with the Good, in the limited sense of "partake of"; to assert that Mr. X is good is not to assert as we see that Mr. X and goodness are one and the same, but that Mr. X in his way of life "partakes of" or "manifests" goodness. Indeed, so this theory argues, it is evident that goodness cannot be defined in any other terms than itself, for definition implies explaining the less known in terms of the better, or of explaining the immediate in terms of the ultimate. If, then, goodness *could* be defined in other terms, those terms would be themselves more ultimate, which by definition they cannot be. To assert, therefore, that goodness is patience, or courage, or sympathy, or happiness, or X is to be illogical. Patience, courage, sympathy, happiness, or X may be goods, they cannot be the Good.

It follows that the Good is indefinable; it does not follow that the Good is unknown. We perceive what is good by (it is asserted) our innate faculty, a faculty given us, as was said,

by God or a Supreme Power. In obeying the dictates of this power, in obeying the Will of God, we are acting morally.

There are, however, many obvious objections to this theory, one of the chief of which is to explain wrong-doing or sin. If God is all-powerful, it would seem to follow that His Will must be obeyed; if then we fail to obey the dictates of our inner voice, which, it is asserted, is in some sense the Will of God, either God is not all-powerful or our inner voice is not the Will of God. The various explanations of this difficulty, some profound, many only ingenious, need not detain us. They are all largely bound up with that vexed question, Free Will, which we shall be discussing later, and I need only say that those of them which do provide an answer to the objection, only do so by raising further questions even more difficult to answer.

But there are two further objections which we may note to this theory, one of which is philosophical, the other of which is scientific. The former in effect carries us back to our starting-point. How does this theory of an Objective and Universal Good help us to account for the multiplicity of morals and the acute disagreement to which they give rise? If the Good is in fact clearly perceived by every individual, by means of the faculty of conscience, why do people quarrel so violently as to what is Good? To substitute Will of God for Good is useless, for God cannot have more than one Will.

Again, the answers to this objection seem to me to be inadequate. They range from the Socratic conception of ignorance to the Christian notion of original sin and are partly indistinguishable from those to which we have already referred.

The latter objection, the scientific objection, is, however, in my view overwhelming. It takes the form of an analysis of "conscience" which on examination turns out to be no more than the result of experiencing in early years inhibitions by our parents. "We imbibe our consciences with our mother's milk, and learn them at our nurse's knees."

In the last chapter I said enough about the psychological

determinants of character during childhood to make clear my meaning in this connection, and it may confidently be asserted that Freudian mechanisms alone can explain the formation of the consciences which, we are told, are the voice of God.

If, then, for the reasons I have given, we cannot accept the notion that an indefinable objective Good is the *natural* goal of all humanity, we are left with the alternative of seeking a definition of Good which is both meaningful and universally acceptable. Let us examine the alternative theory of ethics to which I referred.

This theory has appeared in one form or another ever since the earliest times. It was known to the Greeks as Hedonism, and in our own day still appears under some such title as the Pleasure-Pain theory. There are, however, two distinct theories of Hedonism, so distinct that in fact they cannot be said to share any features in common except the name. It is customary to distinguish them as "psychological Hedonism" and "ethical Hedonism."

The former, psychological Hedonism, is in all essentials the theory of the famous Jeremy Bentham. Although he himself does not state it quite so precisely, it may be summarized as an assertion that man is so constituted that he is incapable of desiring anything but happiness, and that, as a consequence, his actions are all determined by his desires to acquire pleasure or to avoid its opposite.

We may begin our account of this view by pointing out that while some people doubt whether happiness is the *only* good, no one doubts that it is *a* good. Let us assume for a moment then that there are other goods or values besides happiness, such as courage, patience, beauty, truth, good living, friendship, and so on. But why and for what are these other goods valued? For themselves alone? Surely not, but for the happiness that their enjoyment confers upon whomever possesses them. It is unnecessary to labour the point further. It is not difficult (these hedonists say) to see that any action, however unselfish it may be called, can be analysed in such a way as

to show that the motive behind it was the acquisition of maximum pleasure.

A man who braves the perils of a burning house to rescue a child is commonly held to be virtuous. On this view, however, he is merely selfish; for, by his action, he is at best confessing that to him the sight of suffering in others is more painful than the risk of suffering to himself, or, more likely, that he fears social disapproval more than flames, and that gratitude and social approbation give him enough satisfaction to outweigh the pain he may suffer from burns, etc.

This analysis may seem cynical; but if good be truly no more than the promotion of happiness, and the avoiding of pain, then indeed the rescuer's action is good. He has promoted the happiness of the child, and protected it from pain, and he has promoted what seems to him his own maximum happiness.

Bentham went on to argue that since man could desire only pleasure, it was useless to ask whether he could also desire other things as good. Either, therefore, good was meaningless, or it meant pleasure or happiness. That being so, ethics ceased to be a moral science, it became the science of promoting happiness. We need not follow out the steps by which Bentham tried to show that an enlightened pursuit of happiness by the individual automatically involved the greatest happiness of the greatest number. This last, at any rate, became Bentham's criterion of the Good and was immortalized as a famous maxim.

The above theory of psychological Hedonism, however, though it has many followers even to-day, will not bear examination.

Modern psychological study has completely destroyed the premise that man is actuated entirely by his desire to avoid pain or acquire pleasure, and by nothing else at all. Apart from the various considerations which were adduced in Chapter II, there are others which show directly that man is capable of desiring, and often does desire, many things beside pleasure.

Incidentally, on this view vice would be meaningless. To

call a man vicious would mean simply that in our view he had chosen a course of action that did not promote happiness. He had made, that is, an error of judgment; but since he would be by definition incapable of desiring anything that was not good (which is happiness) he clearly was no more guilty or guiltless than in any other error of judgment he might commit, such as in a financial transaction. These two errors of judgment would be exactly equal in kind; the first, however, may excite what we call moral indignation; the second, in certain circumstances, amusement or pity. This could clearly be impossible if Bentham's view were correct. It cannot then be held to square with everyday evidence; to put it more technically, it fails to account for the very real fact of moral feeling. In fact, gratification of desire does not fill us with a sense of moral elevation.

This theory, moreover, has been satisfactorily answered by a series of philosophers from Green and Berkeley to John Dewey. Dr. C. D. Broad, in his book, *Five Types of Ethical Theory*, sums up the objections in a form which has become classic. After pointing out that only experience can tell us which actions satisfy our desires, and that, lacking such experience, we cannot know whether a particular action is going to produce pleasant consequences or not, he refers to the assertion that all our actions are determined only by our desire for happiness, and proceeds to prove that the human race could never have survived were it so. For a new-born babe is entirely without experience; it cannot know, therefore, that sucking is an action likely to result in pleasure, and, not knowing that, it would not suck. It would, therefore, starve to death. As it does not do so, but does in fact suck immediately it is put to the breast, it is clear that its action is determined by something other than a desire for happiness. We must conclude although the desire for happiness may be a cause of action, it cannot be the only cause of action. Psychological hedonism, therefore, is untenable.

The second form of hedonism, ethical hedonism is, however, of a very different sort. It is true that it postulates that the

Good is the Ultimately Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number, but it arrives at that view by entirely different steps. It grants that man is capable of desiring other things besides happiness; that, in fact, it is possible to postulate one or another of many objectives as the supreme good. It does, in fact, say, however, that there is only one supreme good, and that that good is happiness.

We may grant that "conscience," or, at least, a strong moral imperative, is an inescapable fact of experience, and that its working may be observed in those actions which are commonly described as virtues. Whether there is any exact philosophical definition of this moral imperative is doubtful, but it can be described as an innate urging towards a course of action which may not necessarily benefit us, but of which this moral feeling approves. That which it does approve we currently call good; that of which it disapproves bad.

On the face of it, this admission would appear to mean only that every man is his own judge of what is right. But despite the disagreements about moral issues, to which I have already referred, it is possible to make an analysis of the ends to which moral urges direct people, and such an analysis reveals that on the whole the ends promoted are thought to promote happiness.

Now the individual who begins to reflect about his moral behaviour will quickly discover that at first he approved principally of those things which fostered his own well-being, which gave him happiness, but that gradually his moral approval was extended to embrace those things which gave his family and his friends happiness, and, finally, which gave the maximum happiness for everyone. And these latter stages involve the acceptance of what is called unselfishness, namely an approval of certain courses of action which promote the welfare of others even at the expense of himself.

This development is a fact of experience, a fact as common but as unanalysable as the greenness of grass. As such it cannot be argued about; it just occurs. The existence of the

moral "ought" and the way in which it grows is the prime fact of any ethical theory, difficult as it may be satisfactorily to explain it.

Equally it is evident that in full maturity the moral "ought" operates to bring about those circumstances in which are to be found the maximum happiness of everyone. If this be doubted, let us assume for a moment that the ends desired by the moral "ought" are analysed into the happiness they promote, and into X, the sum of their other contents. It has been urged that the true goal of morals is to be found in X, and this argument consists in no more than the assertion, which we have already examined and rejected, that there is an ultimate, unanalysable Good.

It would seem to follow, then, that since the aim of morality cannot be anything intrinsic in X, it must by elimination inhere within, or consist of, the happiness content of the end as a whole. And there is another strong reason for assuming this view is correct.

Is it possible to hold that an action which produces no happiness for anyone on however a long-term view, is a morally desirable action? Surely it would be more normal on the whole to conclude that any objective or action would cease to appeal to our moral sense if it were devoid of its quality of producing happiness, or mitigating unhappiness, for ourselves or someone else. In theory, indeed—although this may not happen in practice, because of the influence of personal motives—in theory most of us would go further, and say that unless the alleged moral action or object resulted in the happiness of the majority number, it could not be held moral.

We may summarize this argument as follows:

In the first place, the existence of a moral sense is a fact of experience, and this moral sense develops until it desires those actions and objects, one of the prominent aspects of which is the fact that they produce happiness for the greatest number. In the second place, personal reflection inclines one on the whole to thinking of the greatest happiness of the greatest

number throughout the greatest period of time as one of the fundamentals of the supreme good. In the third place, any attempt to identify the supreme good with anything other than happiness breaks down. Whatever is asserted to be the supreme good must always be assessed in terms of the happiness it produces for the greatest number. It is valued as a means to happiness for the majority if it be truly valuable, and in consequence it is happiness and not the other thing which is the ultimate and supreme good. Finally, no action which does not result in happiness for the majority can be held to be morally desirable.

We may conclude, therefore, that Jeremy Bentham's maxim "The greatest happiness of the greatest number" is a perfectly safe moral yard-stick, although we must reject the arguments by which he reached this conclusion.

This theory, ethical hedonism, is, as I am aware, by no means universally accepted. But, in my view, it accounts for more facts and accounts for them better than any other theory. It accepts the existence of a moral sense, without in the least controverting the psychological analysis of conscience; it provides an intelligible yard-stick for the evaluation of individual and social behaviour. It accounts adequately for differences of moral opinion which arise partly from disorganization in or arrested development of the moral sense, and partly from errors of judgment as to which course of action will most surely produce the desired end. Finally, it accounts for and makes intelligible vice—the conscious pursuit of courses of action which do not promote the desired end.

All this it does, and the arguments which are brought against it are from expediency, or else invariably of a purely logical nature. It is said that happiness is hard to measure; but then so are alternative goods, like beauty or character, even if the point were pertinent. For the rest, the arguments consist in such assertions already examined, as that attempts to equate the Good with any other term are either meaningless or tautological. They need not concern us here. But it is necessary to

point out that as it stands the theory is, for purposes of practical use, incomplete. In the first place, the number of factors which will make people happy is infinite. They range from philanthropy to sadism. Yet the existence of this multitude of facts need not limit the applicability of our maxim.

We have first to remember that we are concerned not simply with happiness *per se*, but with the greatest happiness of the greatest number for the greatest possible time. We may begin our analysis by stating generally that whatever is capable of promoting the happiness of any individual may be considered as potential good. Whether it should be pursued, however, is a different matter; for it is evident that not all activities which intrinsically promote pleasure are equally desirable. Opium smoking and walking in the country are both pleasurable occupations, but they are not equally *good*.

Some pleasures, it is a truism, are better than others. Therefore, the good man is not he who strives to promote *any* pleasure but the best pleasures. Only experience, of course, can teach us which are the best pleasures, and it is because of ignorance as much as because of personal idiosyncrasies in taste that people disagree about what is good. Tastes may be and are educated. The man whose palate has grasped the delights of a Château-Yquem may remember with amused horror his childhood passion for synthetic lemonade and ginger-ale.

What then are the rules which determine which pleasures shall be promoted? How may we decide, in other words, which pleasures are to be pursued? The answer is simple to state, but not always easy to follow; it is, ultimate quantity of pleasure. Whichever pleasure gives the most satisfaction in the course of time may be accounted the best.

There are thus several ways in which we may evaluate pleasures. Duration of happiness (or abbreviated duration of unhappiness) is one. A pleasure of lasting character is to be preferred, other things being equal, to a transitory one. Conversely, an unpleasant experience, of transitory character,

such as, for example, a surgical operation, is to be preferred to an enduring one, such as a long illness.

Its distribution among the largest number of sentient creatures is a second. For as many living beings as possible to share in a pleasure increases its total amount, and, in many cases, does so more than arithmetically, since each gets an added pleasure reflected from the feeling of the others. In the same way, as few as possible should share in a sorrow, except in so far as to do so gives a consolation of sympathy.

Sureness, or probability, that the expected happiness will really occur is a third! If, as between two possible pleasures equal in other respects, one is more likely than the other to be realized by our efforts, this one is to be preferred.

Poignancy of the pleasure or sorrow is the last. It is to be noted that the intensity of enjoyment of an experience is not necessarily proportional to the objective aspect of the experience. There is a law of diminishing returns here. Weber, experimenting on sensations such as that of pressure, found that if a pressure of a pound had to be increased by two ounces for the difference to be noticed, then a pressure of two pounds would have to be increased by four ounces to be noticed. But it is doubtful whether it gives as much pleasure to a man whose salary is two thousand pounds a year when it is raised by two hundred pounds, as it does to a man whose salary is only one thousand pounds and has it raised by one hundred pounds. Moreover, the intensity of the enjoyment may even be reversed by the intensity of experience. Thus, a pleasant faint perfume becoming strong may become unpleasant.

Bentham, in his classic exposition of the theory of hedonism, asserted that quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as poetry. Now, to most sensitive people, it is clear that poetry is better than push-pin, and many of his disciples followed the lead of his chief disciple, J. S. Mill, who endeavoured to escape from the dilemma in which he felt his master had placed him by insisting on quality as well as quantity of pleasure.

A piggish pleasure, said Mill, is not to be considered as valuable as is a refined pleasure. Such a qualification, however, either is merely tautological, or it destroys the whole theory. What is it that makes a refined pleasure more valuable than a piggish pleasure? If the answer be the greater happiness it confers, than it means simply that refined pleasures give *more* happiness than piggish pleasures. If so, the quantitative yard-stick holds good still. If the answer is an assertion that refined pleasures contain a quality, call it X or what you like, that piggish pleasures do not contain, then what is valuable in refined pleasures is not happiness but X. It follows that X is what we should strive after, and not happiness—a conclusion which, as I said, destroys the case of hedonism.

Any attempt, then, to distinguish between qualities of pleasure is mistaken. But it is not therefore to be thought that the common distinction we all draw between refined and piggish pleasures is itself mistaken. The former are indeed more valuable than the latter. Let us consider a piggish pleasure, gluttony, and a refined pleasure, poetry. Gluttony gives enjoyment at the time. But afterwards our health suffers. Also, gluttony often deprives others of their share of the bounty. Thus gluttony is a pleasure having no other dimension than that of personal and immediate intensity.

Poetry, however, gives immediate enjoyment, just as does gluttony, but instead of undermining the health and so making the enjoyment even of the same pleasure less keen on the occasion of the next indulgence, to say nothing of creating distress in the stomach, good poetry increases the capacity for enjoying still more such poetry on subsequent days. Moreover, it in no wise diminishes the ability of other persons to enjoy the same poems, but on the other hand becomes the means that moves us to add to their happiness in the case where the poem is of a type to inspire us to be sympathetic.

We may conclude, then, that refined pleasures are those in fact which add most to our maximum happiness; and that enlightened utilitarians will always prefer them to those which

we call piggish. We require, that is, discernment and intelligence in our choice of pleasures as much as we require such aids to living in any other walk of life.

An objection which is often brought against this analysis is that it is not convenient to calculate the happiness involved in every case where we are faced with the need for a decision. Therefore, according to these objectors, we should prefer some other standard such as that of, say, its conformity with the thosiac code, which is put down in black and white, and is therefore easier to apply.

Actually, however, many of the substitute standards which are suggested are no more tangible or simple to measure with than is the hedonic yard-stick. But let us suppose that something else were found which would always be easy of application. We have already considered this point, but we can amplify it here conveniently.

What would be the use of selecting some measuring rod this deliberate way, unless it has as great an appeal to people as happiness has? You may say that all men ought to take as their guide in conduct one of the various forms of the golden rule: "Do unto others as you would have them do to you." But immediately they hear you, they first start to judge this golden rule itself. And, consciously or unconsciously, they will judge the rule by whether we all should or should not be happier if we all followed it in every case. If some one thinks: "I do not like my host to fill my plate with cabbage, just because he would like me to fill his plate with cabbage," then he is doubting whether there are not some exceptions to the golden rule. Perhaps its sponsor then explains that one must ~~as~~ apply the rule so minutely; one must say only that we good as like the host to fill our plate with food we enjoy, as we poetry is ~~to~~ with food he enjoys. But there are some who will followed the ~~its~~, but I prefer to fill my plate myself." In any deavoured to eschis phrase "what we enjoy" or "I prefer" master had placed brings us a little happiness"? So we are quantity of pleasure. int.

We may admit that it may be difficult in the heat and press of action to calculate the relative amounts of happiness which will result from choosing one or other of two possible courses of action. This difficulty, however, may be overcome by deducing the general principle rules, such as being truthful, prudent, tactful, temperate, honest, or merciful, which are usually conducive to the happiness of all; for ordinary cases it will be sufficient to follow these, and only if and when they conflict need we refer directly to the ultimate principle, "The greatest happiness of the greatest number."

What these rules are we will explore in the next chapter. For the present we may summarize what we have established. We have seen that some moral measuring-rod is essential to any reformer; we have noted that the discovery of the Good is by no means easy.

We have learnt that despite the attention which the problem has received, there is still no universal agreement as to what constitutes the Good, and that the only thing about which all men will agree is happiness. Any attempt to postulate a universal and objective form of the Good which is ultimate and indefinable, and which is recognized by means of a faculty we call conscience, fails on examination. It is not possible on such a basis if it be universal to account for wrong-doing; all attempts to explain such a phenomenon are untenable philosophically or inaccurate scientifically. Nor can it explain the enormous diversity from age to age and from time to time between different moral standards.

The alternative is to accept the theory of ethical hedonism which asserts that the Good is equivalent to the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

The objections to this view turn out to be either confirmations of it or sophistries. Nor is it necessary to distinguish between qualities of pleasure; the sole criterion is quantity of pleasure expressed as an immediate maximum of an ultimate accumulation.

Such a yard-stick of morality satisfies logic and provides

an adequate answer to such difficulties as: why do moralities differ? Moreover, this basic principle of happiness enables one to deduce sets of more practical rules for the determination of conduct in circumstances where the application of the principle itself could only be seen after such a period of calculation as the circumstances may not permit.

Before I pass on to the consideration of what rules for practical guidance may be deduced from this rule, I wish to point out a peculiar advantage which such a premise has for the social student over every other. The peculiarity of pleasure is that it tends to call for a repetition of the action or the situation which called it forth. We do repeatedly that which gives us satisfaction; we do only once that which robs us of it.

It is evident, therefore, in so far as the species has survived, that happiness bears the stamp of biological approval. And for a scientist such a consideration is of real importance. He is at least assured that his criterion of good does not offend against the precepts of experience, or the dictates of our own natures. On the contrary, he knows that since it is the repetition of some actions—namely those which make us happy—and the avoidance of other actions—namely those which make us the opposite—which has made possible the continuance of our species, that in selecting his yard-stick of happiness he is selecting the very principle which Nature uses to enforce her laws on living creatures.

This necessarily sketchy account of the hedonistic theory of ethics has not revealed all its advantages. I have had no space in which to show exactly how fully it is able to account for conflicts of moral opinion, nor with what unfailing precision it enables us to formulate rules for the determination of what we ought to do in cases of the most obscure moral implications. Its logical advantages are, however, self-evident.

Equally, though, I have had no space fully to consider the objections which are brought against it. I am under no delusion

that they are many, but equally I am not persuaded that they are unanswerable.

They are, in my view, of two types only. Either they are intricate logical quibbles, which have the sole merit of ingenuity, or they are based upon a sincere but in my view quite mistaken moral distaste for hedonism. While I concede that such a distaste may do honour to the moral integrity of its holder, I cannot feel that its indulgence flatters his intellectual acumen. If the Good is valued, it is surely not to be less valued because it may be shown that it is identifiable with what is pleasant.

My own conviction is unshaken that Bentham's principle is the safest and the least objectionable of all ethical rules. It has, for me at least, one overwhelming merit, for while many philosophers may urge that the Good and the greatest happiness of the greatest number are not indistinguishable, no philosopher is likely to urge that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is not good. And as such a criterion is peculiarly appropriate to the labour of the reformer I accept it unreservedly.

CHAPTER IV

THE NEEDS OF MANKIND

THAT great political philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, formulated a basic yard-stick for ethics, namely, the greatest happiness in the long run of the greatest number of sentient beings, but pointed out that although such a yard-stick provided an ultimate guide to conduct, the stress of circumstances requiring immediate action did not always permit us sufficient time adequately to consider all the relevant facts. In consequence, it was desirable to possess a series of rules, each of which was logically and ethically deducible from our basic principle, but which possessed the advantage of being easily and speedily applicable.

Such rules must of necessity be general in nature; it would be useless, even if it were not impossible, to frame a sufficient number of rules to govern conduct in every conceivable set of circumstances. No one would, or indeed could, learn so many. But without committing any such extravagance, it is still possible to prepare a set of sound principles perfectly intelligible and applicable. In this connection we have only to remember the methods of religion; every creed has its basic principle, which is generally guidance by the will of God, or something similar, but each has prepared its five or ten rules of conduct, which are in all cases designed to cover between them the whole field of ethics with applications of the principle on which they are based.

Hinduism and Buddhism have each a set of five commandments—against lying, stealing, adultery, intoxication, and murder. The Jewish commandments are thought by biblical critics to have been originally five—against false witness, stealing, adultery, impiety (or was it originally casting spells?) and murder—but later developed into ten, largely by forbidding wishes as well as acts (e.g. coveting as well as stealing). The

laws of Hammurabi were so similar as seemingly to have been the origin of Jewish commands. The Christian religion adopted them with the additional commandment of Jesus "that ye love one another." Islam's five rules include prayer, almsgiving, fasting, and pilgrimage. Shinto has only the five-fold recommendation of the Emperor Meiji to his soldiers of loyalty, simplicity, courtesy, courage, and devotion.

In addition to their sets of commandments, the major faiths of the world have lists of deadly sins and likewise of virtues. They also each listed a number of steps on the mystic path, of which one phase of the *via purgativa* in a remarkable degree, except that it was moralistic instead of scientific, forestalled much of the emphasis of the present book. These largely incline to run in sevens; for the virtues, four is also a common number. I will not, however, enumerate these here, because they refer to motives rather than to overt acts.

It may well be that the number five was chosen so often for a set of commandments because an unlettered person could count them on the fingers of one hand. Incidentally, however, it and the other popular number, seven, were very good for their purpose. Psychological tests show that from five to seven objects are as many as a person is capable of keeping in mind as a whole group, i.e. without breaking up into sub-groups. It will be convenient, therefore, to strike an average and employ the number six here for our own set of principles.

What are the forms of happiness which are safeguarded or promoted by the five or ten commandments of the various religions?

Almost all of them include a rule against deception or false witness. Let us therefore put down enjoyment of knowledge as a first form.

Some include a rule against intoxicants. This indicates unbefuddled sensibility as second form.

Some include a rule against impiety, and we may call this the enjoyment of right child-parent relationships, or perhaps of inner peace. Impiety against God is psychologically resolvable

into that against the earthly father, and is related to the disturbing Oedipus complex.

All of them include a rule against adultery. Let us put down the enjoyment of marriage or, at least, of a sex-life involving the minimum of jealousy and heart-ache as another form.

All include an injunction against stealing. This indicates enjoyment of security in the material necessities of life as a fifth form of happiness.

All include a prohibition of murder. Let us note the enjoyment of freedom from violence as a sixth form.

I believe that it will be found that all the ethical rules which in practice man has found necessary for the regulation of his life can be reduced to the safeguarding or promotion of these six forms of happiness—the enjoyment, to recapitulate, of knowledge, sensibility, inner peace, conjugal love, and security from robbery and violence. Stated in another way, they are rules of happiness in the six great relationships of life; those with our ideas, our intimate-contact group (aesthetically), our parents and children, our mate, those whom we affect but industrially and those most alien or hostile.

The old-time method of castigating some single type of offence against each of these forms had the advantage of concreteness. It was, in this, well suited to primitive times and peoples. But it had become inadequate under the complexities of modern life. In the first place, it has been experimentally determined by E. L. Thorndike and others that positive emphasis on the desired forms of conduct is a more effective technique than (negative) discouragement of the undesired. Furthermore, our economic perplexities require that "not steal" and "not covet" be supplemented by the fine distinctions between tips, commissions, graft, sharp practice and bribes, and by definitions of stealing, confiscating, nationalizing, levying, taxing, exempting, protecting, and subsidizing. Nor are our sex perplexities by any means solved by the denunciation of adultery, fornication, and lust.

Similarly with the other forms of happiness; it is no longer possible to propound a series of simple exhortations or prohibitions. We have come to realize that we have to be concerned not only with single and dramatic aspects of a field of conduct, but also with the whole field; and unless the reformer bears such a fact constantly in mind he will solve neither his nor our perplexities.

There has been a strong tendency during the past few decades to correct the defect of negativeness of the simple commandments of old-time by altering their form, recommending virtues instead of condemning sins. This positive emphasis has been encouraged by the spread of psychological understanding, and is to be welcomed. But to give a list of virtues, such as wisdom, thoughtfulness, tact, refinement, honesty, and compassion, or of positive exhortations such as: enquire; be foresighted; understand; abstain from stupefying indulgences; co-operate; and rescue the oppressed, is clearly not likely to prove much more helpful than it is baldly to prohibit a series of well-defined actions.

We can see, then, that the task of propounding a set of moral rules which shall fulfil the conditions of being few, easily grasped and applicable to all the complexities of modern life, is scarcely easy. What, however, is of importance, is the fact that within the six forms of happiness I have enumerated can be included all the needs which man has sought to satisfy or the ends he has striven to promote.

It is one thing neatly to classify those needs and ends, but it is another and vastly more difficult thing to propose ways and means by which those needs can be met, those ends achieved. That, indeed, has been man's one and only problem since his beginning. An analysis of how he is solving it or trying to solve it to-day will teach us much about his nature, and perhaps enable us to see where and how he has erred, and to suggest alternative lines of conduct.

This chapter, then, will be devoted to a consideration of what I may call loosely the Needs of Mankind, and for pur-

poses of convenience I shall study them as grouped under the six forms of happiness already enumerated.

I do not propose to discuss in detail here the full nature of each of the Needs of Mankind. Such discussions merit separate chapters. I wish only to point out that underlying every single one is a psychological problem, and that, in consequence, no attempt to satisfy these needs can succeed unless that problem is first understood. Let us consider successively our six forms of happiness.

Enjoyment of Knowledge

Very important among the six forms of happiness is the enjoyment of knowledge. By this is meant partly a knowledgeable attitude towards religion. Abandonment of a naïve trust in organized religion is indeed as old as the Greeks, but not until the emergence of the science of psycho-analysis was a proper perspective of this most remarkable of human phenomena possible.

Indeed, the enjoyment of knowledge implies the understanding of a proper approach to those recurrent problems of thought which have vexed as much as perplexed humanity for countless years. In short, this last form of happiness involves the whole problem of the free enquiring intellect.

It is widely admitted that the ancient Greeks, particularly the inhabitants of Athens during the fifth and fourth centuries before Christ, achieved a level of civilization which has seldom been equalled in the whole history of the human race. That such a level of civilization is largely indefinable—at least in precise terms—is quite immaterial. It was achieved almost entirely because the Greek of that time valued the freedom of his intellect above all else. The point need not here be laboured; Mr. Clive Bell, in his essay on Civilization, has placed it beyond cavil. What is of importance here is that the emergence of a comparable period of civilization, the emergence of a period in which a whole community from the richest to the poorest citizen appreciated the greatest flowering of art, culture, and

thought that possibly the world has ever seen, was dependent upon the exercise without restraint of that spirit of energetic enquiry which more than anything else distinguishes man from the rest of living creatures.

Quite clearly, in so far as certain provinces of thought are closed to the enquiry, the intellect is not free. It is also clear that no organized system of control closes provinces of thought more surely than does religion; the awful guilt of blasphemy lies upon whomsoever questions the workings of a divine providence, and fear is a bad bed-fellow for truth.

Such an assertion is not equivalent to a repudiation of every religious *tenet*. It amounts to no more than stating the obvious fact that religious truth, like any other truth, must stand on its intrinsic accuracy, and that carefully to isolate a series of *dicta*, to place those *dicta* in a sacrosanct realm of piety, and to stigmatize as blasphemous the intellect which dares even to question them, is not a policy calculated to enhance either humanity's happiness, or humanity's regard for veracity.

It may well be asked in such circumstances exactly why taboos, religious or other, are accepted. If the dogmas of religion are true, what is the necessity of protecting them by damning whomsoever dares to query them? If they are not true, how have some of them endured for so long?

These questions take us indeed to the root of the problem. It is not my intention to discuss it here in detail; that is for a later chapter. It is necessary here only to point out that the anomaly cannot be understood and certainly cannot be resolved without recourse to the discoveries which psycho-analysis has made.

That psychology has more than a small contribution to make to the solution of the problem of why men who are born free to think and act and do exactly as they like should in fact accept, and willingly accept, restraints in all three categories is obvious. What is by no means so widely understood is the exact value of the contribution to this problem which psychology can make. But it is enough for my immediate purpose

that it should be realized how insoluble the problem of serving the real freedom of the intellect will be so long as the aid of scientific psychology is not invoked.

Let me finally try to make the point clear by a recapitulation. It is a truism that the acquisition of new knowledge is often resisted, that the valuable fruits of that new knowledge are often indeed most bitterly fought. One has only to recall how bitterly (just after their discovery) the use of anaesthetics was opposed as being contrary to the will of God, to realize how right is such a claim. At the moment, we are witnessing a like antagonism to the spread of contraceptive information.

That such opposition is socially harmful cannot be denied, and that similar instances of it arise every day is equally obvious. In other words, the mind of man is not allowed complete freedom to experiment, to enquire, and to gather information, and so long as these restraints continue so long will man cease to enjoy his birthright in its entirety.

That there are many factors operating in this restraint is obvious; they can mostly be described as religious or moral. How they may be broken down is a different problem; but it is quite clear that the general support which such factors enjoy would be quite lacking in any society which, in the broadest sense of the word, could be described as natural. We must look then in those aspects of society which interfere with its natural and normal functioning for the roots of the opposition to the free use of the enquiring intellect, and those aspects are self-evidently psychological.

It is to psychology then that we must look, if we wish to find a solution to the problem of how to neutralize the factors which to-day circumscribe the free operations of the human intellect. Exactly what psychology has to teach us will form the subject of Chapter XII of this book.

Enjoyment of Sensory Naturalism

The next form of happiness which I wish to consider in

this section embraces roughly all those experiences which are called sensory.

The senses form the primordial sources through which we derive all pains and pleasures. Although, as we develop, they become increasingly the mere channels *via* which we get clues as to the outer world, and our own place in it, yet even as such mere channels we let them become dulled at our peril.

It is a truism that our sensations form the basis of all our mental processes. Hence the question of how to assure that they shall function with qualitative truthfulness and normality ought to occupy a prominent place in such a work as this. I have used the words "qualitative truthfulness and normality" to imply something more than mere quantitative accuracy, for although it may be vastly important to register accurately the sheer intensity of a stimulus given to one or other of our senses, it is equally important that the full qualitative content of the resulting sensation should not be lost.

It follows that whatever impairs the accuracy with which our senses register the stimuli with which they are brought into contact impairs the enjoyment of sensory naturalism.

That there are present in our world a multitude of factors, external and internal, which do seriously affect our enjoyment of our own sensations is self-evident, and it can be admitted that to a considerable degree these limiting factors are more physical or physiological than psychological; but their prevalence and the extent to which they most gravely affect both the health and the ability for sensory enjoyment of the race cannot fail to disquiet even the most easy-going of individuals if the problem is clearly presented. Nor is it possible to escape the conclusion that the resistances encountered whenever an endeavour is made to remove or control some of these limiting facts arise as much from deep-seated psychological conditions as from a distaste for having one's habits disturbed.

I shall be discussing this whole problem in more detail in a later chapter, and here it is only necessary to give one illustration of what exactly I mean.

Everyone possesses a number of senses, those popularly though inaccurately enumerated as touch, taste, sight, smell, and hearing, which, if properly exploited in suitable surroundings, are capable of yielding him an exquisite richness of pleasurable satisfaction. That they fail to do so in so many cases must be ascribed partly to the fact that the world we live in is full of ugly contacts, ugly tastes, ugly sights, ugly sounds, and ugly smells, judged so by senses no matter how unspoilt. But it is due quite as much to the fact that the great majority of us have permitted our sense to atrophy, or to become perverted, and that, in consequence, they fail completely to yield us the satisfaction and the truthful report that are our birth-right.

I have no space in which to enumerate each and every one of the limiting external or internal factors which thus ruin our appreciation of sensory pleasures. Their simple classification would fill a volume larger than this; and I propose to limit this discussion to a consideration of one principal and two or three subsidiary factors only. I shall consider the nature of and the effect upon sensory naturalism of the habits of smoking and alcoholism, and shall also discuss the problem of feeding, both from a hygienic and from a pleasurable point of view. Further, as a conclusion to such a discussion, I shall endeavour to analyse that much more complex "sense" which is usually described as the "aesthetic sense", and try to relate it to sensory naturalism in its narrower physiological significance.

Enjoyment of Inner Peace

Early in this chapter I isolated for later consideration "the enjoyment of right child-parent relationship, or perhaps of inner peace," and I related it to the rule of commandment against impiety which is such a prominent feature of so many religions. These two problems, child-parent relationships on the one hand, and inner peace on the other, may seem superficially to be quite distinct. They are, however, closely related; for modern psychology has shown, with quite overwhelming

force, exactly how much the attainment of inner peace in its broadest sense depends upon a right child-parent relationship in infancy and youth. This relationship is not, of course, the only fact operative in the attainment of this form of happiness, but it is undoubtedly the most important in the sense that it is primary.

Every religion which has stressed a rule against impiety is, in effect, making recognition of this fact, for trouble between man and his Heavenly Father is, as I shall in due course try to show, a complication following on from trouble between the child and his earthly father.

This form of happiness then involves all those factors which determine whether an individual is "normal." I put the word in inverted commas for the obvious reason that no satisfactory analysis of it has yet been found. But it is here used in the widest sense; by normal I wish only to imply that condition of mental equilibrium which leaves one with the fewest possible dispositional disabilities. This is simply another way of saying that he should be free from insanity of any and every sort, whether homicidal mania or a mere slight neurosis.

Mental disorders, then, and their elimination are the principal factors which will concern us in this discussion. In Chapter II, I indicated the sort of contribution which psycho-analysis has to make to their understanding, and in a later chapter I shall be concerned to show in exactly what way the problem may be approached from a socially useful point of view.

Enjoyment of the Family

The next form of happiness we have to consider is that associated with the love-life. This subject opens up a field of speculation that is particularly vexed in the modern world. It is, however, one that has occupied man's attention to some degree since time immemorial. Love is a peculiarly personal problem, but one which at the same time involves issues of deep moral significance. It directly involves at least one other

person of the opposite sex, and indirectly involves the whole of society and all posterity.

I need not stop for the moment to enumerate any of the historical approaches to the problem, nor concern myself with societies in which polygamy in one form or another is legal. The modern western world has adopted with little dissent until recent years an ideal of strict monogamy on at least the woman's part, which has been preserved and protected by a number of clearly defined written laws, but far more effectively by a strong pressure of public opinion which has visited severe penalties upon whom ever dared to transgress these accepted conventions.

To-day, however, partly owing to the scientific development of increasingly effective methods of contraception, and partly owing to the steady emancipation of women, the attitude of society towards the sex problem has been severely tested. It is not without reason that one of the characters in Aldous Huxley's book, *Those Barren Leaves*, remarks: "Contraceptives have rendered chastity superfluous."

In the days when the almost inevitable consequence of the sexual act was a child, a narrow and puritanical system of sexual convention might conceivably be justified, and could be enforced with comparative ease. But such conditions no longer obtain, and the result has been to raise a number of urgent problems requiring solution. Each one of these provokes boundless controversy. Is contraceptive knowledge a safe thing to make general? Are the neo-Malthusians right in wishing to keep the birth-rate low? Are the eugenists justified in trying to assure that the new generation should be born predominantly of the ablest parents, instead of, as now, predominantly of the failures? How far should we go in the direction of divorce reform? Should society approve of pre-marital sex experience? Is the companionate marriage a workable plan?

These and hosts of similar questions are discussed wherever men and women congregate. It is notorious, however, that

their discussion is commonly productive of more heat than light. The judgments of the controversialists are, it is clear, swayed not so much by the evidence (for, if they were, the controversies would have been settled long ago) but by prejudice or by unconscious motives.

Enjoyment of Material Means

The material aspect of existence at first sight would appear to be simply a problem of economics—how to produce enough goods and services in the world so that everyone may have sufficient. Unfortunately, however, it has apparently proved impossible to answer this question without elaborating in some detail in what way society shall be organized. History discloses, indeed the contemporary world alone discloses, an immense variety of ways in which a society may be organized economically. They range from a primitive form of anarchic communism amongst savages to the highly specialized system of production known as capitalism—of which the U.S.A., Britain, and Germany are outstanding examples—and the vast complex organization of modern Communist Russia. Each one of these systems, however, inevitably involves a political background, and although it may well be that the economic background is more the prime mover in deciding individuals or societies in their allegiances to varying political systems, yet, superficially at least, the political flag appears to determine their attitude. And this factor becomes of developing importance.

Thus, although it may be true that because trade follows the flag, therefore that flag may be carried into the most remote corners of the world, it is not necessarily true that the standard-bearers are actuated solely by the conviction that they are preparing the way for trade. Without putting too fine a point on it, it is evident that people subscribe to political systems and political creeds for many reasons other than the fact that that system or creed may be in their view the only one which will ensure or will maintain adequate material needs for the community.

Finally, what is of importance here is that not one of the great variety of political and economic theories which flourish in the world to-day has succeeded in winning universal acceptance. Yet each one of them is designed, at least in part, to increase the material sustenance of the ordinary man. All of them have their passionate adherents; all of them are argued, defended, and attacked with a wealth of energy and skill.

Not one has triumphed. Yet if man were solely concerned for his own economic welfare, it would be difficult to see why the one or two best schemes could not be easily demonstrated to him. Nor can it be doubted that one of two of these schemes could be shown to be the best, if it were simply a question of *pure reasoning*. It is not because they are inherently incapable of reasoning logically that men fail to reach agreed conclusions about things. The violent oppositions in political and economic affairs arise from quite other causes. Reason can only triumph when it is wholly free; and a man's reason can hardly be free if he is himself a slave to want, to greed, or to some deep-seated psychological malaise of which consciously he may be wholly ignorant.

We know that much of the disagreement between men over economic issues arises from comparatively simple and easily analysable causes. A millionaire cannot be expected to feel the same urge to reform the economic system as a man on the dole, nor is it likely that the reformed world he envisages is very similar to the reformed world which his fellow on the dole envisages.

But even such facts cannot wholly explain all the varieties as well as the bitterness of individual disagreement about such issues. We must look for motives that are more deeply hidden—which is the purpose of this book.

Enjoyment of Safety from Violence

The form of happiness with which we are concerned most pressingly to-day is the enjoyment of safety from violence. It seems in many ways and in many parts, even of the civilized

world, further from attainment than any other. It may be cogently argued that crime as such is a product of civilization. Primitive societies have no policemen and few criminals. Tribal customs and taboos are apparently more efficacious instruments for enforcing obedience to law than are prisons and truncheons. Nor, as civilization develops, does crime disappear.

Although an improvement was effected during the eighteenth century, the highwayman of that century becomes the infinitely worse gangster of the twentieth. Murder, crimes of violence, theft, larceny, and robbery of all kinds grow more complex as does society. Despite the astonishing weapons which the progress of science has placed in the hands of the police, of the civilized world; despite the vast machinery of crime prevention and detection, international in its scope, that has been evolved; despite the forbidding aspects of our prisons, the severity of our judges, and the habitual triumph of the police, crime still flourishes, and the criminal records of every country in which they are published furnish lamentable proof of how far are the peoples of this earth from approaching even to within measurable distance of a satisfactory state of safety from violence.

Yet disturbing as may be the multiplicity of these barriers to security, within the limits of an ordered, peaceful society, they represent but a few of the many terrible risks to which everyone is exposed. For the individual criminal working his lone hand, or any small gang, has the whole force of society against him. His only protection is secrecy, both before and after the commission of his crime. The menace he represents is possibly acute but limited. But how may we describe the menace of those other criminals—political tyrants and warmongers?

Safety from violence is indeed far from achieved in our world; over all of us hangs the threat of war; over many the deadly menace of despotism. These two last represent a distinct problem, and one which at least the majority of men do not

feel is so amenable to reform as individual crime. And they are undoubtedly right, in so far as war and despotisms are international problems, for the tackling of which no satisfactory body has as yet been evolved, while individual crime is almost wholly a national problem, with which existing governments are theoretically competent to deal.

Crime is, in a double sense, a creation of man; for a crime involves first, a doer, and, secondly, a law which is contravened or broken. Some crimes, in consequences, are wholly arbitrary. Thus it is an offence to drive a car on the right-hand side of the road in England, and to drive it on the left in the U.S.A. Again, in Russia, it is a crime to praise Fascism, while in Italy it is a crime to praise anything else. But it is quite clear that these two crimes are of a quite different order of importance and of interest.

For our present purpose, it is enough to point out that most crimes fall into one of four classes—political, civic, economic, or psychological. The first of these, namely, the sort of crime which fills the concentration camps of Russia, Italy, Germany, and other modern countries with numberless individuals who have been guilty of criticizing the organization of the States in which they live, itself presents psychological as well as political aspects. It raises acutely the issue: who is the criminal: the individual or the State which is punishing him?

The second, civic offences such as failing to take out a driving licence, being drunk and disorderly, behaving indecently in public, etc., can in turn be resolved into social and psychological factors.

The third, genuinely economic crimes, seem only too tragically simple. They will never disappear so long as want stalks abroad. Penniless mothers and fathers will steal to fill the bellies of their starving children so long as parents remain human. And throughout the whole scale of these economic crimes will always be evident the hopeless struggle in which respect for the laws of man is pitted against the inexorable demands of nature. Such crimes are less the concern of the

judge than of the politician; and it is a sage prediction that only with the achievement for everyone of a reasonable and secure standard of living—the achievement, in fact, of our first form of happiness—will all economic crime disappear. Actually, however, most crimes which seem to come under that category are complicated by other factors.

The last category, that which I have described as psychological, includes all crimes of passion and sexual crime generally, but also those arising from greed, excessive ambition, hatred, and other human failings; such witless crimes as kleptomania and those committed by the insane.

In all these four classes of crimes, with the possible exception of the third, the psychological make-up of the criminal (real or so-called) is the determining factor. The purposes which move him are seldom evident either to police investigators or to himself, and, lacking a scientific understanding of what they are, society will continue to blunder its criminals from prison to prison, wasting time, money, energy, and human lives. Society, of course, is entitled to protection; but that protection is the most valuable which, by its own nature, leads to a progressive diminution of the menace which it is designed to thwart. Most prisons, it would seem, do little but enforce a temporary suspension of activity on the wrong-doer. They are, at best, complicated systems of locking the stable door after the horse has escaped. At worst, they may be any sort of hell for men and women whose fundamental crime is the misfortune of having failed properly to solve, for example, the Oedipus tangle of their early infancy.

It seems reasonable to conclude that the policeman and the judiciary are not an infallible method of handling the criminal tendencies of citizens, and that where they have failed to produce any amelioration of criminal condition, new and scientific, that is psychological, methods should be tried.

But I pointed out earlier that the criminal in the legal sense of the word represented but a small and largely insignificant menace to the universal enjoyment of freedom from violence

compared with the political tyrant or the war-monger or the tactless and blundering statesman.

Here, if anywhere, is a clear case of the psychological rather than the social phenomenon. It is, however, vitally necessary to remember that wicked as the political tyrant or war-monger may be, he is in himself powerless to do evil, *unless* he is able in some way to capture the attention and win the sympathies of a sufficient number of his fellow-countrymen.

‘ This is perhaps one of the most vital and most neglected of the problems facing the world to-day. It may be true that Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, or President Roosevelt are extremely wicked men, or as the psychologist would prefer to describe them, are men whose impulses have been thwarted, or whose desires are not under proper or reasonable control. They may be—in fact, they probably are—interesting psychological studies, and a proper understanding of their natures and a willingness to work on the resulting information would be politically helpful. They in themselves, however, are of relatively small moment, except as they crystallize or bring to a head latent tendencies in the mass of the people in the countries of which they are citizens. And it is these tendencies which are potentially dangerous or salutary—according to whether the present reader is *pro* or *anti* one or another of these famous figures.

Let me try to make this very important point clear by one or two illustrations. War is perhaps the most obvious. It may be true, it probably is true, that in the past, wicked men such as Alexander, Tamerlane, Napoleon, or the Kaiser have plunged their worlds into red ruin to gratify a limitless ambition. Yet it is perfectly obvious that unless their soldiers had been willing to fight, their wars would have been impossible. And a study of war reveals always the astonishing fact that man does in part like fighting. No germ of disease, however virulent, is so contagious as the mad fever which sweeps any and every country immediately following the declaration of war on some other country.

Man does, it seems, like fighting, although war is by common consent the most dreadful evil that can befall a nation. In a later chapter I shall be examining at some length the whole problem of war and war-psychology, but it must be pointed out here that the very use of the phrase "war-psychology" shows beyond dispute that a great part, if not all, of the problem is more or less consciously grasped as being psychological.

It is not, indeed, difficult to see that war-fever, racial hatreds, and cruelty generally are closely linked. The world has become so accustomed to the expression of racial hatreds as now largely to be unmoved by it, and its latent manifestation, the anti-semitism of Nazi Germany, has focussed attention only because of its excessive violence. But no instance of mass activity at the behest of one individual is better fitted to illustrate the point I was making earlier. Hitler and non-Jewish Germany may have many legitimate grievances against German Jews, but the orgy of torture, injustice, and murder to which those unfortunate people have been subjected at the hands of their fellow-countrymen was only made possible because torturing, robbing, and murdering, in short, giving expression to a frenzy of hate, are things which human nature enjoys. German Jews, therefore, are not just the victims of a mistaken sense of justice; they have become the cherished objects of a nation in the grip of a frenzy of hate and, were Hitler to achieve his asserted ambition and finally to expel every Jew from Germany, we venture to say that the active German Nazis would be bereft of possibly their chief gratification in life.

The whole problem of cruelty, however, requires careful attention. It is clearly unreasonable to assume that Germans are exceptional people, backward or primitive in their biological evolution. Those people of the United States have little right to criticize Germany who calmly tolerate the lynching of negroes, which is a feature of life in some Southern States at least. No nation, it is obvious, is guiltless of mass cruelty, from organized blood-sports to organized persecutions, and the conclusion is inevitable that the impulse to hurt is one of

the most powerful in human make-up. So long as it continues unchecked, the realization of our third form of happiness, safety from violence, will be precarious.

It will be advisable to summarize now the contents of this chapter. I shall try, in the earlier parts of the book generally, to show: first, the increasing importance of psychology in every-day life; second, the actual advances that psychology has made; third, the sort of criterion, namely the ultimate greatest happiness of the greatest number that may be useful as a method of valuable social and other change; and, fourth, exactly what that criterion involves. This last has provided the subject-matter of this chapter. I have endeavoured to show that the acquisition of happiness is a complex and not a simple problem. It involves a number of separable factors, and I have argued that these factors can be wholly accounted for in terms of six distinct forms of well-being.

I have considered in turn, in broadest outline, each one of the forms of happiness, and I have hinted at how far each one of them is dependent upon (a) the progress of the other forms, and (b) the aid of psychology for its realization. The rest of this book will be devoted to a more detailed and precise estimate of what psychology can teach us in relation to each of these forms of happiness.

The aim of the succeeding chapters is to show, at least in outline, in what way psychological motives operate to form our prejudices, dispositions, and character traits; factors which notoriously go to determine which side in a controversy we shall support.

Now most of us would at the outset maintain that our adherence to this or that cause was decided entirely by reasonable considerations. The arguments we have heard for and against it have been weighed; the consequences have been carefully considered; and in this dispassionate spirit of enquiry we have reached the conclusion that the cause to which we have given our allegiance is the one more likely than any other to promote the greatest good of the greatest number.

How far such a picture belies the facts all of us inwardly know only too well. That we exploit our intelligences for the purpose of finding good arguments for bad theories, which we believe "on instinct" or for some similar reason is notorious. How subtle, penetrating, and plausible our reasons can make those arguments, again we all know.

It is essential to point out, however, that reason itself is quite "pure." An axe may be used with equal effectiveness for chopping wood or cutting off heads; and because we find that the instrument we use in daily life, our reason, is frequently producing consequences of which we disapprove, it does not follow that we should discard it as useless. I have said earlier, and I repeat, that the free, untrammelled use of the impartial intellect is man's most valued possession. It must, however, be free.

How seldom it is! What binds it, what determines before it begins to work, the lines on which it shall operate, and even the conclusions at which it shall arrive, becomes a vital factor in our lives. Until we understand and learn to control these factors, we cannot hope that the world we live in will reflect more than the work of our blind insistent urges.

I have described in Chapter II the general way in which character is built up. I said enough to show how delicate were the operating mechanisms and how disastrous the consequences if ever they were disturbed.

In tracing the developing of character in Freudian terms, I showed how an interference with the working out of the internal stresses operating during early infancy could produce what are called fixations at certain levels. These fixations do much to determine our character and our reactions in later life to every sort of circumstance and belief.

It is quite obvious that in so far as it is a man's general disposition which tends to determine his attitudes, every factor which psycho-analysts have attempted to classify operates to determine every one of a man's beliefs; but it would be quite impossible to examine and illustrate the way in which every fixation works in every circumstance.

The plan of this book has been explained. I have (to summarize) isolated, with some arbitrariness, six "forms of happiness" which I claim include the essentials for the realization of the ideal, the greatest happiness in the long run of the greatest number.

I am proposing to examine each in turn, and to show how our attitudes to each are influenced by psychological motives; but, as I pointed out, it would be impossible in any reasonable compass to explore the whole tangled skein of motives in every case. A book which did would be of inestimable value to the student of sociology and psychology alike; but I doubt if the lifetime of one man would be sufficient for its completion, and I am sure that it would exceed in length the most forbidding encyclopaedias ever produced.

We need not, however, despair of achieving some success. It is obvious that although all psychological factors may be operative in every one of the attitudes we adopt, some factors are much more operative in a given case than are others. On that basis it is possible to illustrate the general from the particular, and it is the method I propose to adopt here.

I am selecting from the great number of psychological factors which might be considered a definite group which are known to be overwhelmingly important; but, again, I shall not attempt to examine how every one of these factors operates in the case of each of our six forms of happiness. I shall choose what I consider to be the most influential factor in relation to any one form, and shall try to show how it operates in its influence upon us, except that one of two motives—the Oedipus complex particularly—play the chief part in *several* of the social movements. To give variety to the book, I have therefore sometimes passed over the complex which chiefly instigates a movement. Particularly when this complex is widely discussed in another chapter, this is done in order to speak of a factor of secondary importance, not fully treated elsewhere.

Before, however, I commence to deal with the first of our forms of happiness, I wish to protect myself, even at the risk

of being repetitive, against the charges which are all too frequently hurled against psycho-analysts. Those charges assume many forms, but many of them can be solved into the complaint that psycho-analysts would abolish the part played by reason, and reduce us all to automata operated by the most repellent motives.

No psycho-analyst tries to do any such thing. He admits, to adopt his own terms, that ego-impulses are extremely powerful in determining our behaviour. Such impulses are, for example, those arising from hunger or pain. He admits that reason is also extremely influential in determining our behaviour, and indeed urges that it should be made more so. But he points out that ego-impulses and reason are both obvious in themselves and in their effect, and require no special study for their understanding, while the repressed libidinous impulses (his concern with which so upsets or irritates many of his fellows) are extremely obscure in themselves and in their effects. Without the elaborate technique evolved by Freud, they would have remained virtually unknown, and the psycho-analyst's practically exclusive concern with them is a direct indication both of the difficulties in the way of their understanding and of their enormous importance.

CHAPTER V

MAN AND CRUELTY

THE subject of this chapter is violence, one of the most terrible and persistent problems of mankind. Indeed, security from violence is a form of happiness that might be ranked as paramount, if one were to attempt the idle task of arranging forms of happiness in a hierarchy.

In Chapter IV, where I offered a preliminary discussion of the primary essentials for happiness, I drew a cursory distinction between what I may call here political mass violence, by which I mean war and tyranny on the one hand, and lesser forms of violence. I did this because the subject is too vast to be adequately treated as a whole, and accordingly I propose to devote a separate chapter (Chapter VI) to the discussion of the former problem.

In this chapter I shall limit myself to a number of less spectacular forms of violence. I shall discuss, amongst other things, blood-sports, the treatment of criminals and violent crimes generally, whether perpetrated by individuals or by groups. My purpose will be to relate these phenomena to that well-known psychological factor, Sadism.

Crimes of violence of whatever nature arise, like any other human behaviour, from complex motives. I have shown in previous chapters how all the various stages of development in the psychology of a normal human being make their individual contributions to his various character-traits—that, for example, avarice involves factors additional to the anal-retentive trait of childhood. It is therefore to be remembered throughout this chapter that in seeking to lay bare the sadism that is immanent in all forms of violence, I am not asserting that all violence can be wholly explained by sadism. I am in this, as in other chapters, merely illustrating the working in a characteristic field of a particular psychological factor, and thereby reinforcing

the contention which it is the purpose of this book to establish, that only by acquiring a thorough knowledge of our natures and by applying a scientific—that is, a psychological method of cure—shall we ever achieve our goal, the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

But to make the matter quite clear, let me offer a short introduction to this chapter, by way of showing how other Freudian mechanisms play their part in violence.

Beginning with early oral eroticism, one could devote many interesting pages to the connection which has been found by Dr. Edward Glover between it and drug addiction, and to the part played by such addiction in crime. In politics there are not lacking sinister figures, many of them important people, who are known to be morphia or other drug addicts. The "spoilt child" character associated with the early oral stage is also responsible for crime and public difficulties. Thus certain children, if they can back their spoiltness with physical strength become first bullies and then criminals. Finally, the early oral period in life is accompanied sometimes by the child biting the mother's nipple, which is the first hint we get of sadism.

With the second oral stage, certain psycho-analysts have thought that they found associated a tendency to greediness. If, in spite of what experimental psychology has taught of the untrustworthiness in general of assuming that such words represent universals in human character, it should turn out that greediness is indeed a general unit trait operative in several fields, then this, too, is a fundamental cause of crime and of war. Biting, too, as a primary means of defence and of inflicting punishment, is a stage out of which sadism more definitely develops. This latter is generally thought of as a tendency to delight in the suffering of others. Possibly that is not more than incidental. Although the sadist produces this suffering, he is probably initially indifferent to it, and derives his satisfactions from the actual process of crushing, mutilating, and grinding. Such a process, it is unnecessary to point out, is directly

connected with eating; it is a delight in rending and crunching something.

This process can be readily understood in the case of the animal which pursues its prey and kills it by means of claw and teeth.

The retentive stage of anal-erotism in particular contributes to sadism so much that the term *anal-sadistic* is commonly used in psycho-analytic literature. The themes of moulding and forming which arise in connection with this stage enter much into the policies pursued by statesmen, and the passion for control which is paramount in international affairs might almost equally well be discussed under either the heading of anal-erotism or of sadism. Anal-productive eroticism exerts its effects in war chiefly through the economic factors.

The influence of fixations at the phallic stage is an exceedingly fruitful theme for the student of violence, and, in particular, of war and militarism. Weapons are particularly good phallic symbols—spears, swords, and guns. The modern weapons are not only pointed and long, but project particles into the interiors of bodies. Let us remember also that in war and in readiness for it, the *potency* of the group with which the patriot identifies himself is supremely displayed. Quite as important is the opportunity given by war to mutilate (castrate) the enemy. Dr. Edward Glover, in his book, *War, Sadism, and Pacifism*, gives a striking example of the pathological motives we must take into account in dealing with such problems. He cites the case of a soldier who used to steal out into No-Man's-Land at night to pull the teeth of (i.e. symbolically castrate) such dead enemies as he could find lying about.

But important as all these motives may be in the perpetuation of violence, none is so important as Sadism. Sadism and Masochism seem by the earlier psychologists to have been regarded (if noticed at all) as something *introjected ab extra* into the human psyche, to which it was too foreign to be a normal part. Yet Thorndike specifies "instincts" of Mastery and Subordination, and McDougall seems to follow along some-

what similar lines with his Positive and Negative Self-feeling. The term, Sadism, was introduced from another source than academic psychology, namely, psychiatry. A certain Marquis de Sade was discovered to have murdered and mutilated a number of women for the sake of the orgiastic pleasure he derived; and the motive, later found to be present in a greater or less degree in all of us, was named after this famous criminal.

Freud, in recent years, has suspected the existence of an "instinct" of aggressiveness more primitive than any of the love impulses. It is to a combination of this primitive aggression with love that he attributes sadism.

In its earliest stages, sadism manifests itself usually as a tendency to misuse animals or weaker children. Such a tendency is to be noted in any family where there are two or more children from the very earliest days in the nursery. In the case of a pair of siblings of my acquaintance, William and Janet, the former, being stronger, has been inclined to bully his little sister. The latter takes it with an absence of resentment, which curiously contrasts with the fact that in all games it is she who is initiator and leader and he who follows.

Intensive research has been carried out in the U.S.A. and elsewhere to discover how far individual children are submissive or are dominating, and to note the methods they employ to secure their ends. They are also studied in detail in Mrs. Susan Isaacs' masterly work, *Intellectual Development in Young Children*. The conclusions established are most interesting, proving beyond doubt that all children, in one guise or another, derive satisfaction from imposing their personalities upon others. The relation between this and sadism in its crudest form is too evident to need comment.

The impulse to hurt, although less primary, rapidly becomes as strong as, and often stronger than, the impulse to dominate. The child who catches and crushes flies on a window-pane is often defended as the "budding entomologist," and it is no doubt true that he is partly motivated by a curiosity about the nature of the fly and a desire to discover how it reacts to his

treatment. But no one who has observed such a child dispassionately can fail to be struck by the obvious delight he finds in the actual destruction of his victim.

Flies are not a child's only victims. All small animals and other children, particularly if they are little and defenceless, are the object of his sadistic interests. Bridges notes that:

A group of children quite often behave like a flock of hens when a stranger is within their midst. Just as hens peck and chase a new bird, so children may strike and tease a new child in the group.

Such behaviour may sometimes be related to property-quarrels, as over toys, and is therefore to be analysed as sadism arising from anal-erotism; but this is not always clear. I have a note on how one day Janet (7.5) although quite happy in her play, and also very affectionate with everyone, was inclined to be "careless" of how she knocked down things others had constructed. This was so particularly in respect of her brother; she had been reproved for having knocked over a little house he had built of blocks, but almost immediately afterwards did it again, and later a third time. In this case, a desire to dominate was probably allied with some other more violent desire to hurt. This latter desire finds frequent expression. Mrs. Isaacs records the case of Joseph who—

was sitting on a table in the cloakroom one lunch-time, swinging his legs, when Mrs. Z— asked him affably:

"And do you like coming to this school?"

"Oh, yes," said Joseph.

"And what do you like doing?"

"I pinch all the children," he replied, swinging his legs more vigorously.

This was liable to be only too true.

From this simple, restricted sadism to that of the school bully is no far step; but even bullying is only one of the many forms through which the impulse may find expression. That comparatively harmless activity known as teasing is another of

them. I have a note on a little boy, aged barely two, who pushed his face through the bars of his cot as an invitation to his sister to kiss him good-night. When she came he withdrew it, and watched with signs of evident pleasure her tears. He repeated this performance a second and a third time. Then suddenly the sweet side of his nature came out; he went over of his own accord and kissed her.

Finally, we must remember that sadism can find expression in acts that are superficially at least wholly altruistic. This is often evidenced in a group of children the leaders of whom will insist with a great show of kindly virtue in helping the younger do this or that task, and will strenuously continue their help even when it has become quite patent that their protégées resent their interference bitterly and require it not at all.

I need not point out the close if latent connection existing between such activities and those known as bullying, but this is an extremely complex problem. It may take many forms; it may be mere aggressiveness (superficially) or it may be concerned with the possessions of childhood, toys.

Consider the case of an analytic patient of mine who was, one day, silent longer than usual, after which he explained that he "kept thinking about those toys that I saw this morning instead of what I want to think about." After this followed another long silence, succeeded by an account of a tendency on his part to be aggressive to people.

The associations showed that in his childhood he had been deprived of toys of his own, and could play only with those belonging to neighbouring children. His chief recollection in connection with this was of a tendency to dominate the others. He recalled having related to me in a previous hour how a teacher had told him that if he alone of all the boys in the school was always in difficulty with his companions, it must be due to something in himself—a fact which he had resented and denied at the time, but now suspected was true. I pointed out that not by chance had his thoughts successively embraced the two topics of children's toys and his recent aggressive behaviour,

and enquired how far his childish play had been of an aggressive nature. It turned out to have been very much so.

This impulse to hurt, the darkest of all the traits of character which seem to be an inevitable part of the development of human beings, is, as we see, of the utmost social importance. The fact that all children at one time or another pass through a stage when they enjoy cruelty, has the very strongest bearing upon education, as it raises the problem of so handling them as not to increase their impulses towards sadism, and upon social affairs generally.

In connection with the former problem it may be stressed, here and now, that to make a child feel "pain like that which it inflicted" as a means of curing it of cruelty is a vicious plan. The problem is not one of how to instruct intellectually, but of how to moderate a morbid desire. Physical punishment merely excites masochism and that is accompanied by increased, not diminished, sadism.

Masochism, derived from the name of the morbid Polish novelist, Sacher Masoch, is the complement of Sadism. In its fullest expression it consists in a desire to suffer pain inflicted by some one else, but in its common and moderate manifestations it is little more than submissiveness.

Both sadism and masochism find their fullest expression along sexual channels in the common acceptance of the term. Flagellation is the example, *par excellence*, but it is only one of the many forms of cruelty that are inflicted and willingly endured by some sexual types.

This very short introduction to the subject of sadism must be sufficient. I have endeavoured not to overwhelm the reader in a mass of "case-histories," but to isolate a particular characteristic of childhood and to show its development.

I now wish to point out how important such a characteristic as sadism is in the modern world, and for that purpose I propose to run through briefly a number of the activities in which it manifests itself in adult behaviour.

Let us start with the notorious "blood-sports." Cruelty in

“sport” may be said to begin with that first lust for crushing flies that I have already mentioned. Later come such acts as “popping” at birds with air-guns, or tying tin-cans to dogs’ tails, and from that point to the killing of animals for pleasure is no distance. The killing of animals has in past times been a means whereby the larder was replenished. It is defended partly on these grounds even to-day, when the obvious insincerity of the defence is clear to anyone who reflects that the modern slaughter-house and butcher’s shop much more efficaciously supplies the demands of most people for flesh food.

The more extreme examples of the mania for killing animals impress us as obviously pathological, and the question arises how we should anywhere draw a line between a common person who enjoys an occasional day’s shooting and an obvious sadist, like the royal butcher, Johann Georg I, or Johann Georg II, Electors of Saxony from 1585-1689, who between them slaughtered over a quarter of a million animals of one sort or another, from deer to wild cats.

To-day, two much-discussed blood-sports are fox-hunting and bull-fighting. Both of these involve sadism. It does not mean that their followers are in other fields exceptionally cruel or unkind; but consider the essential facts. In the case of fox-hunting, all the features such as fine exercise for man and beast, in respect of which its admirers defend it, can be enjoyed to the full in the drag-hunt. Yet this latter has never won any popularity amongst fox-hunters, although the principal way in which it is distinguished from a genuine fox-hunt is that no animal’s life is always at stake, no animal’s body is in dire peril of mutilation and dismemberment. Is it unreasonable to conclude that the gratification which fox-hunting affords to sadism, latent or patent, is the chief if not the only reason why in civilized countries it is tolerated?

Take next, bull-fighting. The bull-fight has undoubtedly a much more vital element of fascination. At the start, where a spirited bull madly charges a bandelero, who, in consideration of an expected reward, has voluntarily entered the contest fully

conscious of the risk he is taking, to match his skill against that of the animal, it is a sportsmanlike affair, certainly highly dramatic. But later, when the bull, tired out by his efforts, has to be goaded into the arena by such expedients as firing inflammable material attached to the fatty part of his neck; when helpless old hack horses, who have finished their life of faithful service, are also turned into the arena, doomed to be ripped open and to dash round with their entrails dragging behind them entangled with their hoofs—and in some cases even to be patched up again and sent back for a second attempt—then bull-fighting becomes what in all essentials it really is—a mere pandering to bestial sadistic perversion and an insult to civilization.

I have no space in which to enumerate in detail the essentially sadistic elements in such “sports” as cock-fighting (the most stupidly morbid of the lot), rabbit and hare-coursing, stag-hunting, badger-hunting, and the shooting of birds for pleasure. It is really enough to point out that if the “torturing and killing” aspect of every one of these were removed, such “sports” would lose most of their popularity.

But this is unfortunately only the beginning. Besides blood-sports, there are all those activities related to trapping or snaring animals for furs or plumage; the confining of birds in cages; the exploitation of animals (sometimes “trained” with brutal cruelty) in circuses or theatres, and their retention in small cages. Not all these activities can be classed directly as sadistic in motive. But each one of them shows clearly that humanity is either unaware of, or unmoved by, suffering (and such intellectual unawareness would be impossible amongst people who really cared about cruelty). It follows that an insensitivity to cruelty is more widespread than ever it was suspected to be, and such insensitivity is generally a limited expression in reality of an unconscious ~~urge~~ towards cruelty, product of sadism.

It is, however, little cause for wonder that mankind with equanimity views the horrible sufferings to which it subjects

animals, or which it permits animals to endure. The treatment it accords to its own fellows who for one reason or another have aroused its resentment is equally appalling. Horrors inflicted on animals in the name of sport pale besides those inflicted on criminals in the name of justice.

It is popularly supposed that the abominable brutalities of the ancient penal system have given way to enlightened administration. Such a belief is justified by no more than a tendency which has been evident during the past hundred years in civilized communities.

We no longer hang a man for stealing either a sheep or a lamb, or throw him into a most foul prison for his inability to pay a small debt. Yet those mercies have arisen not so much because mankind has softened its heart, as because it has partly hardened its head, and it realizes now more clearly (although it took thousands of years of experience to drive the lesson home) that undue severity in punishing offenders against society does not diminish but rather tends to increase crime. Great severity of punishment is little of a deterrent to wrong-doing; it serves to encourage the more brutal rather than the less brutal crime. "May as well be hung for a sheep as for a lamb" is a popular memento of the fact, though its significance is still not widely appreciated.

Let us try to understand this point more fully. I do not wish to harrow my readers unduly, and I will content myself with the barest mention of some of those facts of history which have a special bearing on our enquiry.

In a most able and illuminating article, "Come Rack! Come Rope!" in the *New York Readers' Digest* for February, 1934, Mr. H. M. Robinson discusses with fine detachment the treatment which past ages have accorded to criminals, and even to suspected criminals. He asserts that every torment devised by nature, such as disease—

seems naïve and amateurish when compared with the studied sadism of the Middle Ages. . . . The ingenuity displayed in the construction of torture instruments—designed to inflict

the maximum amount of torture while permitting life to continue—shows that the whole system of punishment had been carefully studied and had the complete sanction of the Church and State. . . . The basic assumption was this: "Hurt a man enough and he will tell you the truth." The obvious comment . . . that he might . . . perjure himself to escape further agony, and also implicate others falsely, seems to have been entirely missed by jurists and inquisitors.

- He goes on to say that for centuries—

torture was universal and commonplace in Europe; no one was spared. Tender youth, weak old age, delicate females—everyone was liable to the degradation and agony of tortures arbitrarily and cunningly inflicted.

And then he proceeds to offer some explanation of this well-nigh incredible phenomenon:—

Before entering the awful torment-chamber of the Middle Ages, let us try to understand the general philosophy underlying torture. Why did men permit its use in judicial procedure? . . . Legal torture was the outcome of a barbarian device known as the "ordeal." To simple minds, it seemed probable enough that an innocent man, fortified by God's favour, should come unscathed through any physical ordeal that his judges might propose. Thus a man accused of murder or heresy was required to thrust his arm into a cauldron of boiling lead; if after a reasonable length of time his arm healed he was adjudged innocent; but if deterioration set in his guilt was considered proved.

When Roman law supplanted the ordeal through Europe, before sentence could be passed, it was necessary to secure testimony of guilt—preferably from the accused himself—and it was upon this cruel hook of self-incrimination that most mediaeval torture hung. The necessity of making a man testify against himself spurred inventive minds to the devising of such grisly mechanisms as the thumb-screw, the rack, the spiked hare, the Spanish Boot, the strappado, the tongue-tearer, and knobby crown.

I would mention in passing the Inquisition—that terrible blot upon the history of latter-day Christendom. Conceived, so

it is urged, in mercy, it became the most loathsome growth which ever emanated from diseased brains.

What was its conceptions? It was designed only to save a heretic from himself, and the arguments used in its defence were perfectly logical. Granted the truth of the belief that all who did not accept the tenets of the Holy Roman Church were doomed in after-life to an eternity of torment, then any means, however terrible, which would persuade the heretic to forgo the errors of his ways and embrace salvation, are justified. All earthly tortures must be limited in time, but hell's tortures are not, and in that respect must be infinitely worse.

Now it may be objected that it is an unlikely way of endearing your opinions to a man to tear his flesh with red-hot pincers. It may be said that if, under stress of his agony, he repents his beliefs and professes yours, he may always be making a private reservation which, although not known to you, is surely known to God, who will therefore add the sin of hypocrisy so that his last state will be worse than his first. It may be added that only God can *know* what He designs to do with us after death. It is true that if your own views are right, then they are provable and, if provable, must be accepted by all logical people and in so far as they are not accepted, the implication is that people are not wholly rational, and, to that extent, insane and not responsible for their failure to accept your beliefs.

Indeed, such objections to the practice of torturing a recantation out of heretics could be multiplied indefinitely. They are obviously overwhelming to the simplest impartial mind, and the fact that they have not always appeared so is surely significant.

Mr. Robinson, in dealing with secular, not ecclesiastical, torture, suggested that it rested simply upon the naïveté of the mediaeval jurist in believing that a man's confession under torture was sufficient justification for passing sentence upon him.

But is it possible to believe that such arguments really were whiz influenced those people? They were capable of supreme achievements in thought and literature; their science and their philosophy were alike epoch-making. They could not, therefore,

have been so nit-witted as to accept such plausible but empty sophistries unless non-rational factors compelled them. We cannot explain torture, ecclesiastic or secular, by insisting on the softness of our ancestors' heads. May we then invoke the hardness of their hearts?

To an extent it is probably true that our ancestors were slightly less sensitive to suffering in others than we are; but the literature they have left us, the historical records as well, prove them quite as capable as any modern of self-sacrifice, compassion, pity, and all those other emotions and acts which stamp the tender and the moral person.

It cannot be seriously maintained, in short, that our ancestors were very different from us, either in brain-power or in emotions. Yet they acted in a way more appropriate to devils than to humans. Why?

This question only requires an answer if it can be shown that their conduct is in any vital degree different from that of to-day. Now it is true that in the north-west corner of Europe respect for human life has augmented during the past century. In the British Empire, France, Belgium, Holland, the Scandinavian countries, North America (except scattered spots), and a few similar States, torture is no longer sanctioned; but what more can we say? Very little. That portion of the world forms an oasis of civilization in a desert of brutality.

It is not necessary to defend this statement; it is necessary only to make it to realize its truth. Since the Great War, violent political passions either of the Right or of the Left have delivered the rest of Europe over to tyrannies of one sort or another, under which torture has become the recognized methods of stamping out opinions not favourable to the regime in power. What is true of Russia, Germany, and Italy is true also of smaller powers like those of the Balkans. I need not elaborate this point; the newspapers of the western world have supplied all the evidence needed during the last ten years. Were any more required, it has been given by escaped prisoners, or by reports of committees of investigation.

Terror and torture, which, for a few short years prior to 1914, hid their ugly heads, are again rampant throughout the greater part of Europe, and the only way in which that Continent is distinguished from the Europe of four centuries ago is in the secrecy with which the terror operates. The growth of modern science has put into the hands of modern tyrants powers of torment not known to mediaeval torturers, and has given a power of censorship almost impossible to penetrate.

No impartial review of the post-war history of Europe could fail to disclose the fact that so far as its treatment of human beings is concerned, it is little better (indeed, it may be worse) than it was in the Middle Ages.

Asia, of course, has never escaped from barbarism, and life is as cheap to-day as it ever was, and torture as efficient and as prevalent. There remains America. In the South American republics still, and until lately in Mexico, cruelty has been the stock-in-trade of the party or the dictator temporarily in the ascendant. In North America, conditions approximate more to those of north-west Europe; but the United States, with its third degree police methods, its gangsters, and its lynchings, has little justification for congratulating itself on its civilization.

Lynching is perhaps the cruelty which above all others drives home the point I am seeking to make: that the common man and woman is to a greater or less degree possessed of a sadistic urge. As the matter is so germane to my argument, I will quote a few facts and figures. I should add, however, that because I isolate lynching, which is found principally in the Southern States of the U.S.A., I am by no means suggesting that these States are the worst quarters of the world. They are singled out by me simply because lynching is particularly apposite for my purpose.

I will start with the case of a coloured woman who was lynched in Georgia in May, 1918, because she had remarked that, "If she knew the names of the persons who lynched her husband the Saturday before, she would have them prosecuted," and for no other reason. This woman was in the eighth month of

pregnancy. She was hung head downward from a tree by her ankles.

"Gasoline from the automobiles was thrown on her clothing, and while she writhed in agony the mob howled in glee; a match was applied and the clothing burned from her person. . . . While she was yet alive, a knife, evidently one such as used in splitting hogs, was taken and the woman's abdomen was cut open, the unborn babe falling from her womb to the ground. The infant's head was crushed by a member of the mob with his heel."¹

If it be objected that this was an isolated case, let us remember that, on an average, over 100 lynchings a year occur in the U.S.A. If it be objected that civilized sensitive people are not prone to such impulses of wild sadism, consider the following test that was recently carried out. (I take the report from the *Readers' Digest*, condensed from Mr. Prescott Lecky's account in *Popular Science*.)

At the University of Iowa a student recently burst into a psychology classroom. Dramatically he gave details of a local kidnapping and cold-blooded murder. The criminal had been caught, had confessed, and a mob was forming to lynch him. At the height of the excitement 200 students answered the questions: How many would go and help the lynchers? How many would go along as spectators? How many would stay away? The student who brought the news acted so realistically that virtually the entire class was deceived in this staged test of mob psychology. The results picture what the average citizen is likely to do if he finds himself near a forming mob; if guilt is certain, 64 out of 200 people will take an active part. Sixty will go along as spectators. Only 76 will remain away. Thus, out of 200 people of better than average education, more than 120 will rush out to join or watch the mob.

But we cannot limit such behaviour to the student class of society. Enterprising tourist companies have organized special lynching excursions for the benefit of the public at large. Mr.

¹ I take this report verbatim from the January, 1919, *Report of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People*.

A. Gilmour, in an article which appeared in *Vanity Fair* (May, 1935) asserts that:—

despite a decline in lynching, it has developed into a spectacle, a grand sort of sport which draws huge "gates." Promoters—and that term is no exaggeration—frequently have excellent organizations. They easily circumvent the perfunctory objections of peace officers to their plans. They are aided by improved means of transportation, the telephone, the radio, and the Press—the latter being essential for bally-hoo and for furnishing a pictorial and reportorial account just as for any chartered amusement.

I need not elaborate the point further. It is proved beyond all doubt that the great majority of otherwise perfectly normal human beings will in certain circumstances dégenerate into mere savages and, throwing all pretence at civilization to the winds, participate in orgies of cruelty. Such conduct can only be explained if deep-seated, sadistic urges are invoked. History and contemporary human experience alike prove their universality and their terrifying power.

In these circumstances, it is not to be wondered at that the treatment of the ordinary criminal, even in the most advanced countries, is still as lacking in humanity or common sense. Even such nations as Britain and France behave towards their own criminals with a cold ruthlessness more reminiscent of the treatment they mete out to the subject-peoples of their empire than of civilized societies.

The earliest conception of the criminal placed him beyond the pale of human mercy and human consideration. Hence the most trivial of offences was visited with the most appalling punishments. I have already pointed out that such punishments did not lessen crime, but only drove the criminal to excesses he might not otherwise have committed, and that this lesson, learnt with painful slowness, seemed to reinforce a moral consideration urging reform.

Gradually the senses of man began to revolt against the degrading spectacles that were the stock-in-trade of criminal

law, and a new conception of crime and of the way in which to treat the criminal was born. It was conceded that often the criminal was as much sinned against by society as sinning; that to a greater or less extent he was not wholly responsible for his action; and that society, although entitled to protect itself against his degradations, had no right whatsoever to make a scapegoat of him. Finally, it was realized amongst a comparatively small section of the community that not all criminals were hopeless cases, but that with a certain amount of correction and training, and given a new start, a few could become respectable and valuable members of society.

Thus, slowly, the notion that punishment was designed for no other purpose than to hurt and pain the prisoner became partly superseded by the revolutionary idea that punishment needs to produce its educational or preventative justification.

Even to-day, however, this view of punishment as something designed for the benefit of the prisoner as well as for the protection of society is a long way from universal acceptance, and sadistic and vindictive sentences—particularly in political cases—are frequent in the criminal judicature of even the most enlightened countries of the world. It is, however, along the lines I have indicated that societies in every country—typical examples of which are the Howard League of Penal Reform and the newer Institute for the Scientific Treatment of Delinquency, located in England—are striving to influence the development of criminal law. And the realization that our treatment of crime is still far too punitive and scarcely at all reformist and remedial is at the basis of their work.

Such a realization cannot but prompt the suggestion that society's interest in crime can only spring from a motive not very dissimilar from the criminal's own. Often it is lower; he may be activated by an imperative urgency to feed himself or his children, but society in dealing with his delinquency appears often to use it only as an excuse for wreaking on him those violent aggressivities which we are just civilized enough

to restrain ourselves from manifesting towards people who are reasonably well-behaved.

If this view is correct—and there is little doubt but that it is wholly so—criminals are amongst the most pleasure-giving members of the social community. They become our whipping-boys, and permit us to work off our deep-seated hates and passions with the minimum of harm to ourselves. But that our good name in the ear of posterity will suffer appears inevitable, unless we are prepared to make an effort to understand and to control those primitive psychological forces in our make-up that at times turn the most reasonable of men into the most loathsome of beasts.

If we were just indifferent to unnecessary suffering in man or brute, it would be bad enough; if we were frankly cruel and gloried in the amount of pain we could inflict on living creatures, it would be dreadful; but, in a sense, we are far worse; not only are we indifferent to suffering in the main, and also at times eager to inflict it, but we surround our quite frightful actions with a halo of glory. If we wish to gratify our spites and hates against our fellow-men, we whip our children, although we assure them that it hurts them far less than it does us; or we jail or hang our criminals, although we do it under the pretence, which is false, that that stops crime. If such mild gratifications are incapable of satisfying our impulses to rend and main and hurt, we begin a pogrom or we declare war.

It is impossible, for example, to understand in any other terms the terrible persecutions of the Jews which have developed in Germany since the Nazi revolution. These persecutions, which have been extended to pacifists, communists, socialists, even liberals—all, in fact, who are insufficiently enthusiastic for Germany's new regime—offer a remarkable confirmation of the conclusion which emerged from our survey of lynching in the U.S.A. and I am tempted to examine them in more detail. But this chapter is already sufficiently full of horrors and, if I have not already established the universal existence of sadism, I shall not do so by citing more instances of its operations.

I have already pointed out the connection between sadism and sex, and between it and the development of the *libido*. Neither of the facts is open to dispute; but in connection with the former I will point out one very significant fact. It is that the "popular" book-shops which deal almost exclusively with erotic literature, such as the more *risqué* work of the French novelists, a class of cheap and trashy novelettes presented under lurid covers, a whole range of frankly pornographic monthly and weekly magazines, and "art" papers which appeal to the sexually starved, invariably display prominently in their window a host of volumes on torture. This is evidence of a relation between cruelty and sex-morbidity.

I revert, in conclusion, to my opening theme. Violence and cruelty are amongst the greatest and most prevalent evils of the world to-day. Freedom from violence, one of our forms of happiness can, however, never be realized until such time as humanity is prepared to study itself and to profit by the experience gained by psycho-analysts in their practices.

How this very difficult impulse may be managed is a problem I shall leave for discussion until the last chapter of this book, though I will comment on it in connection with the question of war, which I discuss in Chapter XII.

CHAPTER VI

MAN AND VIOLENCE

I now come to the problem which is the most pressing of our age—the problem of war. War to-day has become a sentence of death for civilization as we know it. That is not because man is more furiously violent than his forebears; in some directions it is possible, as I admitted in the last chapter, that he may be less so. It is entirely because his inventive skill has placed at his disposal weapons of such staggering destructive power that their use on the scale to which they are already prepared—and in the event of war their number and their effectiveness would multiply beyond computation—could literally destroy civilization.

I need not labour this point. I made it clear in my first chapter that man was in no need of having his problems enumerated for him. None of them has received more attention than the problem of war. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to say that in Europe, at least, the fear of war has reached a point at which it has become a neurosis. Whole populations are being reduced to a condition bordering on hysteria, and the most unlikely extremes of policy secure a hearing if their chief purpose is to minimize the risk of war by howsoever little.

Nor need I point out that elsewhere war is becoming a religion. In all fascist states the notion of it as an essential and an ennobling feature of man's life on this planet is being hourly inculcated into the population—into old and young, men, women, and children. It is difficult to tell (such is the effectiveness of a ruthless censorship) how far such propaganda is succeeding; but there seems impossibility to doubt that it is persuading large masses of people. This makes the future more gloomy for the world as a whole.

As in the cases of the other of the world's sicknesses, war too is nourished by many roots. These roots are variously economic, genetic, political, psychological, ethnological, and theological.

Of all the predisposing causes of war, the one which has been the most stressed in recent years is the economic. It is recognized that the Great War was largely precipitated by the struggle of rival groups over the Berlin-Baghdad Railway. The sinister part played by armament firms in fomenting international mistrust has received many exposures, of which Beverley Nichols's *Cry Havoc!* was an able popular summary. The imperialisms of the great powers are chiefly expressions of the rival clamour of their respective industrialists for new markets.

Since before-recorded history, the greatest wars have been due to the migration of peoples from over-populated regions. To-day, the excuse offered by every aggressor-nation is that the homeland is so over-crowded that its people must steal somebody else's land. There seems no possibility of holding this tendency in check, short of remedying over-population at its source by encouraging birth-control. When dictators and imperialists who clamour for the land of more prudently breeding peoples also promote large-family campaigns at home, their hypocrisy should be unmasked.

This must not blind us to the many truths contained in that book of two decades ago, *How Diplomats make War*. Even if other forces do work deeper beneath the surface, great issues sometimes hang upon the behaviour of one or a few politicians in key positions. And despite the frivolous attitude which the fascist countries and Japan have shown towards their treaty obligations, treaties still have much influence on the course of events. Even more important are the political forms under which people are organized, and peace will never be permanently secure until the peoples of the world have scrapped the antiquated machinery called nationalism and organize the world under an international equity tribunal, pooling their rival armaments in a single, democratically-controlled world police-force.

Ethnological factors can help determine whether a people will remain contented on its own soil. Thus such customs as alcoholism and tobaccoism—cravings deliberately acquired—

add their burden to life and to its unsatisfactoriness. Besides, in order to smoke when one wishes, one must make a habit of ignoring the rights of neighbours who are reticent to admit how unpleasant they find one's smell and litter. It is hard to believe that a fine fervour for universal justice and considerateness will come as naturally to those who keep themselves habitually nicotinized.

Some of the cruellest wars the world has known have been over questions of belief. In the days of Babylon most gods were tribal deities, to the extent that before there were city states there existed sacred temple states. In these the king was but the servant of the deity charged with defending and extending his estates. Local gods gave way to universal ones. To-day the gods are all threatened by supersession with ideologies—communism versus fascism—which we are called on to propagate in the same manner. When will man learn that the only way to settle questions is by scientific investigation and disinterested experiment?

Finally we come, however, to our main interest in this volume—the psychological forces which frustrate or facilitate the carrying out of our plans. Whatever are the *causes* of war—and they may be legion—it is clear that the *fact* of war depends completely upon man's willingness to fight. If, therefore, man were not, in any circumstances whatsoever, willing to fight, war would be impossible.

Here, then, is our problem. Why is man willing to fight? That it is far from simple to answer, for the reasons are, as everyone knows, multitudinous.

Within the space of a very long book they could scarcely be reviewed, let alone examined; and for me it is quite impossible to attempt even a survey. I shall therefore follow the method I have adopted throughout this book, and concentrate upon one or two psychological factors, the importance of which is perpetually overlooked.

I do not wish it to be thought that because I deal *in extenso* with only these few psychological motives that they are in

themselves sufficient to explain the phenomenon of war. Nor do I wish to imply that war is entirely a psychological phenomenon. I have several times already in this book defined my approach to man's problems, and I shall not do more here than remind my readers of the fact that the "rational" causes of war do not in themselves present unsuperable obstacles, but that until the underlying psychological motives are understood and cured, war will never be removed from the world.

I need not point out the bearing of the last chapter on the problem of war. Battle and strife offer an almost unparalleled opportunity for the expression of those sadistic impulses which in peace-time we are able to control often only with difficulty. So much is this the case that I am tempted to use war as the supreme example of the play of the sadistic urge, and I only refrain from this because there is another psychological factor which, in my view, is possibly even more instrumental in preparing those conditions in which war becomes inevitable. Before I proceed to discuss it in detail, however, I wish to follow my usual practice and point out in general terms a miscellaneous assortment of lesser psychological motives, all of which play their parts in building-up a war fever.

Consider, first of all, an auto-erotic motive such as narcissism. The narcissist likes to admire his own potency and power. As an individual human being he is limited in these, but his imagination allows him to identify himself with his nation. The weaker he is personally, the more may we expect him to clamour for national aggrandisement. The more timid he is, the more surely will he wish his nation to be aggressive to its neighbours.

Exhibitionism expresses itself in an analogous but slightly different way. Instead of a self-centred pride in belonging to an influential group or in possessing (collectively) a big battleship, there is a liking to parade whatever one is proud of before other persons. The simple private soldier's primitive pleasure in a strutting before girls in a smart uniform, and the

vanity of the young aristocrat who lets it be known he has joined a fashionable regiment, are direct expressions of this motive.

Allo-erotism is of a great deal of importance as the force binding a group together. In this connection Freud points out in his *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*:

We have only to think of the troop of women and girls, all of them in love in an enthusiastic sentimental way, who crowd round a singer or pianist after his performance. It would certainly be easy for each of them to be jealous of the rest; but, in face of their numbers, and the consequent impossibility of their reaching the aim of their love, they renounce it, and instead of pulling out one another's hair, they act as a united group, do homage to the hero of the occasion with their common actions.

Of the allo-erotic factors, homo-sexuality is of particular importance. We find this cruder aspect of this impulse functioning in the pleasure of being in physical contact with large numbers of one's own sex—a motive given by many men as among those responsible for their enlistment for the last war. I should point out that this same impulse, where sublimated, often serves as the basis for pacifism—love of fellow-men extended to embrace all mankind rather than just one's countrymen.

Hetero-sexuality, too, plays an important part in building up war psychology. One of the chief justifications for all recruiting and rearmament is that we must defend our women against enemy soldiery. That the latter are similarly arming and enlisting to defend their women against our rearmament is happily forgotten.

All these factors and many more that I have no space to mention find expression in war; but none of them finds fuller expression than sadism and that extremely misunderstood factor that Freud calls the Oedipus complex.

Before proceeding to show how this last factor enters into war-mindedness, I propose to explain in more detail than I

did in an earlier chapter how it develops and how it manifests itself in ordinary affairs.

The fundamental feature of the Oedipus complex is ambivalence. Ambivalence means liking and disliking a thing at one and the same time. In conscious thinking we estimate the value of any thing or of any proposed course of conduct or of any person in terms of what remains when we have subtracted our negative from our positive feelings for it. But in unconscious mental activity the two incompatible attitudes simply live on side by side, rendering our account, in consequence, contradictory or indecisive.

Ambivalent feelings frequently are directed against our parents. The child resents the fact that they sometimes thwart his wishes, even while he is grateful because they, and more immediately the mother, satisfy his needs, give him shelter, help and love him, and so nourish his own reciprocal love. This is, as a rule, the more pervasive and preponderant feeling. But that must not blind us to the fact that frequent occasions and outbursts of hate occur as well, and leave a strain of hate behind them. And we must in consequence also recognize, as a third and very important feature of the child's psychic life, that the hate and the love must occasionally come into direct collision and lead to a recurring conflict in the child's mind. That these conflicts emerge in later life often with disastrous effects is not readily appreciated.

A case known to me was that of the daughter of a woman who was the binding force of the home, but of irascible temperament. In comparison with the father, who was held in contempt for his improvidence, intemperance, and general non-dependability, the mother was looked up to for her relative strength and loved for her greater emotional depth. Unfortunately, her irascibility caused her to be both violent and inconsistent in the disciplining of her family. Under the daughter's love, therefore, were hidden opposite feelings of hate. In after life, her relationship to other women was disastrously affected with the projections (at least a great many of

them), of this ambivalent attitude about her mother. She would, for example, handle her servants at first with unusually sympathetic concern for their welfare, and then would quite suddenly treat them much more distantly; such sudden fluctuations of her favour made them first jealous among themselves and then disloyal to her. To a less extent she sometimes produced the same misunderstandings among her women friends.

Another example of such ambivalence (this time towards the opposite sex) is that of a man whose wife went abroad. He had a job in London and could not easily accompany her, but he was obsessed with the feeling that he was very guilty in not joining his wife. His guilt was increased by the fact that a baby was about to be born. Yet the moment he made up his mind to go to her, considerations such as that he would lose his position and be unable to support his wife and child rose up with overwhelming force. Now although it is not unnatural that he should have had both these sets of contradictory considerations in mind, it was abnormal that in an eternity of alternation he should be obsessed by them instead of eventually reconciling himself to renounce either. In the result he was incapable of any definite course of action at all.

Ambivalence towards other members of the family is usually the result of jealousy. The child who imagines that his claims are passed over on account of a favourite is likely to resort to exactly the worst possible tactics to try to remedy this. Feeling that he does not get his share of love, he becomes morbidly sensitive about it, and tries to get attention by pushing in on every possible occasion. This aggressiveness has, of course, the very opposite effect from that intended; it alienates instead of attracting people. But despite the folly of such conduct, it is often persisted in.

Take the case of a little boy known to me, to whom a baby sister was born. Walter had been his mother's only and dearly loved child until, when he was two years and seven months old, she was taken away to a nursing home to give birth to a baby daughter. After a short separation he was brought there

to see her. He came joyfully bounding into the room, but suddenly stopped short. It was difficult to believe that he would so quickly have realized the situation. It is hard to explain how the child could have appreciated the significance to him of the tiny red mite of humanity that she held in her arms, but he turned and went out of the room, nor could he be persuaded to go back. Not until the third visit to his mother could he be induced to enter her room. Everyone talked to him about the happiness in store with his little sister as a playmate, but for a long period there were all kinds of manifestations of jealousy. Outwardly these gradually disappeared, but the change was more superficial than fundamental, because although he developed feelings of affection towards his sister, the real change was one of policy or acting. Realizing that his feelings of jealousy were regarded with disapproval by his family, he had simply repressed them.

Now it is not easy to account either for the suddenness or the intensity of the jealousy such a young child shows on any normal grounds. Never having seen baby before, having no experience at all of how she would affect his status, or of how his own mother would react towards her, the child lacked all the logical essentials for the arousing of jealousy. Yet jealous he was; and I can only explain it by invoking the idea of transference. The jealousy was not new; only the object upon which it was directed was different.

Before Janet was born, Walter had been frequently jealous of his father. Sometimes, particularly if he were sitting on his mother's knee, the mere approach of his father would produce tears and pleas to "Go away. Mummy, please make Daddy go away."

Here in a nutshell are the essentials of the famous Oedipus complex, which comes to a head usually between the sixth month and the end of the third year of a child's life. Let us enumerate these essential factors or characteristics in order.

First, a special excitability and intensity of feeling (which applies patently with the same force to his love for his mother)

as to the boy's hatred of his father, the powerful, privileged, and excluding rival. Secondly, a specially sharp focus of this feeling on the father's bodily privileges with the mother, and, above all, on the most intimate privilege of all. Thirdly, and issuing from this, an incompatibility between this attitude of resentment and jealousy of the father's own demands and imposed conditions, and the boy's growing desire to live in greater unison with him. And fourthly, by a paradox which is easily made intelligible, an actual enhancement of this very desire for unison.

Owing to the boy's strong wish to remain friends with his father, other male persons are sought for unconsciously as substitutes for the father in order that the hostile feelings may be displaced from him on to them.

What are the origins of this curious tangle of conflicting emotions? That their roots are to be found in early babyhood is evident, and I would remind the reader of what I have already said as to how sensual is an infant's attachment to his mother. The male child (especially) is jealous of anyone who comes between her and himself, even if it be his own father. A child tends to be monopolistically minded whether about his toys or his loves, and in consequence wishes to have his mother all to himself. Doubtless at other times he feels very strong affection for his father, or for brothers and sisters, but this affection arises definitely later than does his initial love for his mother.

Such is the conclusion established by innumerable psycho-analyses, and it has been confirmed by direct observation of very young infants. When the boys are older they sometimes cease to manifest antagonism to father and brothers openly. But analyses and many symbolic actions show that the antagonism has not been eliminated or otherwise satisfactorily dealt with, but has only been repressed by positive feelings of affection towards father or brother, and by feelings of duty towards them which dominate consciousness.

What, then, becomes of the repressed feelings? They remain

as operative as before, and indeed combine with the primeval impulse of aggression as also with sadism; but having been repressed, they have to express themselves covertly or in a sublimated form.

The most usual way they do this is by giving exaggerated force to the reaction against some trivial offence. Let us say the father speaks to the boy a little more sharply than an occasion requires; the latter, instead of resenting his father's anger for a moment and then forgetting it, broods over the injustice of it for half a day.

A second way is by inhibiting the performance of what was consciously intended to be a friendly act. The boy is asked, we will say, to bring his father a certain object. He expresses ready consent, but is so tardy starting as to exasperate the father; or he starts briskly but stumbles, letting the object fall and break.

A third way is the one which has most importance for us in this chapter. It consists in splitting up the infantile image of the father into a good-father-image and a bad-father-image, and then identifying one or both of these with some other male person. Normally, the good image is kept for the real father, who is accordingly loved with much less conflict, and the evil image is transferred to some other male member of the family, such as an uncle or to a schoolmaster or other outsider, who then becomes hated. The persistence within the unconscious of this father-hate long after we have suppressed the very memory of such feelings from consciousness is evidenced constantly in psycho-analysis.

Let me describe, for the purpose of illustration, a couple of analytic hours with a former patient of mine.

He began the earlier hour by commenting on his hostility to other people. He next turned to the topic of a sense of unreality which constantly troubled him, and mentioned three instances. One was the reading of a novel by Ethel Mannin about a man who had received a physical scar from his mother, which symbolized an emotional hurt he had received. The second was how, when about five years old, he had seen a policeman

shoot a man—this memory was evoked in an effort to recall something that was not so unreal to him. The third concerned a memory of about the same time, of how a church had been built on land owned by his grandfather.

I pointed out to the patient that this was not the first time that he had linked up ideas connected with hostility with a sense of unreality. Indeed, it was not hard to understand how the former attitude rendered him averse to facing up squarely to some of the human factors in life.

Ethel Mannin's story had been indeed about an action which might be interpreted as hostile, the inflicting of a scar by a mother or her son, i.e. his mutilation (= castration) by a woman.

The shooting affair definitely was an extreme type of a hostile action by one man against another, and it was significant that the patient remarked he had been very anxious the man should get away from the policeman. It was a clear case of his taking the side of the child against the father.

In the second hour he started off:

I dreamed last night that my wife was in bed with a stranger, and I was in the same room. I went over to the window and looked out of it. I wanted to go out but felt it would not be proper for me to do so while a stranger was in bed with my wife.

In a second scene my father and a crowd of other people were present, all of them extremely sad.

My wife walked up to a man and kissed him. I said to myself, "I believe that I ought not to allow this, but ought to get angry and strike this fellow." So I walked up to him and knocked him down. I then banged his head on the floor many times as hard as I could. All the same I felt somehow impotent.

The stranger was the same man in both dreams. He was blond. The only blond man I can now think of was a cousin of mine. When I was a boy I used to think of him as someone extremely strict and I admired him. Later I remember him as having an affair with a girl, whereupon I felt that I also ought to have an affair with the same girl.

The dream was found to represent a number of ambivalent attitudes on his part. The scene of his wife in bed with his cousin expressed the wish that she might give him some excuse for breaking with her; secondly, the wish by inversion of persons that he himself dared to be unfaithful to his wife; and, thirdly, the wish, through the identification of himself with the blond cousin, to be himself able to be more intimate with her.

His scrupulousness about leaving the room signifies on the one hand a feeling that he should guard his wife, and on the other part of a scopophilic desire to witness sexual intercourse between a man and a woman, ultimately his father and mother.

The thrashing of the man in the second scene is obviously a fulfilment of wishes directed against his father, who is protected in the dream from the admission of anything of this sort by being made to sit sadly aside. The sadness of the father and spectators is presumably a cover-mechanism to conceal the pleasure that accompanies any infidelity on his part to his wife.

What is more natural than that a child should have this hatred in him? He can only take his parents as he finds them, in relation to his own desires, demands, and feelings. If at times they refuse him gratifications, or force particular ways of behaviour on him, how can they appear to him as other than hateful? He knows nothing about their higher motives (assuming these are always there) or about his own ultimate good, not until he has reached a fairly advanced stage of intellectual development. He just knows that they are behaving to him in a way he resents, and are so far hateful. Afterwards, when he has learnt to love them, he tries to absolve them from his hatred by projecting it on to substitutes. Even children may serve him in this capacity. Indeed, when we are grown up, we are tempted to think of our own children when they thwart our wishes as in childhood we thought of our parents.

In this connection, the case comes to my mind of a woman whose child represents to her the sole obstacle to her getting a divorce from her husband. She has, therefore, a real antagonism towards this child, but it is hidden from herself by a

constant fear that something dreadful is going to happen to it. In consequence, she takes such elaborate precautions for its welfare as make the child very uncomfortable. It is never allowed to go out by itself in the street, always has to have a nurse, and cannot even play in the garden unless someone is there. It is wrapped up in excessive flannels in winter time, and altogether its life is made miserable. Thus the antagonism finds a substituted expression in a form that is superficially free from any risk of censure and is altogether praiseworthy.

Such complexity of expression is typical of the working of the Oedipus complex. It might, for example, be imagined that to rescue one's father from peril must always be an act of friendship, not of hatred; but Freud has found in his elaborate analyses of a multitude of men's dreams, based on this theme, that such a view is frequently utterly at fault.

It speedily became apparent that the friendliness was far from real in the sense in which it was so if a man rescued his mother and not his father from peril. The emphasis in the dream was always given to the fact that the father was put into a position from which he needed rescuing, in which he needed the help of his son. By making him dependent upon the goodwill and superior powers of the son, the dreamer reverses the roles they respectively occupy in real life.

The strength of the hatred and resentment which is generated in a son sometimes assumes terrifying proportions. Of course, since by the very nature of the complex, this resentment rarely finds direct expression, it is found in a sublimated form—e.g. the would-be parricide becomes an actual hangman, and so satisfies not only the desire to kill, but the conscience which says killers should be punished (hanged). Extreme instances of this factor and of its moulding of the life of the adult are not far to seek.

I remember a case in point. He was a major in the army, unmarried, and little interested in the society of either men or women. His life was devoted to "sport." In the late summer and autumn he went north for the shooting, and in the winter

came south for the hunting. In between the seasons he lived on a barren little island he owned, where he was only happy when out with his dog and gun, seeking some creature to kill or maim. His great longing was so fierce that he was driven far east, too, in search of real big-game hunting. This was his whole existence.

The fact that he was not, so far as I could discover, guilty of any exaggerated cruelties in his sport, that his passion was to kill things, not to inflict pain on them, may absolve him from a direct charge of sadism, although I should say that dark urge almost certainly played some part in fashioning his life. He might owe some of his passion for murder to a false standard of "inherited" values—derived from a military and sport-loving family, but the intensity of his passion could hardly have been accounted for by that source.

What was infused through and through it was hatred: a hatred that civilized conventions and training alike forbade him to express openly; and the results of the analysis of cases similar to his permit of no doubt that that hatred was sprung ultimately from the Oedipus complex.

Men who live only to kill are rare, but they are of vital importance to an army. I know of a sergeant-major who was decorated for his bravery in holding a machine-gun post during the war under circumstances of particular gallantry. His section had been wiped out to a man, and across a shell-pitted No-Man's Land were advancing masses of grey-clad figures. For twenty minutes he had, although wounded three times, continued firing his gun, never ceasing to pour death and destruction into the oncoming soldiers until his ammunition was exhausted.

The incident is not unusual in the annals of the Great War; what is unusual was his own attitude towards it. He boasted afterwards that no other man single-handed had ever killed so many of his fellows in such a short time, and confessed that the incident had been the supreme moment of joy in his life.

Although I have said that such extreme instances are com-

paratively rare, they are more numerous than most people suspect. The fact that they occur at all is evidence (since people differ only relatively) that in mankind as a species there exist feelings of this nature, if of less degree. We may conclude that the opportunity to kill is one that is welcomed on occasions by enormous numbers of men. The influence which such an attitude has upon war and recruiting for war I need not stress; what I will stress is the connection between this attitude and the Oedipus complex of childhood.

Still this is only a particular illustration of a general factor. It is not difficult to see how the anger and resentment of a child towards its father during a long process of sublimation becomes successively directed onto such objects, as school-masters, policemen, and magistrates, nor how much resentment may conduce to the commission of all sorts of crimes of violence. In some cases the sublimation may be carried on and on until at last the hatred becomes directed upon an object that the whole community agrees in disliking. What more likely object is there than "the enemy," who thus fulfils the extremely important function of providing intense expression for the repressed father-hate of childhood? The desire to "punish" the enemy then becomes a consuming passion, and a harmless citizen becomes a fanatical supporter of a ruthless war policy.

Thus the fact we found true of sadism is so again of the Oedipus complex—the greatest opportunity which life offers for its expression is presented in war. Those hatreds which in peace-time smoulder in every human soul, varying only in intensity, become licensed then to vent themselves upon the national enemy. One is allowed—nay, ordered—to march against this symbol of the evil father with gun and bayonet, bomb and flame-thrower. The more one tortures, maims, and kills him, the more is one praised. So let there be a holiday from pity.

So completely are the hostile feelings displaced on to the foe, or on to whomsoever seems to show him the least sympathy,

either by trying to explain his point of view, or questioning the complete righteousness of one's own, that only love remains for friends and allies. This phenomenon of the cessation of all quarrels and union of all parties at home in a general spirit of *bonhomie* when hate is directed against a foreigner, has been remarked on by many observers, exploited by tottering sovereigns, and made the basis of many eulogies of war. As for the enemy, every cruelty may be perpetrated on him because he is the embodiment of all that is vile, criminal, treacherous, and beastly. Our own country and its allies are fighting him, so it is felt, purely from defensive reasons, after intolerable provocation and in a flawless cause.

Our culture contains all merit and theirs none. Our soldiers never commit atrocities, but have a monopoly of all chivalrous qualities. And when they come home on leave food, drink, women, and sometimes even money are theirs for the asking, nay, are forced on them by generous and mutually loving patriots.

Since this phenomenon takes place equally among the belligerent peoples on both sides, it is clear that the dethronement of their reason has been accomplished by the upsurging of most powerful emotions. No other danger of death, not even from a catastrophic cause like an earthquake, unhinges men's reason and leads them to completely insane judgments about each other as does war. If we would understand this, then we must look for some force stronger than the fear of death—something which can drive men to sacrifice their lives.

Psycho-analysis had made it clear such a force is present in the Oedipus complex. Let me finally recapitulate the main points of the argument. To the infant, with his enormous self-esteem, there can seem to be only one explanation of the fact that his mother gives a share of her embraces to anyone but himself; it is that they are forced upon her against her will. The more openly the father and mother make love before him, therefore, the more is built up in the child's imagination the picture of an ogre-father, prototype of all future villains, assaulters, and rapers.

Our native land feeds, clothes, and educates us. She therefore becomes to us our *mother*-country whom we love truly as we love our flesh-and-blood mother. When foreign troops threaten our country, we describe their action as one of invading or assaulting her, thus showing who in our unconscious minds we think they are. All the allies in the Great War, for example, felt *outraged* by the *rape* of Belgium.

Unconscious fear of an assault on our mother, therefore, is largely responsible for the clamour that our country shall be “protected” against potential evil father-figures by the largest army or navy or air-fleet which we can wring out of the tax-payers. It is this illusion largely which sees to it that as fast as new gains for humanity are made by technical science, the goods they produce are swallowed up by just so much the larger armaments.

It would not be fair, and it would not be scientific, to close this chapter without pointing out that the Oedipus complex may, in certain limited circumstances, work violently against war and in favour of pacifism. This ideal is less frequently achieved, but amongst so-called (and aptly-called) “militant” pacifists its working is clear.

In their case, the mother-idea has progressed beyond the mere geographical unit of the nation or country and embraces the whole world. Hence all soldiers and all those like armament manufacturers and jingoistic statesmen who aid and encourage soldiers are conceived of as father-villains, and it is against them that the heat and passion of the pacifists’ latent father-hates are directed.

Yet these circumstances occur more rarely, for the pacifists are still a minority. If, however, we are willing to learn from psychology—and with the incentive of protection against war to spur us we might be encouraged to do so—then it is clear that one of our first lessons will have to be how to direct and harness the enormous forces latent in the Oedipus complex for the destruction of war, and not, as so unhappily obtains to-day, for the destruction of mankind.

CHAPTER VII

MAN AND HIS BREAD

WITH the present chapter we come to a problem which has been so much in the forefront of discussion that its introduction here needs no apology. It is the problem, in short, of man's struggle to obtain satisfaction of his economic needs.

To the more naïve of my readers there may seem, indeed, to be no very complicating factors in the problem. Wealth is the reward, so our fathers taught us, of work and intelligent management. For all the people to enjoy comfort, what is needed is to teach all these simple truths, increase their efficiency, and exhort them to the sobriety and prudent saving of earnings which will secure them against old age and spells of unemployment.

In this simple view of the matter there is contained a deal of sound advice which is altogether too much neglected to-day. Our populations would be better off if they included a greater measure of the old-fashioned virtues in their make-up. Yet the view in its completeness to-day will be acceptable only to people who know nothing of the great struggle going on between capital and labour.

Others will point out that while superior talents or energy may enable one worker to better his position relatively to his fellows, it is not possible for the whole mass of the workers to rise appreciably by this means. The comfortable positions are reached only through a kind of officership which is paid a disproportionate share of the wealth created by the group as a whole. Moreover, in the jockeying to obtain these better positions, patient merit is far from being the only factor in success. Favouritism, intrigue, and sharp practice are often more efficacious. A century ago it was taught that the free bargaining of workers and employers over the conditions of work would result in every man getting a fair equivalent of the services he

had to offer, while competition between business men would ensure that goods were made and distributed at the lowest cost.

But the scale and complexity of industrial organization to-day have frustrated these hopes. The worker cannot bargain with the employer on equal terms, because he cannot hold out more than a short while against the danger of destitution for his family, and so he has had to combine with other workers in unions. On the other hand, the largest industries are so powerful and the plants which they require are so expensive that to start up in competition with them is becoming hopelessly difficult and they can charge exorbitant prices.

The resulting state of the world is one of immense antagonistic groups of capital and labour arrayed against one another and against the business groups of foreign countries. In such conflicts, capital is again at an advantage in that it is able, and too often unscrupulously does, use its financial resources to obtain favourable legislation, affect judicial decisions, influence public opinion, corrupt labour's own leaders and (in America at all events) hire thugs to provoke violence in a manner to bring in the armed forces of the State on its side.

Without going into the infinitely greater number of details which might be given, this will perhaps show from ego-drive grounds the felt need on labour's part of going into politics on its own. The general movement known as socialism represents an attempt on the part of the masses to seize control of the government which they feel to be unduly subservient to their antagonist, much as a man in a personal fight would seize the weapon his enemy brandished over him. Socialists then propose that their government should force enough loyal and capable representatives of the people on to the boards of all great corporations to ensure that the entire production and distribution of goods were co-ordinated and run, without the waste inherent in the present duplication of plants and elaborate competitive marketing, for the service of the public more than (as now) the profits of a few.

I am not interested in discussing here at length the details for such a plan or for its feasibility, points on which the reader can inform himself by obtaining books on socialism. The point I wish to make is that the proposed reform has received so much public discussion that mankind if logical should have made up its mind about it one way or the other. Instead, men equally well informed of the arguments nevertheless range themselves in violently opposed camps.

As with other controversies, this one is affected by its sister-movements, namely those in genetics, politics, mental hygiene, ethnology, and philosophy.

We come next to the second movement which is of importance for socialism: namely, birth-control. In the degree that workers in over-populated slums breed uncontrolledly like animals, the *morale* of their union organizations must always break down under pressure of hunger and the "black-legs" it breeds. Starvation provides strike-breakers in numbers which it is impossible to restrain. Wages go down to a bare subsistence level, and this completes the vicious circle by making it hard for the unions to collect fighting-funds among their members.

International relations have their influence upon economic organization. Armaments to-day is the extravagance upon which nations squander a large portion of all the surplus wealth which is created by invention, improved industrial organization, and the toil and self-denial of the millions. But for it a vast flood of wealth would flow into housing, popular education, and general improvement of living conditions, with the incidental result of the working class being everywhere more capable of carrying on its fight for a greater control on the direction of industry. Pointing to the impending menace of foreign war has long been a ruse of tyrants and dictators for diverting the attention of the masses from domestic problems, and will remain so until national is replaced by international organization.

Sensory naturalism also is a help to workers who practise

it, and for several reasons. Abstinence from tobacco makes for personal efficiency and vigour; it also is notably characteristic of those who are zealous in a movement rather than of the slackers. Moreover, the old tobacco pipe has solaced many a worker into acquiescence with his lot who might otherwise have struck a blow for better conditions. Finally, what a tremendous financial drain upon the poor family's purse is represented by this worse than useless expenditure—money which might so much better have gone to the purchase of the children's milk, the decencies and comforts which make a home, or have helped to swell contributions to the union or the party funds. As a Mr. M. Woods put it in the *No Tobacco Journal*:

The labouring man and his family have no worse enemy than tobacco. Returning from the work of the day with a pittance, larder empty, children half-clad . . . he is under the influence of that discontent which would soon effect a betterment of his estate. . . . But there on his mantel . . . lies a pipe . . . and soon under the power of its influence, what cares he for the misery of his condition, the cough of his pallid wife, the helpless cry of half-fed children . . . for with a garrulous newspaper in his hand and a pipe in his mouth he is now translated into a listless paradise.

As a final influence on economics and ultimately the greatest of all, there is the growth of the scientific temper and technique. Modern socialism calls itself "scientific" in opposition to the older, utopian kind of Fourier and St. Simon. The altered type of industry which has created it is itself the outcome of applying technical methods to manufacture, and socialism in its turn aspires to be the application to economics as a whole of the technical acumen which has proved so valuable when applied to various parts of the production-process.

With so much of preamble, I can come to the effect on industrial controversies of a spread of psycho-analytic understanding of motives and subsequent clarification of issues. I am first

giving the briefest possible suggestions as to how the very earliest erotisms, the oral ones, are connected with the trait of greed.

Then I pass at once to anal productive erotism, noting the shameless obsession of infants with anal interests, and the signs that these persist into adulthood unconsciously. The production of faeces will be found to be the archetype of giving and of the generous human character which a socialist order might require. Training in cleanliness is the beginning of industrially valuable habits of tidiness and method, and the desire industrially for the greater orderliness of the planned society of socialism.

Anal retentiveness will be credited with giving us misers, thrift, our banking systems and capitalist, co-operativist and collectivist ventures in cheap production and marketing. I shall argue that it underlies that hatred of being exploited which fires so much socialism. It also underlies the interest in manipulation and construction which is of an importance in industry at least comparable with that of the love of gain and which interests people in such things as Five-Year Plans, and in reconstructing our whole industrial order. But we do not like ourselves to be the subjects of others' manipulations, manipulations which unluckily this eroticism also fosters. Obstinate and irritability are other results of anal erotism, results which embitter all struggles over money-matters, and are seen prominently in the character of Karl Marx. Finally, the struggle against anal retentiveness establishes ideals of effort and work. Such factors as these cause the socialists to point with scorn at citizens who live on an income from investments, instead of earning their living, and even to postulate that the value of an article is measured only by the labour which goes to its making.

The archetypal valuable material we shall find to be excrement. For this is substituted, in time, a series of other substances, culminating in gold or money. Hence the disposal of, and abandonment of, the mercantilist theory of trade by pro-

fessional economists has by no means been imitated by the laity; hence also the psychological importance of the "gold standard." The despising of money-mindedness (i.e. rendering gold back into its original anal terms) leads many people to condemn capitalism. Others in the same way find socialism "too materialistic."

Such is the skeleton of the argument which I shall try now to complete. It has been shown by Dr. Edward Glover¹ and others that fixation at the early oral-erotic level of libido-development can cause the character-traits of "spoiledness" with its parasitism and temper-tantrums. Obviously, the ramifications of this through economic phenomena is a rich vein awaiting exploitation. But I propose to reserve the discussion of early oral eroticism for that chapter where I am concerned with the smoking habit in connection with which the operation of that eroticism is more clearly seen. With the later stages of oral eroticism, greediness seems to be associated, and this again opens up another tempting field for discussion, but one which, for reasons of space, I cannot explore.

Springing out of this stage of libido-development are sadism and masochism, with their associated tendencies towards masterfulness and submissiveness. Some hints are given by Professor J. M. Williams and M. Henri de Man of the influence of these tendencies, both on employers and on employees.² But I shall forgo this tempting topic also, and reserve mention of these motives for the chapter devoted to militarism and pacifism.

We cannot, however, in any discussion of the way psychological motives operate in economics treat the anal erotisms so sketchily. For, except for the Oedipus complex, no other impulses so greatly affect economic conduct.

Let me start with a short explanation of what this eroticism

¹ See index of the *International Journal of Psycho-analysis*, London.

² Williams (J. M.): *The Foundations of Social Psychology*. De Man (H.): *The Psychology of Socialism*, trans. Paul (E. and C.), London, 1928, pp. 374-75

giving the briefest possible suggestions as to how the very earliest erotisms, the oral ones, are connected with the trait of greed.

Then I pass at once to anal productive erotism, noting the shameless obsession of infants with anal interests, and the signs that these persist into adulthood unconsciously. The production of faeces will be found to be the archetype of giving and of the generous human character which a socialist order might require. Training in cleanliness is the beginning of industrially valuable habits of tidiness and method, and the desire industrially for the greater orderliness of the planned society of socialism.

Anal retentiveness will be credited with giving us misers, thrift, our banking systems and capitalist, co-operativist and collectivist ventures in cheap production and marketing. I shall argue that it underlies that hatred of being exploited which fires so much socialism. It also underlies the interest in manipulation and construction which is of an importance in industry at least comparable with that of the love of gain and which interests people in such things as Five-Year Plans, and in reconstructing our whole industrial order. But we do not like ourselves to be the subjects of others' manipulations, manipulations which unluckily this eroticism also fosters. Obstinacy and irritability are other results of anal erotism, results which embitter all struggles over money-matters, and are seen prominently in the character of Karl Marx. Finally, the struggle against anal retentiveness establishes ideals of effort and work. Such factors as these cause the socialists to point with scorn at citizens who live on an income from investments, instead of earning their living, and even to postulate that the value of an article is measured only by the labour which goes to its making.

The archetypal valuable material we shall find to be excrement. For this is substituted, in time, a series of other substances, culminating in gold or money. Hence the disposal of, and abandonment of, the mercantilist theory of trade by pro-

fessional economists has by no means been imitated by the laity; hence also the psychological importance of the "gold standard." The despising of money-mindedness (i.e. rendering gold back into its original anal terms) leads many people to condemn capitalism. Others in the same way find socialism "too materialistic."

Such is the skeleton of the argument which I shall try now to complete. It has been shown by Dr. Edward Glover¹ and others that fixation at the early oral-erotic level of libido-development can cause the character-traits of "spoiledness" with its parasitism and temper-tantrums. Obviously, the ramifications of this through economic phenomena is a rich vein awaiting exploitation. But I propose to reserve the discussion of early oral erotism for that chapter where I am concerned with the smoking habit in connection with which the operation of that erotism is more clearly seen. With the later stages of oral erotism, greediness seems to be associated, and this again opens up another tempting field for discussion, but one which, for reasons of space, I cannot explore.

Springing out of this stage of libido-development are sadism and masochism, with their associated tendencies towards masterfulness and submissiveness. Some hints are given by Professor J. M. Williams and M. Henri de Man of the influence of these tendencies, both on employers and on employees.² But I shall forgo this tempting topic also, and reserve mention of these motives for the chapter devoted to militarism and pacifism.

We cannot, however, in any discussion of the way psychological motives operate in economics treat the anal erotisms so sketchily. For, except for the Oedipus complex, no other impulses so greatly affect economic conduct.

Let me start with a short explanation of what this erotism

¹ See index of the *International Journal of Psycho-analysis*, London.

² Williams (J. M.): *The Foundations of Social Psychology*. De Man (H.): *The Psychology of Socialism*, trans. Paul (E. and C.), London, 1928, pp. 374-75

is. If we eliminate our own assumptions as to what a well-brought up child should pay attention to, and what he should not, if we recognize that children are not born well-brought up, we shall not expect them to refuse attention to anything about their bodies that actually challenged it. Prominent among these things will be their excretory processes and products; so we shall expect children to be thoroughly interested in them. I shall bring abundant evidence to show that we actually find this to be the case, up to the time when external pressure has driven back the interest, and prevented it from expressing itself flagrantly.

The child is, moreover, greatly occupied in his phantasy with his excretory activities, achievements, and products, and this interest is of three types. The first two are functional—productive and retentive. The third is an interest in the excreted product. It is necessary first to say a word concerning these in a general sense.

The shamelessness of infants habitually shocks any "nicely brought up" person on whom the care of babies is thrust for the first time. She notes that following upon the mouth-zone, as the first region of the sort, a new and self-centred focus of unabashed interest has developed in the bodily area concerned with defecation, as the child becomes aware of the recurring cycle of experience bound up with it.

The existence of such a focus of interest in the child seems to many people at first a monstrous idea, but the fact that people are so shocked is only evidence of the early training by which we are made to shut that whole cycle of experience out of our acknowledged life in alternate disgust and disregard. But the baby at the first knows nothing of all this. He innocently attends to whatever makes any sufficiently marked call on his attention. If we come to think of it, what an extraordinary and unnatural thing it would be if that whole recurring cycle of events did not attract his attention and arouse his interest! And it is not long before he realizes that the outer world, i.e. his mother, also shares his interest, even if not quite to the same purpose.

It must be remembered that an infant finds tremendous pleasure in defecation. So much so, that it is difficult to cure him of trying to prolong the process. A baby is concerned with all its digestive processes and excretae, solid, liquid, and gaseous, and with the distinct sensations connected with them.

Through the first months, his attitude remains one of shamelessness about his functions. At fourteen months, he does not submit willingly to outside control of his anal sphincter muscles. That the shamelessness continues longer is shown by these two notes by W. de Kok on infants of four and a half and of two and three-quarter years:

A week ago Julia (4.6) and Christopher (2.9) went for a walk in the fields with me. Julia asked to "go to the lavatory," so I took her to the hedge and told her to be quick. She was extremely interested in the evacuation of the motion which, as she was not on a seat, she had an opportunity of watching. Christopher, too, was greatly interested, and sat down to watch her. My first reaction was "Dirty little monsters," but, on thinking things over, I decided that undoubtedly excretion, like every other function, is marvellous and perhaps even more so to a child than an adult. As soon as the performance was over, they were running off and marvelling at the berries, the cows, the rabbits in much the same way.¹

Moreover, as inhibitions imposed by nurse or mother begin to interfere with open enjoyment of the excretory processes, substitutive behaviour is found for these processes by "displacement upward" on to activities, the nature of which is sufficiently related to the original for purposes of enjoyment, yet are activities which have not been specifically put under a ban. Such a displacement was clearly evident on an occasion at table in her infants' school, described by Mrs. Susan Isaacs, when:

There was again much spitting and bubbling at lunch, and the children showed each other the food protruding from their mouths.²

¹ De Kok (W.): *New Babes for Old*, London, 1932, pp. 103-104.

² Isaacs (S.): *Social Development in Young Children*, London, 1933, p. 113.

During the time that these interests are predominant in young children, one of the activities in which they engage is masturbation of the anal region. So strong is, however, the shame which becomes connected with this activity, as the result of parental attitudes and reprimands, that all memories in connection with it are normally quite blotted out almost before childhood is ended. Close observations of children, however, make it certain that such activities are universal at some age.

Moreover, the analysis of normal individuals as well as of neurotics nearly always reveals facts which point back to their early period. A common habit which is easily traceable to such period is that of nose-picking. The disgust which this habit inspires is itself an indication that the meaning of the original anal-masturbatory activity symbolized by it is understood, if only unconsciously, by the beholder.

Such facts as these make clear the overwhelming interest which an infant takes in its excretory processes, and how this interest survives in one form or another into adult life. But the form this interest takes in adult life may condition one's whole nature. The characteristic of generosity, for example, is almost wholly developed from this interest. Let us examine the connection. An infant is occupied in its earliest months almost exclusively with accepting, ingesting, and absorbing. Of rendering back he has practically no experience. Indeed of giving or producing he has only one experience—namely, when he puts forth in the most literal sense, by excreting.

The pride which he takes in this act is encouraged by his mother and nurse, who call him "good baby" when he has produced generously. The product is his first love-offering to his mother, and she accepts it as such. *Anal-production, in short, is the archetype of all giving.*

Later on, shame is taught the child, along with cleanliness. It becomes desirable to him to find some substance nearly enough like faeces to symbolize it, and so partake of its value (from the subjective aspect) as a gift, and yet free of its soiling

property and faecal odour. First mud, then clay, then sand very well answer these requirements; and you will often see children at the seaside presenting their elders with handfuls of wet sand. Later still, other subjects are substituted. At first they still retain some of the be-soiling characteristics of the primeval gift; but they lose this characteristic progressively.

The new-born babe tends to identify itself with other persons to such an extent that to observe others in the enjoyment of food or other gratification often seems to give it the same sort of pleasure as if it itself were enjoying the food. But at a little later stage the differentiation between others and self is more sharply defined. Almost from the beginning the infant has a strong sense of what are its own possessions. He is very much slower in recognizing what possessions belong to other persons, but this feeling is slowly instilled into him by training.

With the recognition of others as demarcated from self arises, for the first time, the possibility of a self-denying gift. While children differ greatly as between one and another, all of them to some degree, and some to a marked degree, evince a spontaneous tendency sometimes to proffer food and other things that they like to persons of whom they are fond. The more generous of them will give other children their toys also.

Among other factors which (so Mrs. Isaacs suggests) intensify the pleasure in sharing and giving is the child's wish to capture in this way a kind of potency which it sees in its parent. Mrs. Isaacs also notes that gifts may include not only objects but services, as with a boy who bathed another's hurt knee, or of a little tot who called out to its companions who were carrying a Christmas tree: "Don't go so fast, so *I* can help!"

At this stage giving has become a thing of complicated motivation, but we must not lose sight of the productive functioning which is its basis.

Professor Flugel, in his treatment of the psychological resistances to a certain social reform, brought to mind that any economic movement that goes to the fundamental causes of distress deprives people, in so far as it is successful, of the

pleasure they get from effecting relief personally. You will find many persons who are ready to give a penny to a beggar for every one who will give money to promote methods of getting rid of begging. Less pleasure is generally to be had from posting a donation in an envelope than from passing even a small sum to a beggar who can be heard to thank one for it.

Of course, the impulse to generosity, when ever pronounced, does in fact lead even to cases of anonymous donations of vast sums, and occasionally to definitely pathological instances such as are evidenced by those people who end up a long series of greater and greater extravagances by throwing money out of windows. But it is clear that, as a general rule, the personal relations of donor and donee are most important.

This is still more so in the frequent cases where generosity is actuated almost wholly by a desire to buy approbation. Giving is too often regarded as virtuous, irrespective of the nature of the object given, or whether the giving is of genuine value to the recipient. Only the exceptionally sophisticated person is entirely able to free himself from the love of giving indiscriminate alms. As was done by Shakespeare in the classic case of *Timon of Athens* (and our own experiences furnish us with many more examples) excess of generosity is usually described as a private misfortune, rather than as a public vice. But that it can, if indulged wildly, produce deplorable consequences, we all know.

While generosity, with its anal-productive origin, abetted by exhibitionist or even allo-erotic motives, may thus at times pass the bounds of social usefulness, more normally the trait is a valuable one, which parents and teachers do well to encourage. At times, alas! they tend to frown upon it. In some cases, this is perhaps justified, as where the child is given to presenting other people with things impulsively, later to regret its act. In other cases the interference of the parents may nip a desirable character-trait in the bud.

I recall how in my childhood, having been taken to church one Christmas Day, I placed in the contribution box a silver

dollar, one of the presents I had received. For this I was reprimanded by my father, who called it a ridiculous extravagance. Very likely my father was right in so conceiving it, but to my own childish point of view the result was ashamed confusion. Giving had been enjoined orally by my elders as a merit, instead of a matter for censure, and this change of front was as alarming as it was distressing.

It is, therefore, much more desirable to enlighten children on points of this character than to preach to them certain ideals in an unqualified form, and afterwards find fault with them for having observed what was preached. Indeed, when the person in charge of children fails to appreciate the child's difficulty, and upbraids him because of generosity, or out of a panicky sense that unless punished the child will grow up powerless to defend himself against solicitations of churches, penurious friends, and the like—in such cases the cause of the panicky action can most reasonably be attributed to unconscious rather than to conscious factors. Conscious reasons may of course be present, but they are to be regarded as mostly helping to make a case for deeper motives underneath. This will ordinarily consist in over-compensation against the person's own anal-productive generous tendencies, a reaction-formation which may have been instilled into him when in his own youth he was taken to task in this abrupt way.

Stern tells how a boy's initial manifestation of a property-sense-selfishness succumbed to delight in giving when he was introduced to this pleasure by his guardians:

Scupin's child Bubi (5.2½) often went with us to take cast-off clothes to a very poor family. Before his first visit, he was asked to take some of his toys to the three children of the family. But he objected at first, saying they were his own toys and he needed them, only going at last so far as to look out some damaged or old toys, long since put on one side. But when he saw how they delighted the children, he himself began to take pleasure in giving. The very next time he was much more generous, looked out toys of his own accord, and jumped about gaily, in anticipation of giving and seeing the

poor children's joy. Yesterday he reminded us on his own initiative that it was time to take the poor children something again, and we even succeeded in persuading him to give them a toy from which at first he would not hear of parting.¹

What conclusions of a socially valuable nature may be drawn from the foregoing facts? I reserve general comment on this habit to a later chapter. But one thing I shall point out here. It may be that in his concern with his material welfare, his economic life, in short, man displays too avaricious a nature, or it may be that he is too spendthrift and that his natural generosity seriously militates against his achievement of reasonable comfort and prosperity.

Whichever of these views may be finally pronounced correct, it is obvious, if any conclusions at all may be drawn from the evidence collected in this chapter, that it will be direct action in the nursery, not exhortation and commandments in adult life, which will most influence his behaviour. To have learnt even this one fact is something for which the economist ought to—though of course will not—be grateful.

Generosity, however important in the economic world, is but one of the multitude of human characteristics which help to decide whether we shall all be poor or affluent. Another, conceived in its widest sense and including derived qualities, is tidiness. Let us see what we may learn again from the nursery about the evolution of this important trait.

The phase of anal erotism so far discussed has been confined to the direct pleasurableness of faecal production. Mother and nurse, however, use all their arts to train the baby in habits of cleanliness. And if we consider one of the fruits of such training when it has been successful from the parental viewpoint, that is, successful in overcoming the desire to brood at stool, we shall find that these fruits are habitual tidiness and orderliness.

Habit and regularity are taught us in some degree with our

¹ Stern (W.): *Psychology of Early Childhood*, London, 1924, p. 529.

feeding. But the emotion then aroused is less, because active interference with our impulses is less than when the training in cleanliness is given. Hence it is the latter which is chiefly significant in determining those habits of tidiness, cleanliness, and orderliness which play so prominent a part in civilized life.

That these habits are highly valued when they appear in others we cannot doubt. Knowing that a person behaves in an orderly way (is, we say, dependable) we can the more easily predict how he will perform in given circumstances, and this is of immense advantage to us if for no other reason than that it saves us worry and energy.

Moreover, the exhortations to tidiness and orderliness are amongst the most persistent in almost every variety of occupation and walk of life. They form, it is possible to assert, the central core round which correspondence courses in personal efficiency are built up. The ideal is well present in lesson four of one of the best of such courses issued in the U.S.A. which I have examined. In this lesson, the then (about 1918) popular hero, President Wilson, is set up as exemplifying the anal-erotic virtues:

He has every task, operation, or appointment of each day scheduled in advance, to the minute, and followed precisely by the minute. Though he personally hates a schedule like this, iron-bound and steel-riveted, he has found it the main-stay of professional achievement.¹

In the fifth lesson of the same course we come upon the declaration:

A man's day should be run by a system as minute and complete as that of an express train. How fast would a train go, how reliable would it be, if it ran by fits and starts? . . . But no more foolish than the way the average man mixes up and slows down the schedule of his daily routine. He runs by mental or emotional fits and starts; he has no schedule of performance to guide him; he attempts to do several things at the same time; he allows helpers, materials, or supplies to

¹ *Purington Foundation Course in Personal Efficiency*, Lesson 4.

remain far from his base of action; he stops in the middle of important work to waste time on trivial details; he fails to articulate his whole industrial scheme or to inspect the running gear and remove defective parts.

That a certain amount of *libido* is released when one set of impulses has full sway, even if that set be on the whole the group connected with discipline rather than the more primary anal interests, it is another point made in this lesson:

Even the hardest, most disagreeable work may be changed to a source of interest and enjoyment by the introduction of new methods leading to better results. Your place of business, no matter how much toil, drudgery, or monotony has been there, will be transformed into a bright spot of discovery where many a path of adventure beckons you, from the moment you say to yourself—and mean it—“There must be a better way of doing my work. I am going to find it or make it!”¹

When the strength of the original lust after dirtiness is very great, the struggle to repress it is correspondingly severe. In such cases the final reaction-formation consisting of the tidiness-ideal can triumph only by becoming fanatically strong. In these cases, we get the fussy, meticulous pedantic kind of person. Those people who are “finicky” about the most minute spot of dirt to a degree which interferes with the needs of life, derive this trait from an over-compensation against unconscious fascination with excrement. Sometimes the underlying liking is revealed when a sufficiently strong motive is offered as a reason for throwing off even momentarily the inhibitions. A case in point is that of a woman whose fear of contamination was so strong that she could never bring herself to use public toilets under any circumstances. A relative told me that she, travelling third class on a steamer, on this account once went for an entire week without defecation. But when this woman had a baby, she became completely insensitive to any kind of soiling from its excrements

¹ *Purington Foundation Course in Personal Efficiency*, p. 25.

and even extremely interested in them and their colour and odour, to the extent that she was annoyed with her husband for not being likewise. One surmises that she was subject to an abnormally strong fascination by excrements, which was ordinarily fiercely repressed, but emerged when its expression was sanctioned by the duty of tending the baby.¹

Even so, these qualities may sometimes be turned into factors making for great accomplishment. Aristotle may well have been fired by a passion to tidy up and pigeon-hole the universe.

Jeremy Bentham certainly worked from such anal-erotic motives. In his biography, one is struck by the amount of time that he gave daily to labour in which he allowed nothing whatever to interrupt him, and no friends to be introduced until he had produced his stint of daily writing—fifteen pages every morning, sometimes more—just as a child remains in the privy until his “duty” is done. The way in which he did this work consisted essentially in elaborating a central hypothesis—namely that everything in political life and legislation should be done for the “happiness of the greatest number.” And into what elaborate details he went concerning how that one principle could be applied to all fields of life! It was a marvellous philosophic tidying-up.

May we not feel reasonably certain that this devotion to orderliness, springing as it does from repressed interests in excretory processes, lies at the basis of the urge which many feel to re-mould and make neat the world? The writings of Mr. H. G. Wells, with their perpetual insistence upon the waste that results from the abominable disorderliness of our present society, are an excellent illustration of the influence which an interest in tidiness (an ideal taught, let us remember, in every nursery) may have upon a person.

For socialists, indeed, one of the most effective appeals which can be made is to point out in the capitalist system that phenomenon which Mr. Stuart Chase has made the title of a

¹ From a note dated October 26, 1933.

very telling little book, the *Waste in Industry*. Mr. Sherwood Eddy is another writer who knows that he can appeal not only to the sense of being actually out-of-pocket (an ego-drive), but to a *sentiment* (more than egoistic) by publishing that

Recently in this country \$7,000,000 (seven million) was spent on a mansion with 121 rooms for one family. A larger amount was spent for a winter residence in Florida by an absentee citizen; \$60,000 was spent on a diamond necklace; \$1,000 for a hat-pin; \$75,000 for opera-glasses; \$30,000 for an automobile. Recently 300 Italian cars have been imported at a cost of \$16,000 each. We puffed away ninety billion cigarettes last year, and nearly two billion dollars in tobacco-smoke. One earnest Christian man has just spent \$500,000 for a play-house for his six children.¹

Professor J. M. Williams confirms that it is not merely the ego-impulses which are reached by such appeals in the case of

supporting high taxes on luxuries and progressive taxes on incomes. The intelligent reasons for such taxes are less influential with the public than is this instinctive feeling that the wealthy "ought to share."²

We are dealing, in short, with a moral sentiment. It is largely accounted for by the fact that the average person was in childhood subjected to discipline and cleanliness and orderliness, and made to feel that their opposites, with which he associates all squandering, were sinful. How often one hears the term "a wicked waste"!

Another of the characteristics which profoundly influence our economic status, is that known as parsimony, or, in extreme forms, avarice.

When psychologists started making lists of instincts, it was almost foreordained that "acquisitiveness," the "collecting instinct," or an equivalent, should be included in nearly all of them. By most of the classical economists, too, it has been

¹ Eddy (S.). Pamphlet, *Religion and Social Justice*, New York, 1927, p. 18.

² Williams (J. M.): *Foundations of Social Science*, New York, 1920, p. 333.

assumed that man acted on some such impulse. Yet doubt of its existence in the form supposed is increasing among psychologists. Beaglehole, after a careful review of the accumulating-tendencies of various types of animals, rejects the hypothesis of such a single instinct to account for them. In the view of the psycho-analysts, the emotional interest which centres around greed is of oral-erotic, and that which is nucleated around saving is of anal-erotic origin.

Freud considers that from fixation of *libido* at the anal-retentive level we derive three important traits. These he names parsimony, obstinacy, and tidiness; of the first he says:

“Parsimony” may be exaggerated up to the point of avarice.¹

To understand how this trait has anything to do with anal-erotism we must go back to the fact that infants are not ashamed of their excretory processes, nor of deriving *pleasure* from them. Anyone having the care of babies can verify objectively what analysis had revealed, namely, that they deliberately prolong and increase this pleasure by remaining unnecessarily long at stool and retaining in their bowel the material which, when evacuated in all the greater quantity, gives them agreeable sensations. This is at once the origin of habits making for constipation and of a sentiment that valuable (because pleasure-bringing) material (of which faeces is the first-known type) should be hoarded rather than spent. This last reaches its pathological apogee in the miser.

Dr. Karl Abraham tells of a wealthy banker who

impressed on his children that they should retain the contents of the bowels as long as possible, in order to get the benefit of every bit of expensive food they have.

As Abraham comments here—

the connection between intentional retention of faeces and systematic parsimony is perfectly clear.

¹ Freud (S.): *Character and Anal-erotism*. First published in *Psychiatrisch-Neurologische Woch*, 1908, Bd. IX, reprinted in his *Collected Papers*, translated Riviere (Joan), London, 1924, p. 45.

And

this fact of libidinous over-emphasis upon the possession of faeces explains the difficulty that certain people have in separating themselves from objects when those have no practical use or monetary value. Such people collect all sorts of broken rubbish in attics, bits of paper, worn-out nibs, and other objects of no intrinsic value, and seem incapable of getting rid of them. Then, on some particular occasion, they will get rid of the whole collection at once. Their pleasure in having a mass of material stored up entirely corresponds to pleasure in the retention of faeces. We find in this case that the removal (evacuation) of the material is delayed as long as possible.¹

What psycho-analysis and infant-observation alike reveal is confirmed by the readiness with which these interpretations suit themselves to folk-lore and story. There springs to mind that classical character, Charles Dickens' Ebenezer Scrooge, as also the hero of George Eliot's *Mill on the Floss*.

Such types are not confined to fiction, as we all know. There are people, often really affluent, who shut themselves up in the cheapest of cheap lodgings, live year after year with no friends, no visitors, no servants, exist on the very barest minimum of food, and die finally amid scenes of indescribable squalor and misery, while within reach of their hands there may have been, literally, bags of gold.

These are extreme cases, and I mention them only because in them it is easiest to see the operation of the trait in question. For parsimony in the form of thrift is a strong element of character and success.

As an instance of its more wholesome embodiment, let me take the case of a highly successful American banker named Percy Johnston. Acquisitiveness became in him a successful spur to the accumulation of a fortune not only for himself, but for the organization which employed him, being not so excessive as to prevent him winning friends for both. In his youth parsimony served to prevent the dissipation of his slender

¹ Abraham, p. 385, summarized by Beaglehole (E.): *Property*, London, 1931, pp. 368-70.

resources, yet did not carry him to the length of niggardliness to his mother (which, as actual events showed, might have done him an ill-turn). Obstinacy held him to the career he had early determined on, but did not become "pig-headedness."

In a biography of this man, issued by La Salle Extension University, Chicago, as a source of inspiration to their students, we are informed how:

The death of his father aroused the lad's ambition to help to provide for his mother and sister. He went to the local gas-works, and arranged to light all the lamps in the neighbourhood every night. For this he received \$3 a month, and he added to it by milking neighbours' cows at fifty cents a week for each cow. He was so small a tot that he was often kicked off the milk stool; but he displayed his ingenuity by strapping them up in a way that rendered the kickers powerless. During the summer vacations he earned \$2 a week by working in the country store of an uncle. In a dozen other ways he constantly contrived to make pennies and dollars. Unknown to him, his mother, instead of using his money, saved it all for him, and thus enabled him to blossom out as a "financier" from almost the first day he entered business.

His domestic responsibilities intensified his serious turn of mind. He thought a lot, worked a lot, and planned a lot. By the time he was twelve, he had made up his mind firmly and definitely that he would become a banker.¹

Whole institutions, notably banks, are built up on a parsimony psychology, and, without it, insurance companies and the investment world generally would never have arisen. Indeed, an astonishingly large proportion of everyday business is conducted entirely with the aid of an appeal to greed or to parsimony. Nearly all advertisements seek to persuade the purchaser that he can exchange a certain sum of his money for an article worth (in one or more of several senses) far more to him than that amount of money. That this appeal is only partly grounded on the self-preserving, or ego-impulses, appears from the nature of some of the devices used. Take, as an example, the trick of sending a stamped, self-addressed

¹ Johnston (P.): *Knowledge is Power*, Chicago, 1924.

envelope in order to compel a reply. The trick is on the whole very successful in appealing to a desire not to waste. As it is not the receiver's *own* stamp and envelope which he might be in danger of wasting, it might be thought that he would have little interest one way or other in the matter.

I need say no more to show how very vitally this habit of parsimony affects every one of us in our day-to-day economic life, that is, in our business. And it is clear that its influence upon our political attitudes wherever these attitudes relate to economic affairs is equally important.

I need do no more than cite the use to which it is put by every political party, although few have shown themselves so adept in its exploitation as have conservatives and socialists.

Particularly is this clearly seen in local politics, where the conservative candidate consistently appeals to the ratepayer to protect himself against the "reckless extravagance" of the socialist candidate. How well the socialist has also exploited this habit by promising to tax the rich for the benefit of the poor, the rise of labour parties in Britain and elsewhere clearly proves.

On the other hand, the threat not only to property but to thrift which, it is commonly held, socialism and particularly communism represent, is by no means a negligible factor in alienating potential supporters, so much so that it has become the conservative candidate's chief stick for the beating of his socialist opponent.

In conclusion, let me offer a short summary of the points I have tried to make in this chapter. I began by pointing out that the concern which a young infant takes in his excretory processes is both natural and intense; that that concern was moulded or restricted by his nurse or mother, and that within the limits of this interest which the child possesses, as also of the way in which it is developed, we find the origins of three factors of immense economic importance: generosity, tidiness, and parsimony. How these factors operate in day-to-day and in social and political affairs I have also tried to show.

CHAPTER VIII

MAN AND HIS POSSESSIONS

WE saw in the preceding chapter how the earliest anal-erotisms affected man's adult attitude towards a whole variety of economic problems, because more than anything else they determined the development of these three vital factors: generosity, tidiness, and parsimony.

In this chapter I am proposing to continue this outline exposition of the way in which Freudian mechanisms influence the whole problem of material subsistence for man. On the basis of the pattern with which I hope the reader is now familiar, I shall attempt to trace the evolution of three more factors which are of immense importance in the general economic field. These factors, are: first, constructive ability; secondly, obstinacy; and thirdly, the sense of property.

All of these are directly related to our primary anal-erotisms, and only by approaching them from that point of departure can they be properly understood. The first and the third are of clear economic importance; the second, however, deserves a word of introduction.

The reader will recall that the second of the three characteristics associated by Freud with anal-erotic fixation was obstinacy. In an essay on *Character and Anal-Erotism* he maintains that

obstinacy may amount to defiance with which irascibility and vindictiveness may easily be associated. To bring obstinacy into relation with interest in defecation seems no easy task, but it should be remembered that infants can very early behave with great self-will about parting with their stools, and that painful stimuli to the skin of the buttocks (which is connected with the anal-erogenic zone) are an instrument in the education of the child designed to break his self-will and make him submissive.

It is at once evident that the characteristic of obstinacy, bound up as it is with the acquiring of discipline and with the phenomenon of effort, is of major importance in man's whole struggle against economic want. Before pursuing this question, however, let us revert to the first of the three factors I mentioned above—constructive ability.

To most psychologists, the nest-building of so many animals has seemed to be a distinct instinct. William James and others have considered that constructiveness in general was no less so. Thorndike went so far as to list manipulation as an instinct. This view was rudely challenged by the researches of, amongst others, Julian Huxley. He was able in 1929 to show that the nest-building of birds is apparently, in its origin, a series of gift-bringings by each bird to its mate. The ultimately instinctive nature of constructiveness and manipulation has been still more questioned and psycho-analysis has now left little doubt that these characteristics are fundamentally related to anal-erotism.

From taking pleasure in the act of expelling their faeces, or increasing this pleasure by retaining the material and manipulating and moulding it with their sphincter muscles,¹ infants pass, as the common experience of mothers and nurses teaches, to manipulating the material with the fingers. When this is punished by parents, or when for other reasons it comes into the category of activities of which the infant has been taught to be ashamed, children substitute malleable damp matter, such as mud, clay, sand, or plasticine, and with it continue the moulding activity. The libidinous pleasure experienced is gradually transferred to other varieties of manipulation, and thence to constructive activities more generally.

Such transfer of feeling appeared most clearly in the psycho-analysis of a man who had been a good deal troubled by digestive disorders ever since he was a boy. He had suffered severely from constipation, which continued all through his adult life. In his case, the early manipulative pleasures with

¹ Freud (S.): *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexual-theorie*, pp. 40-46.

materials more or less faecal in character, like mud pies and sand castles, was easily traced to its emergence in early constructive efforts with wood and metal. At first he made all kinds of objects, especially boats, out of pasteboard, but as he got older he began to build with heavier things. He commenced to use a saw and hammer and made quite large boats. Later, having heard about airships, he built a vessel of considerable size, "to go to the moon." His fascination with the idea of masterly manipulating culminated in an interest in constructing a new order of society, and particularly in planning its basis.

This love of handling and of moulding becomes sublimated readily not only in various handicrafts, but even in professional aptitudes very far indeed removed from the original moulding-tendency. As such, they form an impulse to industry of the very highest importance, as was recognized long ago. "Philanthropia," and "philotechnia," love of mankind and love of one's own craft or science, Miss Jane Harrison reminds us,

are said by a great Greek physician to be the two guiding motives that should rule the true physician's life; and he adds, surely with a rare and startling penetration, that these two loves are not really two, but one.¹

She continues, and with terms (in italics) which are unmistakable in their anal-erotic significance:

Does the artist want to *possess* his picture? Or the author his book? Why, he has *made* it; that is the thing. He will look at it, and perhaps be satisfied; and then his cry is: "Take the thing away, for heaven's sake, and never let me see it again." So it is with the smallest real *makings*. *Possession* seems so dead, so tedious, so irrelevant. Encourage the love of *making*, and the love of mere *possessing* will die a natural death.²

¹ Harrison (Jane E.): *Rationalism and Religious Reaction*. (A Conway Memorial Lecture.) London, 1919, p. 8 and pp. 28-29.

² *Ibid.*, Harrison.

The impulse to construct is not the less imperious because it is a sublimated expression of a repressed childhood desire. It may, indeed, be classed amongst the most compelling of the mainsprings of man's activities, and its thwarting is attended with disastrous consequences.

It would be a laborious but an extremely instructive task to show exactly how much in material, artistic and intellectual, society lost because it is so poorly organized that the constructive impulses of three-quarters of its members are choked before they are granted the most miserable expression. I will instance only the well-known fact of the increasing specialization in industry, a tendency which reduces many operatives more and more to the level of mere automata.

How the lack of adequate scope in our present society for constructive activities has actually driven a number of men to become revolutionaries is evident in some of their biographies. To some, socialism, for example, is attractive mainly as a great creative scheme. De Man holds that

until the days when socialism became a mass movement, and thus first acquired the emotional lure of an ethical motivation, this constructive and organizational motive was the main motive of all the great social utopists.

The most typical living representative of this particular socialist trend is the English mathematician and logician, Bertrand Russell. In Germany, two generations ago, Robbertus was a man of the same type.¹

The great *piatiletka* or "five-year plan" of Russia has certainly captured the imagination of more people than almost anything else which economic idealists have done since 1918, and illustrates clearly the social significance of the constructive impulse.

It is partly owing to the lack of outlets for the constructive spirit that the initial tendency to mould material becomes, through some association of ideas underlying the common

¹ De Man (H.): *The Psychology of Socialism*, trans. by Paul (E. and C.), London, 1928, p. 178.

verbal symbols, a tendency to "mould" human beings. That those who are to be the subjects of this moulding do not always appreciate their alleged good fortune is inevitable.

Karl Marx in his famous Communist manifesto protested (but the italics are mine) that :

Under the penalty of ruin, the Bourgeoisie compel by competition the universal adoption of their system of *production*; they force all nations to accept what is called civilization—to become bourgeois—and thus the middle class *shapes* the world after its own image.¹

Such a protest from a man who was himself an extreme anal-retentive character-type (as will be shown) is indeed ironical. But that Marx sensed, even if obscurely, an underlying motivation which must be reckoned with among social-psychological forces cannot be doubted.

I have not the space here in which to continue this discussion, fascinating as it is, of the development and influence upon society to-day of the constructive impulse. I must content myself with merely pointing out the significance of Freudian mechanisms in social evolution, and pass on at once to a consideration of my next factor—obstinacy.

I cited earlier (see page 154) Freud's analysis of the origin of this prevalent human characteristic. He related it directly to the natural reluctance of the infant when at stool to part with his excrement at the dictates of his mother. The baby resents interference with what he regards as essentially a private concern. But Professor MacCurdy has made a pertinent objection to the whole theory. He argues that

It would be a rare nursery that staged conflicts over just this one difference. The child is wilful and wants his way over many things, and consequently there is little *a priori* grounds for expecting a rigid correlation between anal-erotism and stubbornness.²

¹ Marx (Karl): *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, pp. 4-5.

² MacCurdy: *Principles of Dynamic Psychology*, p. 183.

Mankind may well be tempted to agree, and to dismiss this contention that obstinacy and anal-erotism are indissolubly linked, as just one more instance in which the psycho-analyst's overwhelming interest in whatever is "dirty" has led him astray.

Unfortunately for this view, which attempts to see mankind only through the most proper spectacles, the question is not determined on "*a priori* grounds." The dispute is not as to whether other conflicts arise in the nursery, but as to (a) which conflict is earliest so as to become a prototype for others, and (b) whether any other conflicts which occur in the infant's very earliest stages are able to arouse such violent emotions as does this struggle over anal-retentiveness. And the fact is that no other does so early arouse such feeling; it is only at a much later stage that any is able to do so. The anal-retentive conflict, however, arouses a most fierce excitement in the infant from the first, and it is by association that this excitement or resentment is later transferred to other conflicts.

I shall hope to show a little later in this chapter that there is a peculiarly close relation between our conception of wealth and the anal situation of childhood. It is to be expected, therefore, that obstinacy will play a vitally important part in influencing our attitudes to all situations in which an economic factor is prominent. And so it turns out to be. What can exceed indeed, the obstinate bitterness with which all economic and politico-economic beliefs are held!

I instanced the case of Jeremy Bentham when talking, in the last chapter, of tidiness. But in Karl Marx there exists an even more striking illustration of obstinacy. He exhibits most strongly three marks of the anal-retentive character, namely, a complex over wealth, orderliness, and obstinate irascibility. Professor Laski in his biography (p. 25) records:

Marx never welcomed opposition or rivalry; and he was too prone to assume that a doubt of his rightness was justification for a doubt also of his opponent's integrity.

Impatient of difference, as with Proudhon and Bakunin;

contemptuous, as his correspondence with Engels shows, of all who did not think exactly in his fashion, he never learned the essential art of colleagueship. He was too prone to regard a hostile view as a proof of moral crime. He had not a little of that zest for priority he was so unwilling to recognize in the discoveries of others. He was rarely generous in his recognition of intellectual stimulus. With Marx, to enter a movement was to dominate it; and he was incapable of taking the second place.

“Hatred,” wrote Mazzini of him, “outweighs love in his heart, which is not right, even if the hatred may in itself have foundation.”

There is something unhealthy in the venom with which he assails early friends like Bruno Bauer, or not less ardent seekers after light like Proudhon. His accusations against Proudhon, even when the temptation to destroy is remembered, are singularly ungenerous.

As for his complex over wealth, it scarcely needs mention. I shall refer to it, however, later in this chapter. His orderliness could not have a better illustration than is afforded by the clock-like regularity of his arrival precisely at 9 o’clock every morning at the British Museum.

Obstinacy, however, is but the principal of the complex of characteristics that are evolved from the struggle between infant and mother over defecation. Scarcely less important is the concept of dutifulness or obedience which maternal victory in this conflict instils.

Again the course of development is easily traced. Brooding at stool is punished; production is rewarded. Mother or nurse calls upon the infant to perform its task, the first task ever set it in life.

Mrs. Susan Isaacs tells of “a little girl who was obstinately constipated, but volunteered to a new nurse ‘I will do my ‘duty’ for you.’ ” This sense of *duty* is early distinguished from generosity, or similar motives. Duty is taught us with pain and suffering, and quickly becomes contrasted in our minds with spontaneous service and with pleasant brooding. We are taught to act not because we wish to act, but because we “ought,”

and from this humble beginning are evolved in part our *super-ego* and our conscience. These of themselves become factors reinforcing our sense of duty, and before long conscience is pricking us whenever we fail to do that which duty demands.

The last of the factors resulting from the anal-retentive situation which I shall consider is *effort*. The life of the small baby is comparatively effortless. Indeed, effort, as a thing one has a duty to practise, is first introduced to him in the form of the command by his mother or nurse that he must try hard to produce at stool, in spite of his desire to remain there brooding. The same notion about effort is later expounded and applied to a variety of situations, usually with an emphasis on it as being an obligation.

During an analysis a patient of mine once brought up the concept of effort. I asked him to tell me what effort meant to him, and his first association was "that there was something sexual in it." The second was, that it had to do with "other physiological activities." He then went on with seeming irrelevance to mention that he had never previously told me that he was subject to a good deal of constipation and always had been. I drew his attention to the juxtaposition of these ideas, which, as it turned out, showed with great clarity the origins of our notions of effort.

Early resentment against the need to practise the making of an effort and against the sense of duty to do so are constantly breaking through in life. It is a truism that in his daily work the efficient person has at one and the same time to save himself unnecessary labour, and to steel himself against temptations to yield too soon to fatigue and against a disinclination to do vigorously those tasks which still remain to be done. But humanity on the whole appears to evince a stronger disposition to find easier ways of doing things than a disposition to work. Perhaps the failing is not altogether to be deplored, for its indulgence has led to the discovery of a multitude of immensely valuable devices.

On the whole, however, it cannot be doubted that effort is

disliked and avoided wherever possible. We are taught as children to master our inclinations to idle or to laze, and in most of us is gradually evolved an idealization of combating sloth or of making an effort, as valuable *per se*. The notion of effort is also, as I have pointed out, bound up with our sense of duty. Yet in spite of this training, and guilty as we may feel about it, too often we avoid even quite necessary labours.

How such attitudes colour our outlook on life generally may readily be seen. Anal guilt—that is, an unconscious fear that duty has not been performed—provides a magnificent weapon for the advertiser in the exploitation of his public. He has discovered the value of concluding his appeals with some phrase exhortatory to immediate action, adorned often, moreover, with an apt quotation about neglected opportunities leaving our lives “in shallows and in shoals.”

Examples are easily found. One is that of a letter offering a course of lessons in facial exercises:

For \$1.00 we'll send you the Foundation Lesson, give you an opportunity to find out exactly what it is like. . . .

But you must act quickly. This is the only time this offer will be made. It is a wonderful opportunity to test out a facial exercise to your own satisfaction.¹

Particularly has this tendency found expression in press advertisements where readers are offered goods of “unparalleled value” which they can only secure if they “Act at once.” Unless they do so, they are warned, they will ever afterwards reproach themselves for this failure in “plain duty.” A case in point was the advertising sheet of a certain correspondence-course. Towards the end occurs this sentence:

If you do not take advantage of this offer, and examine a set of this new, low-priced edition, you will have only yourself to blame.

Finally, I should like to point out how vitally these notions about effort and duty affect our attitudes to our fellows, par-

¹ Letter to Mrs. B—from K—, Inc., Chicago, dated July 15, 1929.

ticularly in the socio-economic sphere. It is virtually impossible for the majority of mankind to withhold admiration from the busy, active man. It matters very little to what ends he devotes his efforts: e.g. I have heard Hitler and Mussolini defended on the sole grounds, apparently thought sufficient to sweep all objections away, that they were great workers, and had instilled the notion of work into their fellow-countrymen.

On the other hand, we despise idleness. So powerful is this attitude among some people that they are psychologically incapable of feeling sympathy with the unemployed for no other reason than the fact that they are not working. The objection that they can find no work to do is brushed aside as irrelevant.

Without stressing such exaggerated instances of the development of anal guilt and of its projection on to others, it is easy to show how much all of us are susceptible to the same tendency. If we did not condemn inactivity, few of us could feel strongly about the behaviour of the hero of the following story:

William Norton, 29, went to prison at Luton to-day for a month.

He was strolling along Wellington Street singing and holding out his hat in his right hand. His left arm was missing.

To a detective he explained that he had lost the arm.

But the officer found it concealed inside the overcoat.

“This is a stroke of bad luck; I was just doing all right,” Norton said ruefully. He was. In his pockets were 23s. 10½d. in coppers and 30s. in silver.¹

And that this moral disapproval of laziness influences many people towards socialism—a political creed which stresses the abolition of the man who lives effortlessly on unearned income—cannot be doubted.

Indeed, it is obvious that a large part of our sense of values is derived from our unconscious attitudes such as these. I shall in a moment be concerned with the notion of wealth related to gold as a faecal symbol, but here I would mention in illustration

¹ *Star*, London, February 15, 1930

one very widely held economic theory of value. I refer to that first put forward by Karl Marx.

Marx, as some of my readers will know, distinguished between the "exchange-value" of any article and its real value. He held that the latter was determined by the amount of labour that had gone into the making of the article.

In my previous book *Father or Sons?* I pointed out that such a theory was untrue anywhere in real life—it makes no difference how much work a truck-gardener puts into harvesting vegetables, if for lack of demand they are already rotting in the market stalls. But in one place the theory was correct: "in the nursery the child is rewarded if he has been good and performed his task dutifully although no one wants his product."

Marx's insistence on the theory is one more illustration of how truly he epitomizes the anal-retentive type of character. We have already seen its relation to his tidiness and to his obstinacy and here is evidence of his complex concerning *value*.

It is perhaps ironical that the clearest exposure of the fallacy of his theory is furnished by the very country where his doctrines are most widely acclaimed—Soviet Russia. My observations during visits to that country led me to believe what other observers have confirmed (Beatrice and Sidney Webb, for example, in their masterly survey of Soviet Communism), namely, since the vast efforts of millions of Russians produced goods and services of relatively such little value, no credence could be given to the view that value and the amount of labour which had gone into an article were identical. What could not be doubted was first the strenuous efforts of Russia's millions; secondly, the poorness of their return.

I admit that the Russian temperament bequeathed by ages of tyranny rather than the communist regime is the cause of this poor return. I point out only that the Marxian theory of value—except in its very significant relation to the nursery—does not hold true in actual practice.

The obviousness of the reality does not, however, prevent the said theory from being widely accepted. So it is difficult

to escape the conclusion that its supporters are determined in their belief, as all of us are determined in so many of our beliefs, not by the intrinsic truth, but by fundamental if unconscious prejudices.

I discussed in the last chapter the psycho-analytic approach to the phenomenon which is commonly (though in the view of psycho-analysts, wrongly) described as the *instinct* of acquisitiveness. The reader will recall that it is based on the anal-erotic situation; and it is so important a conception that, at the risk of wearying my readers, I propose to sketch its development again in relation to our notion of property.

It should be obvious that an infant can acquire the notion of value in an object only by deriving pleasure from it, or by associating it with other things which give him pleasure. Food, his mother who caresses him and many other objects and activities thus become valuable. One thing which acquires value in this sense is his own excrement, the passing of which is so sensuously gratifying to him. There are several reasons why he considers it valuable. It is the product of his own body, and must therefore take on some of the supreme worth with which in his vanity he regards himself; to him his faeces appear to be a severed extension of his own body—really parts of his supremely beloved self (for the small child is the perfect egoist). It is a result of his labour and wilful striving. His mother and nurse endorse his evaluation by praising him for what he has produced; and finally the social stigma later placed upon it endows it with vertiginous fascination. Dr. Karin Stephen relates how she

overhead some children of six or seven amusing themselves by cooking up a concoction of slimy, brownish paint, which they called "tut tut." This "tut tut" was moulded into a paste, and then there was a lot of laughing and whispering. Finally they explained that they intended to make a man out of it. They had the interesting idea . . . that men . . . were made of "tut tut."

I have already mentioned several similar cases. Indeed,

conduct of this kind is so usual among children that many of my readers will wonder why I trouble to mention it; but it is the next point I wish to make, namely, that the value attributed to excrement gets transferred to things associated with it by contiguity or by similarity, that shows up its importance.

We have seen how children delight in playing with mud and sand, clear cases of transference of interest in excrement to similar objects, but that the transference operates in cases of objects associated with the excremental process is illustrated by the value many people put upon scraps of paper. They carefully fold or file away every small white piece for future use, although large sheets could be purchased for a few pence. Consider also the case of a baby boy of my acquaintance who, in his first year, began to make a favourite plaything of his chamber, and transferred this interest to his mug and later to cups and vessels of all kinds, until he had developed what could only be described as a receptacle-fetishism.

This phenomenon of transference to associated objects is clearly of immense importance in determining what things we may hold valuable; for it may extend in any direction as the result of the most unlikely and unsuspected association. Its operation is only difficult to trace, not to understand.

Much more direct is the transference of value from excrement itself to objects resembling excrement. Let us follow a typical case of such development.

Janet (7 years 5 months) manifested a sense of value in sand. On several occasions she had brought her father and heaped up before him gifts of wet sand. Later, when she and her mother were in England, she sent her father an envelope enclosing a folded scrap of paper which she had filled with this substance; written on the envelope was "Sand to dear Daddy from Bournemouth." Also, when playing in their garden, she and her little brother used to get bright stones and put them in a hole in a tree which they said was the "bank"—they would bring these pebbles and deposit them as equivalents of money.

The next step in the evolution of this interest which, let it be remembered, was originally faecal, is normally towards an interest in collecting actual coins, at first bright ones, which take the place of shells and pebbles. Then comes the trading of coins and making of other collections (especially of the bits of paper called postage stamps) and actual buying and selling of objects. An observer can see gradually the transition to a development of interest in cash, currency, and economic matters.

Thus it is that the valuation put on faeces as the first hoarded material and gift to the mother passed through the medium of mud and wet sand, dry sand, sea shells, and other pretty objects to coins, copper, silver, gold, and stamped paper, and so becomes the basis of all our ideas of wealth.

It is significant that, in actual life, we tend to estimate whatever we value in terms of money. Now money is in the last resort usually gold. The compulsion which the idea of gold exerts in economic discussions is a curious thing. Such discussions are considerably complicated by this fact, that an irrational fascination always has been exerted over the human mind by the idea of money and, particularly, of the precious metal. The purely logical features of this phenomenon are inadequate to explain it. Professor J. T. MacCurdy senses this:

With the evils of gold-hoarding displayed to a tortured world, it is only natural that proposals are put forward for the control of international finance. We hear much of demonetizing gold, of remonetizing silver, of synmetallism, and so on. There are even schemes suggested for abandonment of any fixed standard, *i.e.* for the substitution of commodity price-indices. There is not one of these for which a good case cannot be made out in an academic vacuum. But how many of the proponents of such remedies make any serious examination of the *raison d'être* of gold economically? Gold is a psychological and not an economic necessity.

Indeed, a hundred pages earlier in his book, *Mind and Money*, MacCurdy had seen just a trifle further into this problem by

realizing the unconscious nature of the mechanism involved in our thoughts about the precious metal:

... a tendency to primitive symbolic thinking, long outgrown by the conscious human being, persists in groups which have no consciousness. The desire for gold is of this order. . . .

Once again we must look to the psycho-analysts for a wholly comprehensive explanation of the fact. Dr. Ernest Jones has pointed out, in an article on the theory of symbolism, how

modern economists know that the idea of wealth means simply a "lien on future labour," and that any counters on earth could be used as a convenient emblem for it just as well as a "gold standard." Metal coins, however, and particularly gold, are conscious symbols for excrement, the material from which most of our sense of possession, in infantile times, was derived. The ideas of possession and wealth, therefore, obstinately adhere to the idea of "money" and "gold" for definite psychological reasons, and people will simply not give up the "economist's fallacy" of confounding money with real wealth. This superstitious attitude will cost England in particular many sacrifices after the War.¹

Elsewhere Jones calls the

association . . . between the ideas of gold and faeces . . . one of far-reaching significance in mythology as well as in the reactions of everyday life.

As an example of such significance, one gets repeatedly the fairy tale in which the gold that is created by the wizard or witch within a few hours turns to earth or mud. And there exist certain statues which are more striking testimony still to the origin of gold, such as the notorious one of the "Gold-scheister" (excreter) in Germany. Americans use the term *scheister* for an avaricious lawyer. Do we not also reveal much when in some earnestness we speak of "filthy lucre"?

In short, the explanation which I have already given of the origin of the sense of wealth generally applies with particular

¹ Jones (E.): *Essays in Applied Psycho-analysis*, London, 1933, pp. 153-54.

force in the case of the "royal metal." Its yellow colour connects it with, yet is by a tint removed from, the original brown material, from which all sense of value proceeds.

It is unnecessary for me to stress the economic effects of the value which we attach to gold, and, by derivation, to money. In one sense it is true to say that did we not believe in its value, the whole economic organization of the world would be put in jeopardy, for were faith lost in gold as a medium of exchange, without preparation having been made for the event, the trade of the world would be brought almost to a standstill.

On the other side of the picture, however, is a different, frequently absurd, and often tragic story. The society in which most of us live, capitalist society as it is called, tends further to play up our over-emphasized sense of the value of money and of property in relation to it. Two passages from Mr. J. T. Adams are worth quoting in this connection. The first of them is about the way that gold-getting tends to give one a materialistic outlook. It runs as follows:

Dealing inevitably with material things and with the satisfying of the world's material wants, the business man tends to locate happiness in them rather than in the intellectual and spiritual, unless he constantly refreshes his spirit away from business during his leisure. . . . He may live in a palace, ride in the most luxurious cars, and fill his rooms with old masters and the costliest manuscripts which his wealth can draw from under the hammer at Christie's, but if he cares more for riches, luxury and power than for a humanely rounded life he is not civilized, but what the Greeks properly called a "barbarian."¹

The second passage deals with what is really a result of the first; as a result of evaluating everything in terms of how much money it can be exchanged for, we get into some queer absurdities:

Some time ago a prosperous and practical inventor disclosed some of his adventures with popular psychology. He

¹ Adams (J. P.): *A Searchlight on America*, London, 1930, pp. 11 and 30.

had invented a small article which, with fair sales, could make a large profit when retailed at ten cents. He sent out a number of street hawkers to sell the article, half of them with the thing priced at ten cents, and the other half with a twenty-five-cent price. The latter sold immediately, whereas few were sold at the lower price.¹

Property is not always material, however, or, to be more precise, a sense of property is not wholly confined to material things. That this is so in later life is evident in the later examples I cite; but that it develops along with the more orthodox sense of property in early childhood is shown by this note of Mrs. Susan Isaacs:

Ownership is felt in things other than actual objects. Harold and Paul felt a keen sense of property in the nursery rhymes and songs they had heard at home, or on gramophone records of a kind they had there. No one else had the right to sing or hear these things without their permission. All the children felt that anything was "theirs" if they had used it first, or had made it, even with material that itself belonged to all.

Duncan and others felt a thing was "theirs" if they had "thought" of it, or "mentioned for it first," and so on. (One is reminded of controversies among scientific men as to the parentage of ideas, discoveries, and inventions.)

This note indeed helps us to understand the case cited by Mr. F. W. Watson about the labour quarrels which break out over questions of which the trade union is having jurisdiction over a specific kind of work:

Demarcation disputes occur in government and municipal establishments where the possibilities of "the sack" are very remote. It is not only that a craftsman loses certain work as a result of changes, but that some other craftsman picks it up, that intensifies the trouble. Removing couplings is essentially the work of a fitter—the engineer claims a proprietary right to the work. If couplings were abolished, or were designed so that they would automatically remove and replace them—

¹ Adams (J. P.): *A Searchlight on America*, London, 1930, pp. 11 and 30.

selves, the fitter would accept the position more or less philosophically, but when he sees another man on the job, one who cannot by any stretch of imagination be called a mechanical engineer, he resents it.¹

It is fortunate that these quarrels and sordid concerns are not the only possibilities in the development of the latent sense of property discovered in the nursery. Robert Louis Stevenson, in an exquisite passage on page 38 of his *Lay Morals*, has reminded us that:

He who has learned to love an art or science has wisely laid up riches against the day of riches; if prosperity come, he will not enter poor into his inheritance; he will not slumber and forget himself in the lap of money, or spend his hours in counting idle treasures, but be up and briskly doing; he will have the true alchemic touch, which is not that of Midas, but which transmutes dead money into living delight and satisfaction. *Etre et pas avoir*—to be, not to possess—that is the problem of life. To be wealthy, a rich nature is the first requisite and money but the second. To be of a quick and healthy blood, to share in all honourable curiosities, to be rich in admiration and free from envy, to rejoice greatly in the good of others, to love with such generosity of heart that your love is still a dear possession in absence or unkindness—these are the gifts of fortune which money cannot buy, and without which money can buy nothing. For what can a man possess, or what can he enjoy, except himself? If he enlarge his nature, it is then that he enlarges his estates. If his nature be happy and valiant, he will enjoy the universe as if it were his park and orchard.

Such passages as this reflect clearly that second aspect of our attitude towards property, in the material sense of the word—an attitude of contempt. We are creatures of queer behaviour and more queer origins; we display passionate attachments in one moment to something which we as passionately despise in the next. Our waking lives are largely devoted to acquiring possessions; we earn that we may feed,

¹ Watson (W. F.): *The Worker's Point of View*, xvii, "Whose Job is It?" *The Human Factor*, London, 1934, pp. 141-42.

clothe, and shelter ourselves. Yet, in our daily speech, we habitually despise if we do not openly condemn the mercenary, the commercial.

Now I have made some attempt in this chapter to show how our interest in possession, our sense of values, if you like, arises, and I have tried to trace its development and its influence upon the life we live and the society we live in. Whence then do we derive this contempt for mercenary profit-makers which (no one can doubt) does genuinely inspire us at certain moments?

It is an anomaly which can be understood only by invoking Freudian mechanism. If we accept the theory of the anal-erotic origin of our ideas of money, then two reasons for our contempt become evident.

One is that in maturing from babyhood to adolescence, we come to despise with a fierce contempt whatever reminds us of earlier stages in our development. Who has not seen at school the intolerance of children for companions slightly younger than themselves? They get on far more easily with juniors separated by several years from themselves than by only one or two, because they are most securely past the stage these former represent. In exactly the same way, when anyone of our higher motives is surrendered to a lower one—as the hetero-sexual to the homo-sexual, or, still more, to the auto-erotic—we are moved to contempt.

The lower ethical value put on mercenary motives is attributable in large part to the fact that the mercenary as connected with the anal interests represent a more infantile stage of development of the *libido*, as compared with all other types of values, excepting the oral. This association is made by many socialists, for example, who despise the existing order of society because of its emphasis upon the economic motive to the relative exclusion of others which they consider higher; they crave a more "refined" sublimation of the anal tendencies, as is found in the creative impulse of the workman.

The second reason arises from the direct teaching which we received in infancy: a teaching driven home by withdrawals of

love and often by physical punishments. Certainly the endeavour to retreat from everything which should remind us of our excretory functions is constantly evident. For an example, take the difficulty we find in naming directly a certain indispensable place of domestic sanitation. It is called by its initials, w.c., but as these are learned by everybody, and therefore cease to conceal anything, it is re-christened successively by the names given to the room in or near which it is housed—bathroom, toilet, lavatory (= washroom), and cloak-room. Finally, as each new name is successively understood, we descend in desperation to calling it “a certain place.”

Such illustrations could be multiplied indefinitely, but they could not prove more clearly how bitterly we resent, even if unconsciously, any attempt to induce a retrogression in ourselves, or any example of a retrogression in others. In some cases, as is well known, the sense of shame at first associated with the excrement which we valued in our infancy is transferred at later stages to subsequent objects which we value; until we are left convinced that money itself is shameful and unclean, and that only the Stevensonian possessions are worth our regard.

This familiar fact is commented on by Thorstein Veblen in his amusing and brilliant satire on the *Theory of the Leisure Class*, wherein he remarks that we have a

sense of ceremonial uncleanness attaching in an especial degree to the occupations which are associated in our habits of thought with menial service. It is felt by all persons of refined taste that a spiritual contamination is inseparable from certain offices that are conventionally required of servants. Vulgar surroundings, mean (that is to say, inexpensive) habitations, and vulgarly productive occupations are unhesitatingly condemned and avoided. They are incompatible with life on a satisfactory spiritual plane—with “high thinking.” From the days of the Greek philosophers to the present, a degree of leisure and of exemption from contact with such industrial processes as serve the immediate every-day purposes of human life has ever been recognized by thoughtful

men as a pre-requisite to a worthy or beautiful, or even a blameless, human life.¹

The sense that money is unclean has been the inspiration of many communistic schemes. In most of these, to be sure, the property is merely turned over from private to collective possession, as though from the child to the parent. In some cases, however, even the group is forbidden to hold property. An example of this may be found in St. Francis' original ideas about property for the order which he founded. He wished them to own lands or monasteries neither individually nor collectively.

This contempt for the mercenary or material affects our political views. Capitalism is often condemned by many for this reason; but so also is socialism. The latter theory is often associated with the words "dialectical materialism" by which its advocates intend only a theory which maintains that economic events and motives are the prime determinants of every one of man's activities. Mukerjee and Sen-Gupta, however, on page 250 of their text-book, justify the view which holds that socialism is materialistic in a far more inclusive sense than that which marxists themselves admit:

In recent collectivistic schemes of reform, the picture of injustice that is drawn is concerned with instrumental values, wealth, prestige, material comforts. Such has been the influence of the mechanized industrial system and the social hypnosis to which it has given rise. A defect of recent class movements, Syndicalism and Communism, has often been that they insist upon the fulfilment of partial interests rather than of the whole human nature. They strive after economic interest abstracted from the complex scheme of values in which it arises, and do not allow legitimate outlets for the remaining unsatisfied complexes. Moreover, the rigid socio-economic organisation of the commune may work very well for unprogressive bees and ants, but not for dynamic human nature that is perpetually projecting its tentacles of interest in novel directions.

¹ Veblen (T.): *Theory of the Leisure Class*, London, 1924, pp. 37-38.

Here, again, is only an instance of the way in which our sense of values may affect our attitude towards a theory. For if the theory were adequate, the effect would be to increase the number or to alter the distribution of the existing objects of value in the world, in a direction desired; hence there is a disposition to believe the theory *is* adequate.

The passage from Mukerjee and Sen-Gupta is also interesting as pointing out that the identical accusation of "too materialistic" is brought by progressives against capitalism in favour of socialism and by conservatives against socialism in favour of capitalism.

Like the earlier instances I have given in connection with the other factors with which I have been concerned in this and the previous chapter, this one shows that the teachings of psychology must be heeded before the protests of politicians if the hope of improving the material conditions of the people of our world is to be realized.

If this holds true of economic, material affairs, which are so primitive and fundamental, how much more helpful is psychology likely to be in other matters! It will be my purpose in the following chapters to defend the implied assertion.

CHAPTER IX

MAN AND HIS CHILDREN

ANOTHER of the forms of happiness I reviewed in Chapter IV is that which I described as Inner Peace. Its opposite is madness.

Now madness in any one of its many forms takes a terrible toll on the happiness of mankind. We have to take into account not only the sort of mental disturbances which, because they render the sufferers dangerous to themselves or to their fellows, lead to their detention in institutions of one sort or another, but also that vast range of disorders that are not strictly classifiable as madness in the legal sense of the term. Persistent hallucinations, melancholia, irrational hates or loves for any particular object or thing, simple cases popularly described as "crankiness," all these must be added to those breakdowns in the poise of the mind from which so many myriads of people suffer.

If we divide insanity for the moment into two rough (and admittedly quite unjustifiable) divisions, namely, insanity which is legally "certifiable" and insanity which is not, then it is probable that the second category, which includes so many times as many cases as the other, is responsible for more unhappiness in sum than the first.

Modern life, "with its sick hurry," its divided aims, is responsible for precipitating an acute increase in the number of cases which, in one or other degree, pass over the border-line into insanity. The point requires no emphasis. If it did, a cursory survey of the rise in the suicide rate in highly industrialized countries would alone be sufficient to prove it.

It is clear that psychology comes peculiarly into its own when dealing with the problem of insanity. My critics (and they will be numerous) who have objected violently to the manner in which I have persistently made psychology intrude

into such subjects as politics, economics, finance, must here remain silent.

Psycho-analysis, in particular, has won its way because of its intrinsic ability to deal with cases of "nervous" disorder. Nor need the cynic conclude that a science designed to aid the mentally sick is of no importance to the mentally fit; for which of us, in all honesty, may claim to be completely sane?

It is, indeed, on the strength of its achievements in that direction that I am pleading for the application of its principles in fields where it has so far hardly been considered. Were I to assert that psycho-analysis is simply a method of correcting mental disorders—a method, that is, of securing inner peace—I should be falsifying the truth only in so far as I am suppressing some of it. That psycho-analysis is something much more universal in its application, I hope I have already shown.

Because, however, of the attention which the science in its narrower field has already received, and because my purpose herein is not to trespass on ground that has already been so well cultivated, I shall not attempt here to give any elaborate exposition of precisely what psychological factors contribute to the breakdown of that mental state which can be described as inner peace. These can be studied better from the case-book of any practising psychiatrist.

I propose instead to examine aspects of the problem involved in the last chapter where I shall be concerned, amongst other things, with the resistance of psycho-analysis and its practice, and hence to what is more important still, the application of knowledge gained in this way to the handling of the very young.

It is in relation to the sexual question that lay criticisms of the psycho-analyst assume their most coherent and their most virulent form. These criticisms consist essentially in an emphatic denial of the importance which psycho-analysis attaches to sexual impulsion.

Man only attacks violently what he dislikes violently. It is to be assumed, therefore, that man dislikes violently, if not necessarily any general reference to the sexual impulse, at least

any theory which endeavours to show that this impulse is, far more often than is assumed, the root of our behaviour. But what makes man object so strongly to the view that sex is at the root of so much of his behaviour?

The reasons for any human hate are apt to be many and various; they are also frequently obscure. But no other cause for hatred is so strong as a feeling of guilt in relation to the thing hated.

I have said enough in the last chapter to show how a feeling of guilt is built up in relation to sadism; in fact, this guilt-feeling was the cause of much of the dislike and hatred we feel for so many objects in life.

In a similar way, I suggest—and in this chapter I shall be giving many illustrations in defence of this suggestion—our guilt about our early sexual erotisms affects us in later life. The very strength of the opposition which psycho-analysis encounters on this question is proof of the strength of the impulse which it seeks to understand. For the more violently anyone objects to an exploration of the sexual impulse, the more violently (we may be sure) did he have to repress in himself the interest. Fanatical opposition to any mention of sex is to be understood primarily as proof of the strength and the importance of the sexual impulse in life.

That this impulse makes its effects felt in nearly every one of our activities would be easy, except that it would be laborious to show. So, as in the last chapter, I am going to select arbitrarily the field which I propose to explore, and the tendencies which I hope to make clear here must be understood as an illustration merely and not as an exhaustive analysis of the way in which the sexual impulse affects our attitudes and our beliefs.

In the preceding chapter, I was concerned principally with the first of our forms of happiness, namely, the enjoyment of abundance. In this one, I shall be concerned with the second of those forms, namely, that which we have called secure enjoyment of a sex life happy for all concerned.

I propose to begin with a short discussion of the sex problem as it presents itself to the modern world, and I will point out how, because of the violence with which the most conflicting beliefs about the problem are held, we must look not to the facts of the case but to underlying motives, for an understanding of why men so disagree. I shall then proceed to analyse how the earliest love impulses manifest themselves and how they develop, and shall finally point out their effects in determining our attitude towards the sexual problem.

So far, I have used the word sexual eroticism very loosely, but as I will show later in this chapter, it is capable of precise sub-division. And the two sub-divisions whose workings I propose to illustrate are: first, auto-erotisms, with particular emphasis upon the phallic stage in development; secondly, allo-erotisms, with particular emphasis upon hetero-sexuality. The second of these discussions will form the subject of the next chapter.

Any intelligent discussion of the sexual problem as a whole must take account of three more or less separable factors, or, to be more precise, three spheres of interests. The first is, naturally, the partners in marriage and reproduction. The second is the children of the union, and the third is, broadly, society. It is clear that although the interests of any two of these groups *may* coincide, they *need* not coincide. Much of the controversy which the sexual problem arouses springs from a failure to recognize this simple fact. The three factors are not, however, wholly independent; they overlap at many points, but they can be usefully distinguished for the purposes of discussion, as is evidenced by the fact that each of them has given rise to its appropriate reform movement. The modern sex reform and marriage reform movement works primarily to promote the happiness of sexual partners, although it would naturally claim that the children and society as well would benefit if its proposals were universally adopted. The birth-control movement primarily affects the interest of the children; although again its proposals directly affect the welfare of the

parents and of society generally. Finally, the eugenics movement is concerned primarily with the needs of society and the human race, although here too it is obvious that its suggestions are of vital interest both to parents and to children. Let us consider each of these movements in a little more detail, and endeavour in that way to grasp the extent and the nature of our problem. I begin with the last.

The eugenics movement endeavours to secure that reproduction shall be as much as possible from the best stocks, and as little as possible from the inferior. We need not go into contentious questions arising out of the idea of the best, because in the first place there are sufficient matters which are clear, and give us enough to do for a long time to come; and because secondly it is part of the spirit of modern enlightened eugenics to recognize that there is a vast deal still to be learnt about the question of the ideal stocks to be looked for and selected. The only thing that matters for our present purpose is that under our principle of the greatest and most enduring happiness of the greatest number, we have become responsible about the rights and claims of the race in human reproduction. This is a new thing. We have left behind both blind, indiscriminate breeding, and sole preoccupation with our own "moral" affairs or souls as if our offsprings or their future fellow-citizens or our race and its welfare had no rights or claims in the matter. We are concerned about the qualities of health, fitness, character, ability, which are needed for sustaining the life and well-being of happy achievement of our race. We have added a new dimension to our sense of responsibility.

The birth-control movement in its more immediate aims obviously flows out of the same principle. We have recognized our responsibility to secure for the offspring of reproduction the necessary conditions for a worth-while life. First of all, we see the necessity for controlling the mere quantity of population, in order that it may not outrun the condition of economic well-being. Secondly, and a vital need, we want to reduce the number per family, so that each can be properly cared for

physically, in education and personal interest and attention. Thirdly, we want to regulate the times at which children arrive, so that each shall only come when it is wanted, and when proper provision for it is secured. Of course, in all these respects birth-control is only a part of a wider movement, aiming to secure well-being for everyone through a more satisfactory economic organization of society as a whole. But until better industrial conditions are brought about, the practical birth-control movement finds itself limited to lessening evil rather than ensuring full positive good.

The marriage—and sex-reform movement is designed to promote the happiness of the partners. We want in the first place to remove injustice and inequalities, such as those which have long weighed so heavily on women. We want, in the second place, *knowledge*, so that people are prepared, and can act intelligently and responsibly instead of being kept in ignorance and plunged into situations for which they have been left quite unfitted. In the third and main place, we see no reasons at all why we should not recognize the right of our sexual impulses to a full part in a balanced, happy life. We know, or we should know by this time, that we cannot prevent them from acting upon us most powerfully; we can only choose between different ways in which they can do so. If we try to prevent them, they simply act along uncontrolled and uncontrollable lines (*a*) indirectly in fashions of which we know nothing, and thus certainly cannot control; (*b*) directly, breaking through against our will, in ways which we should perhaps most have wanted to avoid; (*c*) directly again, as a continual besetting pressure. Demanding constant struggle and effort at suppression, entailing a heavy drain on energy and attention, they are then after all coming to play a much larger part in controlling our course—from which they were to be banished—than if we accepted them frankly. By the contrary course of permitting our sexual impulses a regulated expression, we can bring them into line with the rest of our interests and values, and work out for them the same conditions, based on the same sovereign principle.

of the greatest ultimate happiness of the greater number, as we apply to our other activities. In this, of course, we have been immensely helped by the development of scientific methods of birth-control, which has allowed us to separate sex partnership from reproduction, and thus for the first time in history to give just acknowledgment to the different demands of both. Their previous entanglement was often equally fatal to both.

From our modern point of view, therefore, we can consider frankly and freely the conditions for happy sex partnership, as something which must as a matter of course be satisfying to both partners in it, which must therefore be equal and reciprocal, and which needs the fullest knowledge and understanding. Parenthood then falls into place as an added enjoyment where the conditions are favourable to it, just because it is a deliberate responsible act, of which the consequences are fully willed and provided for.

Conspicuous amongst the advocates of sex reform in the modern world is Bertrand Russell, whose numerous essays and books on the subject have attracted great attention. His view may be taken as the extreme reaction from the Christian ideal. In his book, *What I believe*, he sets out in two words what he conceives to be the only possible basis of an intelligent sexual ethic. That is: "*mutual inclination*." Provided that is, that two responsible adults have given their free consent, their sexual behaviour, however irregular or even shameful it may seem to others, concerns and can concern no one but themselves.

Judge Ben Lindsay of the Juvenile Court of Denver, Colorado, is less extreme in his views, as he would require a ceremony of marriage to be performed before the union of two young people should be deemed sanctioned. In his two recent and greatly discussed books, *The Revolt of Youth* and *Companionate Marriage*, he summarizes the conclusions to which he had been forced by long experience with young people of the great American cities. He finds that youth, tired of the hypocrisies of its elders, has decided to take matters into its own hands, and to flout openly the morality which has so long

been preached as essential, even while it has been disregarded in practice by the older generation. He finds that adolescents of both sexes are extensively experimenting in intercourse which society holds to be illicit, and that socially the most objectionable feature is the secrecy under which it has to be carried on, owing to the attitude towards it of society. He pleads that more would be gained than lost if we were to give open recognition to what exists in fact, allow unlimited spread of contraceptive information, and give our sanction to the whole affair, provided only it were entirely honest and open, and were preceded by a marriage ceremony which should be considered as binding on both parties for a trial period only, and so long as no children were born to them.

Whatever may be thought of the views of these two men, views that are at once the result and the cause of the changing attitude of society towards the problem of sex, it is evident nowadays to most people that wise management of one's own sex life is made extremely difficult by existing taboos and conventions. The main effect of these is to build up a quasi-religious, quasi-scandalized "mystery" in which the whole subject of sex is to be carefully shrouded; and until this cloak of secrecy is stripped away, it seems inevitable but that ignorance, fear, and prejudice will continue to levy their toll of suffering on successive generations.

Much has undoubtedly been done and is still being done. But that the problems for the solution of which these various reform movements have been brought into being still continue, anyone who chooses to visit our divorce courts, our mental homes, our juvenile courts and, indeed, our police courts, where sexual crimes in one form or another occupy a quite astonishing prominence, may find out for himself. Besides this public evidence of the failure of society's sexual code, there are millions of tragic cases of which the public never hears, each in itself an indictment of one or another contention which society imposes on its members. Intimate friends, and occasionally ministers of religion or doctors, get to know; few

beside. And yet the sum total of misery which is thus caused is colossal. Can we hope for its alleviation?

Economic conditions work to-day to cause the more intellectual and more energetic sections of the population to reduce their birth-rate to below the point where they keep their numbers even, while the least desirable parts of the population are prolific. These facts have been established by many investigators, and recently for England most specifically by Cattell. Moreover, any constructive eugenics proposal assumes that for its purposes the inherent differences between persons will become manifest to an extent which makes it possible to assess their worth. This is only approximately true in a capitalist society, because many of the hereditarily well-endowed are choked by a poisonous childhood environment which wilted the bloom that might have been theirs if their economic circumstances had been average. Finally, there can be little doubt that, behind the laws designed to prevent the poor practising the birth-control which is practised by all those who make the laws, and behind the big-family propaganda preached and published by small-familied preachers and publishers, there is class-interest. The employing class intuitively feel their supremacy to depend on labour being prolix and plentiful and so cheap and divided.

A most mighty frustration of our hopes occurs through the persistence in the world of rival nationalisms. It is in the most militaristic States that poor mothers are not permitted to know how to prevent unwanted children being brutally forced upon them. A dictator demands that mothers shall breed additional cannon-fodder for his armies, even while he is making the need of more territory for his already too large population the excuse for sabre-rattling. Among the people, the fear that we shall be out-bred by alien groups and races whom we despise gives rise to the "race suicide" cry, although the really significant inheritable differences between men are found between one individual person and another, or one family and another; whereas, all vast collective units contain each so

many good and so many bad cases that in the aggregate the differences between one huge group and another are nearly ironed out.

Child-handling methods I do not habitually discuss as a causal factor in these social movements, apart from the detailed analysis of the psychology of the movement, but it should be noted that a very important problem of mental hygiene is that of whether and how to impart sex-instruction. The principle of progressive education is that all a child's questions about sex should be answered fully and frankly, without treating this topic as "sacred" or otherwise set apart, and by someone who feels no embarrassment about it. This practice makes for better selection of one's husband or wife, married happiness and prudent spacing of children to come when conditions of circumstance and of affection are most favourable.

Genetic problems are further complicated by various social customs. It is well known that alcoholism is responsible for much bastardy. Tobacconism does not take its toll in the same manner. Drs. Kostral, Tidswell, Playfair, Etienne Mutrel and Thomson have found that it increases the proportion of still-births among women, a fact confirmed by the experiments of Gy and of Fleig on guinea-pigs, Deprierris on chickens, Petit on these and on dogs and rabbits and Kellogg on rats. Wherever the young have been compared with those of a no-nicotine control group, they appear to have been inferior.

Most fundamentally of all does ignorance block the way of sex-reform. It does so very immediately, since without knowledge of wholesome preventive technique, birth-control can only be effected through methods which are uncertain and also psychiatrically harmful, such as *coitus interruptus*. But more than that, censorship on sex information and discussion leaves the way open for the inaccurate, individually and socially harmful teachings of fanatic prudes, and for such information to spread unrefuted. A population unaccustomed to think scientifically falls a prey to priests. These teach it, on the authority of a tent-maker who evinced very little knowledge of

the sociology of even his own day, nineteen centuries ago, that woman is a mere breeding-animal who should "be subject to" her husband.

The scientific temper and technique are, I insist, the necessary remedy for this state of affairs; and of all the sciences the most useful will be psychology. If it be possible to indicate one cause as more responsible than any other for the continuance of the systems which promote the evil, it is surely the attitude of mind towards the problem which the vast mass of society exhibits. Change that attitude of mind, indeed, and the whole problem is half-way to solution.

Whether that change can be effected, even then, is a vital query. But until we understand how that attitude is built up it can never be answered.

Once again, we must invoke the aid of the psycho-analyst, for only thereby shall we be able fully to comprehend the nature of the resistances to be broken down before we can hope effectively to alter human nature.

It is not my purpose here to discuss the "rational" arguments which are used by one controversialist or another in this problem. I have said before that if man were actuated solely by his reason, he would have mastered his problems long ago. For all the effect which these arguments have upon society they may be virtually disregarded. Clearly, what must be considered are the motives by which people are blinded to reasonable arguments, whatever those arguments may be.

It would be possible to review all the stages of libido-development in turn, and show how each helped to determine our attitude towards the problems of sex. I can only indicate here in the briefest way some of them.

Oral erotism comes into the love affair at latest with the first kiss. Again, if in infancy there was formed a definitely oral-erotic type of character, this may result, through its usual accompaniment of the trait of "spoilt-ness", in refusal to renounce immediate pleasures at the demands of eugenics, or for the

sake of the economic, hygienic or other needs of the marital partner and the children.

Sadism and masochism are more macabre influences. These are behind much of the pseudo-medical objections to allowing women even the advantages of anaesthetics to render childbirth painless. How, then, should they be absent when the question is one of mercifully freeing woman from bearing children against her will? Sadism and masochism receive all pleas for birth-control based on mercy to the mother, the child or the race as grounds for unconscious bias *against* the birth-control movement.

The anal erotisms are also important in their influence over our attitudes towards procreation. Anal production is the prototype, psychologically, of production in general, and so of creation. Dr. Ernest Jones, in particular, has shown that some of the expressions of endearment used by mothers to their babies indicate that they regard them in anal terms, and the theory of birth *via* the bowel is one frequently held by children. Hence a fixation at the productive, the retentive or the product-valuing stage of anal eroticism at times becomes the real motive determining our view for or against birth-control. Depending upon the positive or negative nature of the original eroticism, it may make one become a high-birth-rate enthusiast, or, on the contrary, a neo-malthusian restrictionist—in general, one passionately convinced either way about the relative merits of quality and quantity of offspring.

The importance of urethral eroticism for birth-control is probably not very great. So we terminate these suggestive surveys of the auto-erotisms as we come to genital eroticism, to which I devote the remainder of this chapter. Perhaps it will be of help if I outline my argument.

First of all, I am going to show that while genital interests awaken at a very early age, there are differences in what may be called the natural urge to reproduction which become rationalized as the approval or disapproval of large families. The natural desire to have children is one with which we must

reckon, if we propose to restrict children only to such people as will bear them eugenically. Symbolism is also to be mentioned because of the confusion it introduces into thought; babies are often pictured, for example, as love-gifts from one married partner to the other. Aggressive castratory wishes, we shall find, lead to that sort of censorship which interferes with the sane discussion of sex problems. Phobia of being castrated, at the same time, shows itself as a flight from sex which results in inability to face squarely the social problems involved, such as birth-control. Finally, I shall show the existence of self-castratory wishes, and from the fact that birth-control itself can be regarded as symbolic of self-castration to point out how unconscious wishes about the latter may affect our attitude towards it. One of the results of Freud's researches which has elicited the greatest amount of hostile criticism has been his postulate of infantile sexuality. It was indeed the last straw which broke public tolerance of his views and let loose a storm of vituperation. Yet evidence of its truth is available to any mother who will not shut her ears. Every infant takes a spontaneous interest in his own gentitals and their functioning. To sex organs in others, his attitude is also one of attentive interest, though the interest is sometimes admiring, sometimes hostile. Sex phenomena in adults exert a fascination over him. This interest in the genitals is manifested in the way they may be symbolized by other organs, such as the fingers, or, particularly, the breasts.

This identification between penis and breast is carried over from the maternal nipple; testimony of this fact has been afforded by the psycho-analysis of adults, and by observation of children. Dr. K. Stephen reports, in *Psycho-analysis and Medicine*, how one of her patients

identified the breast and the penis, describing the woman's body as one with two penises above and none in the right place.

Dr. Susan Isaacs, in *Social Development among Young*

Children, correspondingly reports from observation how a boy,

about five years of age, was stroking a large collie dog, when it sniffed at his trousers in the genital region. "Oh," he said, "it wants to suck."

The penis, to all little children, both boys and girls, is especially an object of tremendous interest and curiosity. About it they weave various fantastic conceptions and make many innocent queries until adult prudery has effectually crushed them into a prudent reserve, at least when grown-ups are present.

In *New Babes for Old*, Dr. W. de Kok has a most illuminating passage in this connection. She is describing the reactions of her little daughter, Julia, towards her brother, who was born when Julia was 1 year 10 months old.

The first time she saw him naked, I saw her look at his genital organ in surprise, her hand flew instinctively to her own, and then she said:

"What's that, Mama?"

I said quite simply, "It's Christopher's botto," that being her own word.

Her interest in this amazing appendage continued.

At 2 she saw her father having a sun bath, and pointing to his genital organ, said: "What's that?"

"It's Daddy's botto. He has one like Christopher because they are both boys."

At 2 years 2 months she often said, as she watched the baby being bathed: "I think it's a lovely little botto," and "Can I touch it?"

At 3 years 3 months: "Christy has a botto like a thumb," and she would call him "little Thumbkin."

At 3 years 10 months: "Did I have a botto like that when I was a baby?" "No, Christopher is a little boy and you are a girl."

At 3 years 11 months, she volunteered the information: "Christopher is going to be a man when he grows up, and I'm going to be a lady."

The male organ has been found by Freud and other analysts to be an object of which the boy is extremely proud, and the girl often is envious. After the early childhood years, these attitudes usually become unconscious. Hence to persons who have not been analysed, their strength if not their existence is sometimes incredible. Consequently, Dr. Alfred Adler was unwilling to make it, as Freud did, the basis of the feelings of inferiority which the child experienced in comparing itself with adults. Yet most persons admit, and Adler even emphasizes, the fact that for some reason, which to them remains mysterious, the boy is generally proud to be such, and the girl envies him his status. As Money-Kyrle observes in his paper, *Psycho-analytic Study of the Family*, it is, for the average person,

easier to say with Adler that most girls wish to be boys, than with Freud that they wish to have a penis. . . . Hen birds, cows, bitches and female apes often attempt to mount their companions, so that there is nothing strange in the occurrence of similar masculine impulses in women. And, if we once accept the presence of the impulse, we naturally expect to find a desire for the organ which alone can satisfy it fully.

Theoretical disputes of this kind are best solved by actual observation. Evidence on the point has been afforded by the analysis of many patients, who were ultimately able to trace back their inferiority feeling to a comparison of their own organs with those of their father. The likelihood of Freud being right is increased by the fact that children are much excited by the sight of adult male genitals. Dr. Karin Stephen in *Psycho-analysis and Medicine* relates how:

Two little girls who had the opportunity of seeing their father's body about the age of two showed pleasure in the penis, exclaiming "pretty." Another, a year or two older, used to admire her mother's pubic hair, calling it affectionately "your mouse."

Affection and admiration seem to be the spontaneous reaction so long as the child's attitude is loving. But if the discovery of the adult genitals and sexual activities comes at

a time when the child is angry, disappointed and jealous, it may arouse feelings of intense hostility and alarm, riveting the attention upon them with a sort of horrified fascination.

Masturbation as indulged in by children has caused an amount of parental solicitude which is quite unwarranted by medical facts. The indulgence is not really measurably harmful, but is the habit of well-nigh all little children, who may continue it throughout their immaturity and then outgrow it in perfectly natural fashion if nothing intervenes to cause fixation. Real harm is done, not by the physical practice, but by the fact that the child who has been taught shame of his activity is nevertheless compelled to go on practising it, but then, feeling it to be very wrong, becomes degraded in his own esteem.

The genital zone is *par excellence* the source of intensively agreeable sensations. When the infant in the course of self-investigation discovers it, masturbation becomes for him a game, the reward of which is such great pleasure as to wean him from most of his previous auto-erotic activities. For this reason, genital eroticism remains, throughout life, a symbol of fleshly enjoyment. The treatment afforded the child by "moral" parents combines with innate tendencies to make sex a subject of outstanding importance. As Groves and Blanchard in *Introduction to Mental Hygiene* observe:—

he discovers that a certain sphere of his interest gets a different reception from his parents than any other. This means that his curiosity or some accidental happening of his body exploration has entered into what is known to the adult as "sex." These things that the child does and becomes so curious about are not different to him than other experiences that have arisen with his growth, though for the adult they have a distinctly different meaning from any other events and ideas, because they are saturated with an emotional colouring that comes out of his past and the conditioning that he has himself received. The adult, by a harsh reprimand or shocked tone of self-conscious expressing of mingled guilt and pleasure, dramatizes the incident in a way that fixes the child's attention

on what he has done or said, which immediately takes on a colouring of differentness from the other happenings of his life . . . because of the emotional intensity of the parent in dealing with it, becomes a thing apart, more fascinating than anything else, not to be openly discussed or experimented with, nor to be lightly dropped and easily lost sight of.

When there is no interference from outside, the masturbatory urge tends to subside in the degree that various hand-employments and skills are developed. This, together with the extremely early age at which the practice may begin, are described by Dr. de Kok, in *New Babes for Old*:-

Julia practised masturbation at 9 months by rubbing her thigh and rocking herself. In the characteristic adult fashion I was distressed and wondered if I should stop her, but wisely decided not to interfere, but wait and see what would happen. About that time, she became an adept at crawling, and life became very interesting. In less than six months she had outgrown the habit, and there has been no recurrence.

Mrs. Susan Isaacs found, among children still of nursery age, that masturbation was accompanied by fantasies of the parents' copulating and by a feeling on the part of the child that because of his jealous desire to separate them they would punish him. Consequently, he may feel that his own organ is wholly bad and has to do only with poisoning. A certain mother told her she had heard that a good way to stop the habit was painting the boy's organ with an anaesthetic! To such extremes will "good" parents go!

Negative methods may actually increase the tendency. Or, if so dreadful as to inhibit it, they often inhibit with it *all* emotional life. A factor which prevents development out of this auto-erotic phase is precisely the over-importance which becomes attached to it through efforts of anxious parents and nurses. Bertrand Russell wisely says that we should be most careful not to give artificial emphasis, to say nothing of unnatural and psychologically harmful terrors, to this subject by punishments of any kind. I shall revert to this subject later.

Although generally it is only after puberty that penetration becomes possible, and, in consequence, that the desire for coitus becomes normal, it must not be forgotten that even very small children occasionally make attempts at copulation. Professor Malinowski in his great book, *The Sexual Life of Savages*, has furnished evidence that amongst the Trobriand Islanders copulation is practised from the earliest age. Dr. G. Roheim has also observed attempts at copulation by children of two or three years amongst the primitive peoples of Australia. It may be admitted that the warm climates in which these natives live may induce a precocity not met with amongst more civilized peoples. But it can scarcely be thought that native children can be activated by desires which children of more civilized races never experience at all. Indeed, direct observation in infant schools, in crèches and in nurseries has furnished ample evidence to the contrary.

Although I could produce further data on the sexuality of young children almost indefinitely, enough has, presumably, been said to make my point. Many readers may feel that I have laboured it unduly, and in a sense this is so. For unless infantile sexuality is a fact, then it cannot develop. And unless it can develop, then the fixations which occur at various levels and which are, as I hope to show, responsible for so many of our prejudices about sexual matters, cannot be real, but must be myths of a disordered imagination.

It has been to escape this charge that I have emphasized at such length the very real fact of infantile sexuality. Let me at this point pass on to some of its developments.

That every species is entirely competent to reproduce its kind without receiving instruction on the technique, is adduced as a reason to assume that an instinctive or intuitive knowledge is possessed by members of the species of the biological functions of their sexual organs. Now human young differ from non-human young by their intelligence, and this in itself would strengthen the view that children do guess at the purpose of their own and their parents' sexual organs with almost

uncanny directness. I am not claiming that every child has an intuitive perception of the exact nature of coitus. I only say that we must not be surprised to find children acting as if from a sure, however vaguely conceived, sense of the connection between their or their parents' genital organs and procreation.

Much evidence has been accumulated to prove this. I have space here only for one example. The guess of intuition in this case appears in the form of a fantasy, but the symbolism is not difficult to understand.

The little son of S.G. made a visit to a clergyman's family. Now clergymen often have a painful consciousness of being regarded as meek and mild to a degree not altogether admired by others; and so they frequently try to compensate for this reputation by displaying military or else so-called sporting proclivities. The clergyman was such a one and accordingly sent the little boy home fully inculcated with the mania for hunting and killing whatever living creature he could find in wood or garden. Thereupon his little sister—and this is the point in the story—hit upon the most ingenious complementary pastime. It was to go about after her little brother with a big syringe filled with water; the phallic symbolism of the syringe will be obvious to all. As soon as her brother killed any creature, she immediately projected on to it a stream from her syringe, and she gave to this instrument the significant name of "an aliver."

In view of what I have claimed as an intuitive appreciation of the connection between the pleasure-yielding genitals and procreation, it is not surprising that the genital instinct appears not only in its aspect of desire for physical sensations, but also in that of the desire for progeny. This is largely behind the young girl's interest in playing with dolls. At an early age, such an interest is usual in boys as well. But amongst girls, it is apt to continue for a long time, until it is replaced by the wish for something more truly child-like, the desire for actual children or, failing them, at least live pets.

The actual desire to "mother" may appear at a very early age. Take the case of a little friend of mine, Janet (8 years

8 months), who was being visited by her cousin, Johnny, a very charming small fellow of four. At tea-time Johnny was not allowed by her to sit on the chair he had taken, without a pillow being placed on it, partly to raise him up higher, and partly to save the upholstery of the chair from having things spilled on it. Johnny was also reprimanded when he put his elbows on the table.

Countless instances of this disposition to mother amongst young children could be given. Judge Ben Lindsay in his book, *The Revolt of Youth*, furnishes many; and he shows how often tragedy may result from the failure of parents to realize how vital such an impulse may be. I have space here only to summarize one such case, that of a young girl who had just reached adolescence. She became devoted to the newly-born baby of her sister, and when, because the family moved, her overwhelming impulse to look after the child was denied expression, she was utterly heartbroken.

Distrustful of her own parents, she sought information from a school companion as to how she might have a baby of her own, and promptly put her new knowledge to use. When her family discovered she was pregnant, they were scandalized. The case was brought before Judge Lindsay, who might have led it to a happy conclusion, had not the threats and reproaches of the parents already driven the young child frantic. In her terror she had again consulted her sophisticated friend, and had found means to procure an abortion.

This interest in procreation, going back into our infancies and which often was brutally repressed by our parents, is amongst the most powerful of all those motives which affect our attitude towards sexual problems, and, in particular, towards birth-control. If it provides us with no legitimate arguments one way or the other, it no less frequently supplies the whole of the emotional background against which we see the problem, and which, far more than any argument, determines our attitude towards it. But I shall not offer any long discussion of the point here; the significance of infantile interests in

procreation in relation to society's attitude towards birth-control will emerge clearly during the remainder of this chapter.

I pass now to the symbolism. We saw in the case of anal-erotism that symbolism played a vital part in determining our behaviour in adult life. Thus the fact that we tend to see in gold a symbolic representation of faeces was of immense importance to the whole of our economic system. Similarly with genital erotisms, symbolism plays a great part. What is more, the symbols become valuable guides as to the desires which have been repressed into the unconscious and which, as I have constantly had occasion to point out, so strongly determine our beliefs and our conduct.

Penis-symbolisms are the most numerous of any. The representation is subserved by all elongated, pointed or tubular objects, especially parts of the body such as fingers, toes, arms, legs, or even the head. It can happen that the acquisition of a baby fills a woman with joy, partly because its birth means to her symbolically that she had acquired a penis. (Remember that the lack of this organ is unconsciously felt as a mark of inferiority to boys. Naturally, such symbolic meaning need *not always* be the motive for desiring any object, nor in any case the *whole* motive.)

A dream which was brought to me recently had as its manifest content a vehicle running into an iron lamp-post. The post became incorporated in the vehicle and all moved off together. The association with the dream showed clearly that the latent theme was the penetration of the female with the male genital.

The substitution of one part of the body for the penis is a common phenomenon in dreams. It is illustrated by the case of a woman patient, cited by Dr. Karin Stephen in her *Psycho-analysis and Medicine*,

who had one finger thickened and deformed. When she was in an acute phase of her insanity, she attacked another woman and thrust this finger down her throat so far that she injured the larynx. Several times she also thrust it down her own throat. When she was partly recovered and able to converse

intelligibly, she told me that this finger strongly reminded her of a penis, and that it belonged to the devil. She had a horror of it. It was, in fact, the finger with which she had masturbated in childhood. In this case, the symptom substituted the finger for the penis and the mouth for the vagina. The patient took a male sadistic attitude in her attack on the other woman, while, in relation to herself, she played the parts of both male and female.

Symbols of the baby itself, even, may occur because, as we have seen, it tends to be thought of unconsciously as an extension of the genital. One may well ask why there should be any need to repress thoughts about so innocent a thing as a baby. Indeed, there hardly need be except in special circumstances; such circumstances, for example, as where a woman desires one which is forbidden her, or desires that her husband should wish to give her one. The baby may be thought of as proof of one's own genital potency, or of one's success in exciting love.

It is on this account that a woman whose husband fails to give her a child so frequently becomes what persons who do not understand call mercenary. (Naturally I do not mean that all mercenary women are so for this one reason.) Such a woman is merely demanding of her man that if he will not give her the most natural proof of his affection, he shall give her a symbol thereof. She reverts to the infantile conception of the child as a gift produced anally, and demands an anal substitute—jewels or money.

This was the basis of an interpretation given by Dr. Wm. Stephenson to a woman who wrote him:—

I dreamt that I was on a visit to the country, when I heard that a rich uncle had come from abroad to see me. I was told in the dream that he was going to make me his heiress.

Dr. Stephenson held that underlying the picture of the money-giving uncle was the wish for a baby-giving husband. He continued:—

These baby dreams take the strangest possible forms. Many women, for example, have written to me that they dream about picking huge, juicy berries off bushes. . . . Every berry is a baby that the dreamer wants for her very own!

Very often married women dream about saving life.

A typical "saving" dream of this kind is sent to me by Mrs. F. L. "I dreamt," she writes, "that I was walking along the banks of a canal when I saw that a friend of mine was struggling for her life in the water. I tried to pull her out . . . and at last I succeeded."

This dream about saving life is just the same as those about picking apples or blackberries or gooseberries off bushes.¹

Birth-control has been ignorantly misrepresented as "murdering the unborn babe in the womb." The phantasy of saving its life, and therefore of opposing birth-control, is, as we may see from these facts, motivated by the phallic stage of auto-erotism in which the baby is seen as a love-gift.

Undoubtedly, however, the most influential of all the auto-erotic complexes at the root of our attitude to birth-control are those connected with castration. I have already mentioned the intuitive understanding possessed by children of the function of the male organ, and that that intuitive understanding leads to jealousy. I lack space here in which to discuss the why and the how in detail. It is partly related to the disturbing Oedipus situation, which I am reserving for later treatment. Briefly, we may say that in the penis, the child, particularly the male child, tends to see the sign of the aggressive power which his father exercises over his mother. And as he resents that power—for the reason that his father is a dreaded rival for his mother's affection—he develops a jealousy which is sometimes all-consuming. This jealousy tends to be accompanied by a desire to castrate the other male involved. To be sure it is difficult to understand why this should be so in unsophisticated children, but we must not let this difficulty make us refuse to accept the

¹ In an article "When Women Dream of Marriage," *Sunday Chronicle*.

evidence that an aggressive desire to castrate those of whom they are jealous does exist among children.

This evidence is derived partly from analyses of patients, analyses which leave no room for doubting the existence of such wishes in the earliest years. Further evidence is provided by recorded utterances of children themselves. Conventionally "well-brought-up" children are so repressed that we can learn little from them, though Dr. Karin Stephen relates how,

at one very modern school where the children were allowed to say anything they liked, a little girl of four, who had been prevented by her teacher from doing something, turned upon him in a rage, saying: "Very well, then, I will cut off your seed pods."

To hear of castration inflicted on an adult as vengeance horrifies us possibly more than murder itself. This fact indicates that we have built up such resistances against the act as are only built up against what are strong temptations to commit.

We may disregard the castration that has been practised, and in some countries still is practised for such purposes as supplying eunuchs to be keepers of harems, or to be male sopranos for choirs. But malicious castration such as is inflicted by many savage peoples upon their enemies is itself evidence of the desire.

Among civilized peoples, it still survives in symbolic forms, of which the chief is circumcision. This operation is defended in modern times upon very doubtful medical grounds of hygiene. But as this reason is also given by the Jews, where it has been practised as a rite since times entirely antedating scientific medical knowledge, we suspect that any such argument is just a rationalization of some more primitive urge. For the practice is inherited from remote ancestors, to whom the ideas of modern hygiene were not known.

This desire to castrate, repressed as it necessarily is in childhood, takes on many strange sublimated forms. It is notorious that in some marriages the woman behaves in a

manner which, so far as sexual relations are concerned, is in effect a castration of her husband. We may assume as probable, so psycho-analysis has taught us, that behind a given mode of behaviour is some measure of a wish for the effects which the behaviour actually produces; so a castrating wish possesses such wives. Whether or not this is sensed by the husband, he is likely to react with all the anxiety typical of a castration phobia.

Censorship of art and literature, especially where they portray erotic subjects, is a kind of manifestation of a castration complex. Hence the "knife" is applied to what is conceived of in terms of an indecent thing protruding itself lewdly into the home (which symbolizes the maternal vagina) to violate its purity. In persons in whom there is going on an internal struggle between repressed genital eroticism and inhibitory forces, the eroticism in question is quite often projected onto other persons. The neurotic accuses these others, and not himself, with desiring to do various sexual things. He externalizes the entire conflict. He is not consciously aware any longer of the libidinous feelings, but only of his wish to repress such feelings, and he then becomes a crusader against what he calls the forces of vice.

Purity-campaigns and those bodies known in Britain as "watch societies" and in the U.S.A. as "vigilantes" owe much of their fervour to the castrating desire reinforced by guilt about sexual matters—a guilt painfully instilled into that most unfortunate fact of the censoring mania that its greatest vehemence is directed against all *serious* discussion of sexual problems. A lewd musical comedy or novel manages to get past the censor more easily than Shaw's *Mrs. Warren's Profession*, Ibsen's *Ghosts*, or the books of Margaret Sanger or Marie Stopes. In England the public sale of Havelock Ellis' great work, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, is still prohibited. How, in these circumstances, we should achieve a solution of marital problems, and of the birth-control question in particular, would be difficult to imagine, if our thinking were realistic, but on the hypothesis of repressed complexes it becomes

understandable, for, of course, the frivolous mood is the better adapted to slip things past the censorship.

Even more important in influencing our attitudes in marital life than the desire to castrate is the fear of being submitted to this attack. This fear gives rise to one of the most dangerous complexes for mental health, and one which, like most others of the sort, tends to perpetuate itself from one generation to another, namely, the famous castration complex. Dr. de Kok, in *New Babes for Old*, reports a conversation which shows clearly that in a normal boy of only two and a half years there is already in process of formation some anxiety as to whether he can be secure in the possession of the valued male organ:—

Christopher (2 years 6 months) seeing me nude:

“Have you got a botto?”

“Yes.”

“Has it got hair on it?”

“Yes.”

“Is it a little one?”

The last question throws light on the idea small boys have that little girls are minus a sexual organ. I am not surprised that there exists a “castration complex,” for there is no doubt that to a little boy or girl it seems that the girl lacks what the boy has. The parent can do much to dispel this idea.

At 2 Christopher said: “Julia hasn’t got a botto.”

Julia: “I have, haven’t I, Mama?”

“Yes, of course, you have a girl botto, and Christopher has a boy botto.”

There still existed some doubt in Christopher’s mind, for a few weeks later, whilst bathing, he saw another small boy naked, and exclaimed gleefully, “Boy has got a botto.”

Causes of this castration phobia are not hard to find. The first is that unconsciously we tend to project on to others the desire we harbour ourselves. In this way, a child’s desire to castrate his father becomes easily a fear lest his father will castrate him. The substitution for the father of other men is not a great step.

Biologically and historically the fear may be not unfounded.

I say this because Freud has been criticized severely for adopting the theory that in prehistorical times the herd-leader, by threat of castration, monopolized the females of the tribe.

But the recent work of Dr. A. Zuckermann, reported in his book, *Social Life of Apes and Monkeys*, lends new and interesting support to this view that the earliest men lived in hordes in which the leader monopolized the females.

Nor is the impulse to-day wholly dead. Dr. G. Roheim in his work, *Psycho-analysis of Primitive Cultural Types*, cites an interesting case:—

The old man was of a savage and cruel disposition, and one night he got up and went to where his son was sleeping, took hold of his testicles and began to press them and utter threats. From that time on, the son was completely changed, and never spoke another word to his father, mother, or sister. The father has now long been dead. She has sent money to her brother, who had formerly been very good to her, but she had had no answer, so thoroughly did this "primal father" succeed in frightening his son away from mother and sister. Now, with a people amongst whom an actual attempt at castration occurs, we need have no hesitation in assuming that the threat of castration is a real one.

This case illustrates both the direct survival of a castrating urge, and how terribly strong the fear of injury to the genitals may be: a fear indeed that many claim is stronger than the horror even of death; death itself may be dreaded as a symbol of castration.

Another cause of castration anxiety arises out of the situation in which the child finds itself through masturbation. This habit represents a stage that it would normally pass through, but parents, nurses, and teachers too frequently feel it their duty to interfere and tell the child it is behaving wickedly. Not only does the parent punish the child whenever he discovers him at it, but he connects genital activity in the child's mind with concepts like naughtiness, forbiddenness, nastiness, and the like. The derived feeling of sin is apt to be associated with,

first the pleasure in, and later the physical accompaniment of masturbation (emission of semen) even when this occurs in sleep. The child is whipped, perhaps, or its hands tied, and adults may even make the threat that they will cut off its organ if the child continues to play with it. It is astonishing with what frequency that threat is uttered by nurse-girls.

In one way or another, an infant gets the feeling that the genital organs are something that represent forbidden pleasure—pleasure in which it is wicked to indulge. And from threats uttered, or in whatever other way—partly, perhaps, self-originated—children conceive the idea that the fitting punishment for masturbation is the cutting off of the genital organ. This idea is strengthened by the fact that the penis is observed by them to be missing in girls.

Sometimes physical precautions, such as tying the hands, are taken to prevent the child masturbating. In so far as these succeed—but success is always doubtful, if for no other reason than that masturbation may be carried out in many ways other than manually—they do so only at the expense of driving the child from overt acts to inner phantasy. The normal development of the child is violently arrested, and too often a fixation occurs at an auto-erotic level. Day-dreaming, and that tendency to phantasy at the expense of one's duties that characterizes so many adults, results. But more germane to our argument is the stimulus to prudishness which is developed in the young child.

It must be remembered that even if a child associates the genitals with procreation, its immediate interest in them is frankly one of sensual gratification. It sees in them no more than complex instruments for the acquisition of autistic pleasure, and its impulse to acquire that pleasure by friction, whether manual or otherwise, is both wholly natural and very strong. If that impulse be brutally restricted, if the scruple be indelibly impressed on the child's mind that everything connected with it, and with such pleasure as its expression brings, are wrong, then the reaction is equally violent.

If the repression completely succeeds, the child is in the way to become an ascetic, to whom all pleasures are anathema. Lecky's *History of European Morals* contains many masterly surveys of early saints whose lives are illustrations of these dangers.

In the second place, and this occurs much more frequently, a dreadful squeamishness or prudishness about all sexual matters may be built up. A person so afflicted will be incapable of facing a sexual problem, not to speak of discussing rationally its solution. Birth-control as a subject is particularly pertinent, for one of the consequences of birth-control is to avoid the pains and tribulations that normally result from sexual pleasure, namely, pregnancy and child-bearing. Inevitably, an acute opposition arises; for to prudish people not only are all such subjects "nasty" even to think about, but also sexual pleasure is wicked, and can be expiated, if at all, only by pain.

A derivative from the castration complex is man's fear of woman. It is derived also partly from that envy of the penis which I have already mentioned; the male child, believing that the woman envies what he has and she lacks, fears she may try to deprive him of it. This phobia is often the cause of impotence in man, because he has an unconscious dread lest, during coitus, the woman may grip his penis and never let it go. In her book, *Psycho-analysis and Medicine*, Dr. Karin Stephen gives a vivid instance of this fear of women. She tells of the dread expressed by a male patient whom she analysed

that if women had not got penises of their own, they would want to steal from men. This made the idea of intercourse so alarming that he could not bring himself to risk penetration for fear that the woman would never let his penis go again. He described a bad dream in which he was stuck in a muddy hole; frequently he expressed fear of being trapped and shut in. Along with this fear of suffering genital injury himself, there went also the corresponding fear of the injury which he would have to inflict, since, almost consciously, he regarded the vagina as a wound too painful to be touched.

Yet in the book she contributes a note, which I cannot do better than quote:—

It was taken for granted by Freud and the earlier psycho-analytic investigators that this extreme valuation of the male genitals, with the accompanying denial of all sexual importance to those of the female, was a perfectly natural manifestation which needed no explanation. Further study, however, began to throw doubt on this assumption, and many psycho-analytic investigators now follow Dr. Karen Horney in the view that, while the boy's pride in his own sexual organs is natural and normal, the denial of value to the sexual organs of the other sex is not natural and calls for explanation. This attitude, though no doubt it is often met with in the phallic phase of the boy's development, is held to be not a normal phase of development, but essentially pathological, being the result of castration fear, and directed towards the women's genitals regarded both as a wound, the proof of castration, and also as itself an instrument of castration. The denial of value to the vagina, which may be carried to the point of a denial of its very existence, is regarded as an attempt to overcome the intense fear which this organ inspires in the boy who, as a result of his own destructive sexual wishes, believes that the woman will revenge herself by using it to castrate him.

How often a youngster is terrified the first time there is thought of cutting his hair at all, regarding it as a mutilation! The case of a grown person who used to faint when the hairdresser approached with scissors will presently be given. In this connection I would mention a small boy of my acquaintance who, at the age of six years and eleven months, showed signs of fright at the proposal that his hair should be cut by a woman and in the women's department at Harrods, but became calm on his mother taking him into the men's department.

If it be objected that the castration-complex is something which applies only to men, and that men are, after all, only half the human race, the answer is that strangely it is not confined to that sex. Women, too, suffer from a castration complex—although such an assertion sounds like a contradiction

in terms. The name is not an improper one for a fear which analysis has found to be present, a fear that they lack, however, because it has been surgically removed, an external genital such as is possessed by their brothers, and that thereby they have been rendered inferior. The emotional disturbances connected with this infantile belief that they have once been subjected to mutilation attaches itself sometimes to such things as having the nails or hair cut, or being incapacitated from bearing a child.

Dr. William Stephenson, in an article in the *Sunday Chronicle*, relates one such case. From facts which a woman told him in a letter, Dr. Stephenson deduces the reasons, peculiar to her case, why her sex was no bar to her suffering from this phobia. Briefly stated these were that, since her infancy, she had always wished to be a boy. At the age when her character and many neurotic complexes were formed, this woman "had no idea at all that she was different from a boy," and when she grasped that she was not a boy "it gave her a shock that she had never really got over." Unconsciously she still resented the fact that she was a woman and not a man, and every symbolism of castration was feared because it reminded her of the fact that she is female or (as a child often conceives such a thing) a boy who has been made into a girl by the act of castration. Consequently, "she cannot control herself when she goes to a hair-dresser. She turns dizzy and faints, as soon as scissors are used on her hair." A dream which she had was as follows:

I was standing in front of an altar with my future husband. It was apparently our wedding day. The vicar called me aside and told me the wedding couldn't take place. He could only marry women, he said, who had not had their hair bobbed. The wedding simply had to be put off.

Such facts make it clear that a castration complex is not confined to men. Of course, in relatively few people does it develop into a serious phobia. More often it acts in a way that results in a form of behaviour frequently met with, namely, a

flight from sex. That this tendency, which manifests directly in an enormous variety of ways from mere distaste for dirty stories to long and laborious efforts at bowdlerizing great works of literature, is common cannot be doubted. One of its strongest manifestations is in the effect it has upon its sufferers whenever they are faced with any problems that involve sex. They are rendered incapable of facing them at all.

The above are some of the psychological reasons why in our society such a question as that of the dissemination of birth-control information—a question intrinsically no more difficult of solution and not essentially different in kind from that of whether motor-cars and wireless sets should be licensed—is as far from being decided as ever, while the other questions were disposed of almost as soon as they arose.

I cannot close this chapter without mentioning briefly self-castration as a motive in our behaviour. It is in many of its manifestations very similar to others I have mentioned, but has also an interest of its own.

The function of rendering sterile is sometimes taken over by one's own self. I am referring here less to the exceptional, although known, cases where men have surgically operated upon themselves, than to where they have produced the effective result by psychological means. I am referring, in short, to chastity, complete continence, and coldness.

Continence is a conscious suppression of sexuality; the desire, however, may still be felt, for continence does not always imply sexual coldness, in which the process has reached a sort of perfection by a final triumph of repression so complete as to banish the involved desires into the unconscious. In continence, the struggle is still fought out wittingly.

While coldness has occasionally been regarded as a virtue, continence has quite *commonly* been held to be such since earliest times. In proof of this, we have but to read the religious writings handed down to us. Whole colonies of people have segregated themselves from the rest of the world in order the better to practise celibacy.

Once again, the origin of this attitude is to be sought for in the discouragement by parents of the early genital erotisms. Fully to understand it, we have further to realize that the attitude towards these erotisms displayed by his parents is taken over by the child and adopted as his own ideal of proper behaviour. In short, the self-punishing disposition is the supreme fruit of a punitive discipline which has succeeded in making the victim feel that his punishment is right and deserved.

One of the more complex but by no means unduly remarkable of such cases is reported by A. S. Neill, in his book, *The Problem Parent*:

Mark was a boy of eleven, son of a religious mother who played the organ in her village church. He said his prayers night and morning. He was musical and liked only classical music; jazz to him was low music, i.e. belonging to the devil. He was short-sighted and wore glasses.

It was reported to me by one of my staff that he had given up wearing his glasses, and I asked him to come to my study.

“You’ve given up wearing your glasses?” I said.

“Yes. . . .”

“What will happen if you go on not wearing them?” I asked.

He smiled pleasantly.

“I’ll go blind,” he said, quickly.

“You sound as if you want to go blind,” I said.

“I wouldn’t mind if I did. . . .”

“Any . . . advantage of being blind?” I asked.

“Yes, I wouldn’t have to look in the mirror.”

“Why don’t you like looking in the mirror?”

“Cos my face is ugly,” he said fiercely. . . .

I was pretty sure that I had not reached the deepest motive. His disapproval of his face was covering a greater disapproval . . . that of his soul. No healthy boy of eleven is concerned with how his face looks. I resolved to get him to talk about eyes.

“What is an eye, Mark?” . . .

“Oval thing.” He paused and then added: “But it has two balls . . . I mean each eye has a ball in it.”

“Yes? Two balls you say?”

He sniggered.

“Yes,” he said, “and I know what balls you are thinking of.”

"Evidently you are thinking of them too," I said. . . .

Oedipus put his eyes out, that is, he castrated himself symbolically. Little Mark was using the same mechanism when he stopped wearing his glasses; the unconscious motive being: "If I have no sex, I shall have no temptation to masturbate (he had previously been severely punished for masturbation and had prayed fervently for forgiveness) so that if I go blind (lose my balls) I can be religious." From the superficial point of view, going blind would save him from the sight of his sinful self.

The self-castration desire in this case was complicated by a religious motive, but it illustrates with what terrible and fierce strength it may endow the most self-destructive impulses. It has been argued, indeed, that suicide is sometimes a form of self-castration arising from a guilt about sex.

That this guilt exists in one form or another I have striven to show by illustrations throughout this chapter; and in order that its nature may be better understood, I have endeavoured to explore its origins. I have largely contented myself with this exercise, and have taken little trouble to point out the obvious—that whatever is liable to generate the idea that sexuality is a thing of which to be ashamed, is something which will result in the creation of a bitterly hostile attitude to all sane, free discussion of sex.

In the next chapter I shall offer further illustrations of this contention.

CHAPTER X

MAN AND HIS SENSORY ENJOYMENT.—I

I PASS, now, to that form of happiness which we described as enjoyment of the fruits of sensory naturalism.

This chapter will, I fear, prove unpopular. I shall be accused of being fussy to a degree that stamps me as a crank, of being a dull spoil-sport, of being a ridiculous puritan. While I fully appreciate the inevitability of such criticism, I do plead with the reader to consider the case here presented on its merits, and that the annoyance that many readers will inevitably experience while reading what I have to say will be understood by them and their choler accordingly restrained.

I am, as I hope I have shown, no modern Quixote to tilt at windmills. My concern is with the well-being of humanity, but I cannot, more than any other would-be reformer, hope that humanity or even the majority of it will see eye to eye with me in my analyses of current evils. I do not despair of democracy because it is sometimes mistaken, but place my trust in it becoming ever more hospitable to science. And what science teaches me, I resolutely maintain.

In this case her teaching is clear that a certain popular habit is a noxious one, to be eradicated from the social body. In no hope that I shall succeed in my time in influencing large numbers of my fellows about it, but in the belief that I should try, I here voice my protest.

I object to smoking. I object to all perversion of natural sensibility, but particularly where it causes the addict to ignore the sensibilities of those around him. And the purpose of this chapter is partly to justify my objection and partly to disclose some of the unsuspected motives which drive men and women to smoke, to drink excessively and to gluttonize. I offer, that is, an analysis of a disease and thereby suggest a method of cure, but I cannot expect to interest my potential patients in this

cure unless I can first convince them that they suffer from the disease. To create that conviction will, then, be my first task.

It will have become clear to the more perspicacious of my readers, despite the slightly unconventional tone I have adopted in this introduction, that I am still pursuing the same line of approach to my problems as I have thought it advisable to do in the earlier chapters. They will have understood that once again I am proposing to place before them a particular instance of a general evil for consideration, and to examine certain psychological aspects of it, in order to make use of the conclusions arrived at to illustrate the working of a particular Freudian mechanism.

The general evil with which I am here concerned is, of course, our modern lack of receptor delicacy, so to speak. I address myself to the necessity of recapturing what I have earlier described as sensory naturalism, if we are to satisfy the fourth of the six forms of happiness which I enumerated in Chapter IV as comprising the minimum essentials for a fit and proper existence.

Now, it is not necessary to emphasize the fact that the world in which we live thrusts upon us a multitude of sights, sounds, and smells that, considered calmly and in isolation, are revolting. What it is necessary to emphasize is the fact that we tolerate them almost unmoved.

Let us consider just a few. Stench is perhaps the most easily appreciated of the sensory evils that afflict us. We have, it is true, made some real progress in its elimination during the past century. Sanitary knowledge and sanitation have improved beyond recognition since the days when Occidental as well as Oriental towns were without drains, when noble lords migrated from castle to castle as each became uninhabitable from accumulated refuse, and when ladies and gentlemen could better bear to approach one another if both were smothered in strong perfume.

But have we done all that we could? Consider the condition of our city streets after two or three hot days in summer; the

stench of acrid soot that hangs over Pittsburg or Wigan; the effluvia of glue factories and slaughter-houses which pervade large sections of Chicago and other towns.

I said, and I repeat, that we have progressed in this direction during the last hundred years. When we read in our history-books of the conditions of personal hygiene under which a man like Pepys passed his existence, the more fastidious of us shudder in reproachful horror. But have we, on reflection, much right to cast stones at our ancestors for their apparent insensibility to bad odours? If we have modified the smelliness of our world, we have only exchanged one which stank for one which is so full of clattering din that medical authorities are seriously perturbed by the toll which noise is taking on the nerves of citizens.

What right have we to congratulate ourselves upon our superior smell, while in point of noisiness we are inferior? However le Roi Soleil stank, he did live in comparative quiet. And if we had resented (and rightly) the affront which in his person he offered to our noses, how much would he have criticized (and as rightly) the affront which our cities, with their street cars, elevated railways, automobiles, lorries, klaxons, radios, gramophones and road-drills, offered to his ears!

Nor surely can we claim to have progressed very much in the world of sight. We do not, it is true, any longer tolerate the spectacle of diseased beggars thrusting their running sores before our supposedly sympathetic faces. We have largely abolished public executions. We no longer permit heaps of offal and rubbish to litter our streets and alleyways for weeks on end. Yes, we have made some improvements, but we have substituted for old evils unspeakable nastinesses of our own. We still have our revolting butchers' shops with their hundreds of flayed and bloody carcases exposed to inspection and sometimes to infection. We scar the fair face of our countryside with concrete auto-roads that lie like weals across a lashed body. We desecrate the green hills and valleys with masses of stone and wood buildings as hideous as they are inconvenient.

I speak not only of the slums which defame the centres of our cities, but of the horrible red rash of suburbia which desecrates their environs. Besides all this, we bewitch and bemuse ourselves by outrageous methods of advertising that succeed only by their ability to out-scream all competitors and by their universal ubiquity. The hoardings, the billheads, the placards, and the telegraph poles which extend along every road and railway, and the electric power transmission towers make it increasingly difficult to escape into nature's beauty beyond where the finger of ugliness reaches.

I have no space in which to mention more. Here in a nutshell are some aesthetic evils of our world; and for each one I have put down, any truly sensitive person can discover a hundred more.

There remain, however, two senses of which I have not spoken—the senses of taste and touch. Both of them are in a slightly different category, as they are more personal, more individual in their working.

You can see precisely the same object as I can, hear the same noise, smell the same smell, but what I taste I taste myself; what I touch I touch myself. I do not claim that this distinction is of any metaphysical value, or that it could seriously be maintained philosophically. For my general purpose, however, it is enough to state that taste and touch are slightly more personal in their operations than sight, hearing, or smell. That is principally because the objects on which they operate are not so generalized in their distribution.

I find it necessary to make this slight distinction for the offences which this world commits against our senses of taste and touch while they are, in my view, no less objectionable, are less easily stated than are those which it commits against our other three senses.

Before I can consider them, therefore, I wish to generalize a little more about the first three.

The evils which I have described are part and parcel of our industrial mechanized age. Factories which make smoke and

smells also make clothes and food. Clothes and food have, in our competitive society, to be sold by means of screaming advertisements. That, at least, is the line of argument taken, and so it is often claimed these evils are unavoidable. Certainly few people would admit that they were psychological in origin. Neither do I claim that they are wholly so, nor that all of them can be easily or rapidly eliminated. But I do claim that their continued existence has a psychological background; for they continue only because we tolerate them, and we tolerate them because we lack that sensory naturalism possessing which we should at once clamour for their abolition. And if people clamour loud enough and long enough about anything, it immediately becomes worth somebody's while to attend to it.

Scientists and inventors would then give to the abolition of things which offend our senses some of the energy they now give to perfecting instruments of destruction or new aids to high-pressure salesmanship. Already, as we all know, the knowledge of how to abolish these evils is largely to hand. Home and factories no longer *need* stink and smoke; city streets *could* be rescued from spoliation.

No: man does not lack the ability to cure these ills, he lacks the inclination. He has repressed his sensibility. The cynical critic may at this point be prompted to retort: "how lucky then! If he does not know them as evils, why do anything about it? Reserve your energies for something else."

That, however, is not only a cynical, it is a superficial point of view. For of course man's insensitivity to these evils is but superficial; it is but another type of repression from consciousness. In that fact lies the tragedy.

The possession of senses which function with complete precision, which register accurately, that is, not only the quantitative but also the qualitative value of stimuli, is an indispensable attribute to beasts in their natural state. Sight, smell and hearing must be of the keenest if they are long to escape from their natural enemies or capture prey; touch and

taste must be equally ready to warn them of perils. The wild animal whose senses become blunted dies quickly.

We, as human beings, have passed the state at which the preservation of sensory keenness is a biological necessity from the short point of view. But in permitting our senses to become blurred, we have abandoned a heritage of immense value.

The pleasures derived through the senses are legion; they need not be emphasized. Yet their value is never wholly quantitative. Quality is indeed more important. And we are in danger of losing all our ability to evaluate either the quantity or the quality of sensory stimuli.

In that there is tragic loss. Did our senses possess the fine keenness which is their proper state, a whole world of subtle sensory pleasures would open for us.

Let me offer one illustration which is perhaps extreme, but will make clear my point. It is recorded that among the Chinese there exists a habit of handling and stroking jade. The texture of this material, they allege, gives them great delight. In Japan, also, I have been taught by dealers in ivory to caress the object being evaluated. Yet, in the West, how many of us could say of our sense of touch that it was capable of causing us pleasure? We are capable only of distinguishing between sharp pains and no pains. We feel the prick of a pin, for example, and withdraw our finger; but we fail entirely to feel the "value" in the touch of jade or ivory.

Here is but one example of the way in which our senses have begun to atrophy and of the sensory loss we have in consequence suffered. I have no space in which to offer more. I can only refer to the sense of taste and point out that so blunted and blurred has it become amongst us that the man who has what is called a "palate" is pointed out as a rarity.

There is no valid reason why we should forgo so many of the delights which our senses, if properly preserved, could yield us. The fact that biological necessity no longer presses upon us so heavily, that we do not to the same extent as in our primitive jungle existence rely upon our senses for preserving

life itself, is surely no reason why we should permit the fine edge of those senses to become dull and thus lose for ever the ability properly to enjoy the world they open up.

Our cynic who points out that were we all to recapture suddenly the full measure of sensory naturalism, we should find ourselves in a world that more affronted us is right. But this only means that what to aim at is sensory naturalism in a world fit for sensory naturalists.

I cannot, in the space of this book, even begin to indicate the factors which have combined to pervert our senses. They range from destitution and anxiety to parasitism and excessive *joie de vivre*. Many of them are physical in origin, but more are psychological. It is with the latter that I am concerned, yet they are far too numerous to permit me to discuss them all. The various psychological motives that enter into the defects of sight, hearing, smell, touch, and taste, from which we suffer, are legion.

Once again, therefore, I shall be selective. In illustration of my theme I shall take a particular evil which gravely outrages our senses and shall endeavour to show how this evil is largely the product of psychological factors.

The smoking habit is become to-day perhaps the most widespread and certainly the most persistent of all those habits by which our senses are affronted. There is no sense organ which tobacco smoke does not injure. It destroys the sensitivity of our taste buds; it ruins the fineness of our olfactory nerves; it weakens our eyes; it affects our hearing by the catarrh which it helps to foster; and finally, because it undermines our whole system, filling us with the poison of nicotine, it impairs our various kinaesthetic and skin senses.

That, together with interferences with our digestive, eliminative and circulatory systems, constitutes the medical indictment. There is also a serious social one. Cigarette and cigar ends, ash and dottle from pipes are amongst the filthiest objects which we encounter. They are, unfortunately, not confined to our streets; they invade our houses, and are to be found in the

sitting-room, the dining-room and the bedroom, as well as the lavatory to which such habits are properly confined.

To-day it is thought no breach of manners to smoke anywhere. Theatres, cinemas, even opera-houses, trains, buses, trams and even restaurants, are all befouled by tobacco and its filthy remains. It is increasingly difficult for the man or woman whose natural senses revolt not only against the stench of tobacco, but also against the dirtiness which its use engenders, to discover any place free from the invasion of this invidious and repulsive poison.

These facts must be clear to anyone who studies the question with any show of impartiality. They are but a baldly stated tithe of the arguments which can be brought against smoking, and the case they all make out is overwhelming. What, indeed, are difficult to discover are any reasons worth listening to why such a vice should ever arise or ever, having arisen, be tolerated.

It is said, on the medical side, that the moderate use of tobacco, like the moderate use of alcohol, does no harm. Whether that analogy or that assertion be right or wrong, it is sure that the smokers who use tobacco moderately are as hard to discover as is a convincing definition of the word moderate—though each thinks *himself* moderate.

It is said that tobacco is a gentle corrective for jaded nerves. So are cocaine, heroin, and the like. Tobacco is but one more such addiction drug as these; not quite so disastrous in its results as the other, quantity for quantity, but (on that special pretext) consumed in recklessly vaster amounts than they. And, as any smoker knows, the continued use of the drug merely exacerbates the conditions to alleviate which (it is alleged) it is used. The more one smokes, the more one's nerves are in need of soothing—a vicious circle.

It is said that smoking is a bond of sociability, the want of which is a handicap to the abstainer. To my way of thinking, this is at last a valid argument—the only one of the lot. I would only, as a lifelong non-smoker, say that the argument

is generally greatly overstressed, that it is perfectly possible to chat pleasantly with people—even strangers—without exchanging cigarettes, and that this small social asset of the habit does not begin to balance the immense liabilities some of which I have indicated.

The most obvious causes of smoking are economic. The exhausted worker, coming into his dingy home, discouraged with the meagre even if real results of honest efforts at betterment, tries to blot out his troubles for a time (alas! only to have them return the more insistently) in a cloud of smoke. Another economic factor has also been hinted at already, namely, that this vice is commercialized to the tune of 337 million dollars for the eight leading companies. The profits (\$75,000,000 annually for these companies alone) of pandering to an addiction so nearly universal are so stupendous that it is no wonder that unscrupulous methods of deceiving the public are resorted to—according to the *New York Arbitrator*:

In 1930 the president of the American Tobacco Company received \$2,447,280, four vice-presidents a total of \$2,530,000, and sixteen directors \$1,645,910, including free stock all round.

Such are the blessings of capitalism for the dopers and for the duper, respectively.

There can be little doubt that overpopulation also lends itself to an increased consumption of tobacco. Unfortunately, I do not know where to go to for exact data here. But overpopulation means squalid living conditions, and squalor leads to dissipation, as a misconceived attempt to find relief—the increase of alcoholism under such circumstances is notorious, and that of tobacconism can be assumed to run it parallel.

When we enquire into the history of this unprofitable custom, almost the first thing which strikes us is the role which has been played by wars and soldiering in its propagation. The Spaniards brought the habit along with their loot from the Americas. French soldiers in the nineteenth century brought the habit from Spain. English soldiers brought back from the Crimea

the form of tobacconism which is most insidious—cigarette-smoking. When the world-war came, the vast modern industry was in the field ready to exploit humanity's agony by a campaign to make cigarettes the chief form of gifts from home to "our boys," through Y.M.C.A.'s, etc. This permanently, as well as enormously, increased the market since "once an addict, always an addict" is the rule. The war was also a means of popularizing smoking among women, thus nearly doubling a market previously limited to males.

Colleges and schools, government bulletins and the public press and radio ought to be a means whereby the public should learn of all the above truths and judge whether it approved of this evil. But such few school texts on hygiene as once included a few words on the subject have been dropped. The topic is taboo to newspapers—one will never see in them any account or editorial acclamation of researches into this field to offset the untruthful display advertisements which the companies lavishly pay for. There is much wanted a public intolerance of falsehood and of attempts to hoodwink—a scientific spirit in place of credulity.

So finally we come to the last influence on smoking which I am interested in disclosing, and in disclosing this time in detail—the psychological. To begin with, we should note that even so-called "moderate" smokers are pursued by a nemesis. To smoke ten or twenty cigarettes a day sounds, perhaps, a reasonable consumption of nicotine, but if I took ten or twenty aspirins a day, after a few days I should be unable to carry on without them. In exactly the same way, the cigarette addict does not smoke his first or his twentieth cigarette because it is naturally enjoyable; he smokes it because his body has become accustomed to regular doses of nicotine, and when it lacks them protests.

These protests take the form of a vague sense of unrest growing to fitfulness and exasperation, accompanied by an increasing yearning for the drug that is comparable in intensity with the appetite of a hungry man. Denied his nicotine, the

smoker manifests on a smaller scale most symptoms of any drug addict.

His motive for smoking, therefore, is to satisfy a craving, not to add to his store of sensory pleasures. How pitiful! By giving way to his "taste" for tobacco, he has reduced himself to a condition in which he is no longer normal without it. He smokes merely to fill up a want; he does not add to his whole. He smokes, not for positive joy, but to allay a yearning. He has saddled himself with a new brute which imperiously demands to be fed, its appetite growing on what it feeds upon, at a high cost to his pocket, his health, and his consideration for others.

Why, then, do men and women give way to such an addiction? In the case of tobacco, this is the more difficult to understand, since whatever may be said of the habit's subsequent value, there can be no doubt that to the novice it is disgusting. Little boys who retire to some private spot, there to smoke surreptitiously a stolen cigarette, display great courage. The first puff sometimes sets them gasping and choking, the next makes their eyes smart, the third turns over their stomachs. They end by being violently sick. Such is the cost of initiation. Were there *no adults to imitate*, I do not believe it would be easy to bribe some little boys to venture a cigarette for a second time.

Here, then, is to be sought the explanation of the origin of smoking amongst the young. *Imitation*, a desire to copy and emulate the behaviour of adults, alone can be strong enough to make a child persevere in face of discomfort to eyes, throat, lungs and stomach. And this desire to emulate is purely psychological.

But it would be fantastic to assert that there *was* no pleasure at all in smoking. Even that pitiable victim, the chain-smoker, gets some enjoyment from at least the first few of his daily half-hundred cigarettes. What is the nature of this pleasure? Is it purely a sensory one, or is it to be explained as due to the canalization of some deep-seated unsatisfied psychological urge? I suggest it is the latter.

As the origin of smoking can be partly explained as a manifestation of homo-sexuality (which is at the basis of wishing to do what our heroes do), so the pleasure derived from it can partly be explained as derived from the satisfaction of an oral-erotism. There are, it is true, many other erotisms bound up closely with smoking, but I must content myself with examining these two only. Their operation, I hope to show, is of the most vital importance in relation to the problem of smoking and its cure. In this way, psychology enters closely into the larger problem of sensory naturalism, which is one of our six forms of happiness.

I shall begin this explanation with a brief account of the origin and development of oral-erotism. This is the technical name given to the first stage in an infant's development when his chief source of pleasure is localized in his lips and in those muscles of his mouth which are engaged in sucking movements.

Professor J. B. Watson, in the course of much valuable experimental work on the point, has shown that the movements which a newly-born child's mouth makes on its first contact with its mother's nipple, and which are the primary requisite of its continued existence (since in sucking it derives its nourishment)—these movements are to be explained as simple reflexes. As such, then, oral-erotism begins and for some time continues.

But there are elements in the situation bound to lead to complete emotional states. The developing child becomes more and more aware of the direct points of focus in itself and the outer world from which his satisfactions and most marked experiences proceed. The first and most powerful focus in the outer world, the great primal centre of life, is his mother's breast, from which he draws the joint satisfaction of his two greatest needs—those for nourishment and love. With her breast he begins to associate as the primary focus in his body, his mouth, which thereafter comes to have, as we shall see, a significance going far beyond the ordinary physiological ends of which we commonly think.

Meanwhile, it is early noticeable that sucking has become

for the child a pleasure in itself entirely apart from the nutrition which it produces. Anyone with the least experience of babies will readily appreciate the truth of this observation. In pursuit of the pleasure to be derived from this exercise, the young child will put into its mouth an enormous variety of objects ranging from its own fingers and toes to such articles as lumps of coal and pieces of wool and cloth. Indeed, I have observed in my pet baby gibbon even a tendency to do exactly the same.

The soothing and soporific effect which sucking has upon young children is evidenced, if any evidence be demanded, by the way in which a child's tantrums can be calmed by giving it an article to suck, and by the fact that if the sucking be prolonged the child becomes drowsy and eventually goes to sleep.

In view of such facts, it is impossible to doubt the intrinsic emotional value to the child of sucking in itself. It has been objected that a child who sucks is a child insufficiently nourished continuing to suck *in the hope* that the exercise will yield the nourishment it craves. This objection is obviously invalid. The contention might suffice to explain why a hungry child sucks, but it is well-known that children utterly replete will continue to suck and this fact is the one requiring explanation.

It can only be understood on the Freudian hypothesis that in the earliest period of life, lip-exercise or sucking yields *intrinsic* satisfaction. If there remain doubts as to the emotional satisfaction which it yields, or as to the sexual nature of that satisfaction, they should be dispelled by the phenomenon of kissing. Continuing into adult life, this yields intense emotional satisfaction, and is as clearly sexual as it is oral in origin and in development. Moreover, the analyses of adults and the observation of children alike show that the libidinous energy which is for a time tied up in the act of sucking passes normally from that to other actions until, at the end of its chain of development, this energy, known as *libido*, becomes permanently fixated at the sexual level. Why is it that an arrest in the development of this *libido* sometimes occurs at the very first stage?

Dr. Edward Glover traces the fixation of oral-eroticism largely to unfortunate handling by the mother when giving the child the breast as by attempting to wean it so soon. However, it must by no means be supposed that the mother is always to be blamed for a mistake which she could have avoided by better intentions or greater enlightenment. We are coming more and more to see that the unwise conduct of parents which early analysis led us to believe was responsible for many mal-developments, frequently existed only in the imagination of the child. What is important is what the child *felt* was the objective truth and even if in our view objectively the mother may have treated the child quite generously, and yet subjectively the fact remains that to the child she did not appear generous.

I once held to the theory that children's appetites must be instinctively suited to their requirements. So, if you let the child have the choice of its own food, it would soon come to take those things and only those things which suited its natural needs. I was very astonished in my early school-teaching experience to find that one little boy wanted to eat nothing but pickles and meat. Being *in loco parentis*, I did not dare to let him go on in the hope of seeing whether in time he would get over his most curious taste.

The defect of the theory mentioned is that it does not take into consideration how all sorts of fortuitous events in the weaning of the child may give a strange twist to appetite and may associate symbolical meanings with numerous articles of diet. It is in this way that some persons come by their abnormalities in eating. Consider the case reported by K. Schlesinger, summarized in these words in *Psychological Abstracts*:

A forty-nine-year-old man had as a child been provided daily by his mother during her absence with 1.5 litres of *café au lait*. Later, as he became independent, he raised the daily amount to 2, 4, 8, and finally to 10 and 12 litres (3-4 litres of milk, $\frac{1}{4}$ kg. coffee beans, and $\frac{3}{4}$ kg. malt coffee); no *diabetes insipidus* resulted. The fluid intake was immediately

reduced to 2-2·5 litres without discomfort. The stomach and intestines were normal on X-ray examination, in spite of the great consumption of liquid. The father had been a heavy drinker, and consequently the patient, both as child and adult, detested alcohol. Schlesinger assumes an inherited tendency to drinking, which in consequence of this hatred of alcohol, satisfied itself with coffee, and when this was unobtainable during the war and post-war period, with substitute drinks.¹

The nipple-sucking period in any child is very likely to be followed by one of lollipop-sucking. Perhaps the child may also be given a rubber teat or may be allowed to go about putting whatever articles it chooses into its mouth and sucking them. But as the child grows older, after the lollipop and "all-day-sucker" state, other substitutes must be found as these early indulgences begin to come under public criticism as babyish. Two such obvious substitutes are, on the one hand, various forms of tobacco, such as cigarettes, cigars, and especially the pipe, and, on the other, different drinks which have some special quality of titillating the lip zone. Such drinks include some which are practically harmless, such as ginger ale, and on the other hand those containing alcohol which, besides giving the necessary sting, are both harmful and habit-forming in all but the smallest quantities.

Freud and Rado, as Brombert and Schilder point out,

have indicated the strong oral libidinal tendencies in drinkers, and Rado compares the satisfaction got by imbibing with the satisfaction the child gets by the ingestion of food (alimentary orgasm).²

Certain analysts also have been convinced that drug-taking is more related to early oral than to any other form of erotism. Dr. Glover, in his article in the *International Journal of Psycho-*

¹ *Psychological Abstracts*, December 1932, Vol. VI, No. 12, pp. 599-600.

² Brombert (W.), and Schilder (P.): "Psychological considerations in alcoholic hallucinosis—castration and dismembering motives."—*International Journal of Psycho-analysis*, London, April 1933, p. 206.

analysis, relates that in patients of his who were addicted to drug-using and intemperance in wine, these weaknesses bore a relation to the early oral stage. One can understand this more easily in the case of alcoholism than in the case of drug-taking, because obviously the first stimulates the lips pleasurable and is taken largely for that purpose.

One of the most curious manifestations of oral eroticism is that the interest it makes us take in certain flavours is frequently so great as to cause us actually to overcome our sense that the taste in question is unpleasant. Take the case, for instance, of medicines. Physicians remark on the fact that the person who takes a very bitter medicine is likely to feel that it is doing more good than if it has no taste or smell. If it is foul-tasting he feels very sure it is a potent medicine—a fact which has had tremendous influence on the prescriptions with which our doctors supply us.

To revert, however, to smoking. A man of my acquaintance asked me one day why it was that he found himself inclined to smoke most when in a state of agitation. Yet he was familiar with the expression sometimes used by women that "a man with a pipe is like a baby with a comforter."

An analytic patient of mine began the hour one day with the recall of the previous hour's conversation having turned upon his strong mother-fixation. During the previous twenty-four hours his thoughts had run largely along that line. He also said that he had been thinking a good deal lately of eating and smoking. Why was it that when he was waiting his turn in the analytic ante-room he automatically pulled out his pipe and commenced puffing at it? Someone had once made a criticism of him that had stuck in his mind, to the effect that he never kept at any occupation very long. How was it that smoking was an exception to this? Why didn't he get tired of the habit and throw it over, as he was apt to do with more useful things?

I was able to point out how in those activities which he tended to weary of, and to throw over, the motive was predominantly extraneous and conscious and the throwing-over

was due to the eventual uprising of unconscious resistance against the activity. In the case of smoking, on the contrary, the activity was indulged in for the sake of immediate and largely unconscious satisfaction yielded by it. Moreover, it became, like any other addiction habit, a canal into which an increasing amount of *libido* tended to drain itself.

Next he began wondering what made him jump from the subject of his mother to that of his pipe. There must, he thought, be some connection between the two. He surmised that the pipe represented to him the mother's breast. When he was pulling at it, he was really seeking consolation from her breast.

Why was it, he again asked, that the times when he was dissatisfied with the state of affairs should be the times when he was particularly keen on smoking? I pointed out that every child when it is hurt or unhappy tends to regress to thumb-sucking, which is itself symbolic of seeking comfort from the mother's breast.

As the thumb or pipe consoles the child or smoker when he is out of sorts, so, *per contra*, the deprivation of his comforter is likely to bring an irritable mood on. Bridges, quoted by Isaacs, gives the following:—

Abusive remarks made by a child when asked to take out of his mouth a pin that he was sucking. "You good for nothing, you! You mutt, you! I'll tell my mummy! I'll bring a stick and beat you!"¹

The same child when he grows up is likely to develop into one of those smokers occasionally found who drop into unpleasant expletives if anyone expresses an objection to their indulging the habit in whatever place they choose. Some people to whom smoke is an abomination, or so we read in the *Western Morning News and Mercury*,

endure it rather than brave the indignant looks of the man who is refused when he asks permission to smoke; but there

¹ Bridges, pp. 77-78, quoted by Isaacs (Susan): *Social Development in Young Children*, London, 1933, p. 46.

are also a few brave spirits who stand on their rights and spend the whole of a long journey in an atmosphere free from smoke but full of hate. There is no more ferocious being than the habitual smoker who is deprived of the solace of a pipe or cigarette.¹

I rarely meet smokers who are so rude as this. But enough of them exist to make it impossible to doubt that while other motives, too, are responsible for our taking up smoking in the first instance, oral-erotism is the most powerful of all those which conduce to its continuance. The reduction of this "social" habit will, therefore, be enormously furthered if a satisfactory alternative channel for oral erotism can be discovered. Some who find the custom particularly objectionable have suggested that gum-chewing might serve as a substitute. So far as the oral-erotism alone is concerned, this might be satisfactory, but on the whole the substitution is unlikely to be made because, in the first place, the sight of others chewing gum is unpleasant to most people—to some as much so as the smell of other people's smoke; and, in the second place, there are, in addition to oral-erotism, certain other symbolisms in smoking (notably phallic) which gum-chewing does not satisfy. Still, I admit to being surprised that the manufacturers of various chewing-gums have for some reason never exploited their opportunity of advertising their product as a substitute and a relatively healthy one for smoking.²

Before leaving the subject of oral-erotism, it is only fair to point out that besides its direct expression as in smoking, we encounter also in adults strong reaction formations against it. That is to say, that besides oral desires we find fears of, or antagonism to, oral sensations. Cases occur in this respect where tobacco is welcomed for its narcotizing properties which dull the general sense of taste. But more normally these reactions

¹ *Western Morning News and Mercury*, April 5, 1928.

² On the contrary, several of them exploit smoking itself as an aid to their sales by alleging that to chew their gum after a cigarette or pipe is to make the next taste much better.

inhibit tobacco indulgence itself. They operate with great strength in this way whenever tobacco is thought of as being thrust upon one's self or another by an extraneous agency. It is then that we get such vehement protests as this of Professor Bruce Fink:

There is no greater curse being forced upon humanity than the cigarette trade, and yet we complacently watch the effect of the tobacco trust to put the cigarette into the mouth of every boy and every young man.

I shall mention in the next chapter several other psycho-analytic factors which influence smoking, or the opposition to it, before I go on to consider the influence which homo-sexuality has upon the problem.

CHAPTER XI

MAN AND HIS SENSORY ENJOYMENT.—II

I ALLUDED in the last chapter to homo-sexuality as one of the chief operative influences in the smoking habit; but before I go on to illustrate the working of this mechanism in its relation to smoking, I must refer briefly to the part played by anal-erotism in this connection.

We have had occasion in previous chapters to note the phenomenal interest which a child takes in and the acute pleasure he derives from his excretory processes. The interest extends from the substance excreted and thence to flatus and in general to bodily odours. Revolting as these interests seem to us, we must, on reflection, see that we can hardly expect them to be any more unpleasant from the point of view of a child than from the point of view of a colt or calf or any other animal. If we doubt this, actual observation of any child will very quickly convince us of its truth and introspection of our own earliest childish memories will confirm it. Moreover, analysis has revealed that all feelings of "decency" which we possess are acquired and not natural.

There are sufficiently social reasons why children have to become cleanly in their habits and give up their pleasure in forcing their anal interest on to the attentions of others about them. The very first training which children receive is therefore in physiological habits, including that of cleanliness. As any mother or nurse knows, the child does not in the least welcome such training, but resists it with all its force, and while he has outwardly appeared to yield to the greater strength of his tutors and to forgo his interests in his physiological functions, he only indulges them the more when he is with other children or alone. Such interests may endure until well into adolescence.

Those who keep cats or dogs about the house know how hard it is to house-train them. The similar training of children

is even more difficult. In the first place, it has to be carried further; in the second, the child knows how to derive a greater amount of pleasure from the anal source than does the animal; and, in the third, stubbornness in this field is one of the few ways in which an infant can defy his mother or nurse and defend his personality against their encroachment.

For these reasons, the child's interest in excrement and its derivations is only suppressed with great difficulty, or given sublimation by aid of hardly-found satisfactory substitutes. A most common substitute expression of this interest, particularly after the advent of adolescence, is to be found in smoking.

Mr. Eric Hiller, in the *International Journal of Psycho-analysis* in 1922, pointed out that tobacco could symbolize faeces. He specified its connections—the brown colour, odour, moisture, association with heat and burning sensations and the release from tight conditions in the package—as primary qualities leading to this association. Additional factors were the manipulation of the pipe plug by fingers, the manner in which many people abstain from smoking for a period in order to obtain the more enjoyment by postponing release (a typical constipation mechanism) and such things as the collection of cigarette ends by wretches in the gutter.

Such phenomena are too self-evident to need elaboration. It is, however, worth while to deal with the olfactory influence in a little more detail. Our interest in smells in childhood appears to merit treatment (for a number of reasons) as much in connection with oral-erotism as with anal. It is closely bound up in earliest experience with the taste (smelling is only an extended method of tasting) of our mother's milk; indeed, it would be possible to place small preferences amongst the ego-impulses by pointing out that to animals in a natural state, it is both the principal guide to food and the chief method of detecting danger. But there is little doubt that whatever may be the proper analysis of its origin, smell is rapidly, in the development of a child, overlaid with complex libidinal factors.

The centre of these is usually anal, and the interest of a child

in the odour of faeces and of *afflatus* is the pivoted point round which revolves the later struggle to teach cleanliness and right habits. Thus a child is taught to dislike as nasty the anal smells in which he is interested, and to prefer the perfume of flowers, or of artificially extracted scents.

It is revealing to note, therefore, that a large part of the prestige which attaches to perfumery is a sublimated *flatus*-interest. In some cases, the original attachment was so strong as to require the maximum of breaking down, and an inhibition against one particular odour become an inhibition against odours, even the most exquisite. Those people who "cannot stand scent at any price" are typical examples of such cases.

For the most part, however, scents and other similar odours become for the child in time perfectly satisfactory substitutes. His original interests meet with complete taboo in polite society, and he has no acceptable outlet for them in their primitive form. In time he learns to express them in a sublimated way, in his liking other odours, chiefly, as I said, scents and similar things; but obviously nothing else so well gratifies that displaced desire as the smell of tobacco-smoke.

Mr. Eric Hiller, in the article I have already quoted, pointed out that

the pleasure taken in puffing smoke and in releasing it suddenly from the mouth and the pleasure in its scent are all evidently displacements upwards of the infantile pleasure in passing *flatus*.

Smoking therefore permits the individual in a social situation to make a bad smell and yet to have it excused; and his long-forgotten though still active interest in *afflatus*, which tobacco smoke so resembles, is thereby satisfied.

Although I do not consider that this motive is so influential in the encouragement and continuance of the smoking habit as either oral-erotism or homo-sexuality is, it is yet powerful and should not be neglected.

It would be unfair of me, however, to fail to point out that

the campaign against smoking also derives most of its strength from these anal and olfactory influences that I have been discussing. It is not, indeed, influenced by them so directly as is smoking; but is so indirectly.

Let us remember the long and stern struggle that goes on month after month in the nursery between infant and mother or nurse. In that struggle, so portentous because of its repercussions on incipient character-formation, the victory of the adults finally succeeds in establishing in the child's super-ego certain ideals of cleanliness, neatness, and tidiness as moral virtues opposed to opposite traits which are regarded as more or less wicked.

The training of the child in cleanliness teaches him to despise not only the defecatory products, but substances associated with these, such as scraps of paper and various kinds of litter. This is the essential psychological foundation of our anti-litter campaigns, for as Freud has said:

We are indignant and call it "barbarous," which is the opposite of civilized, when we find the paths in the Wiener Wald littered with paper. Dirt of any kind seems to us incompatible with civilization; we extend our demands for cleanliness to the human body also, and are amazed to hear what an objectionable odour emanated from the person of the Roi Soleil; we shake our heads when we are shown the tiny wash-basin on the Isola Bella which Napoleon used for his daily ablutions. Indeed we are not surprised if anyone employs the use of soap as a direct measure of civilization. It is the same with order, which, like cleanliness, relates entirely to man's handiwork.¹

In the same way and for the same reasons many people object to smoking. The objection, however, has grown smaller in volume if more determined in attitude. At one time smoking was only indulged in out of doors or, if in the house, only in the dining-room after a meal and when the ladies had retired. To-day both sexes smoke everywhere, often in insolent defiance

¹ Freud (S.): *Civilization and Its Discontents*, London, 1930, p. 55.

of persons or of printed signs asking them to refrain. And this habit is persisted in by those otherwise courteous and cleanly people who would never require a neighbour to ask them to refrain from eating garlic or a notice to remind them that they were in a non-spitting room!

But childhood training in cleanliness and order is still a source of antagonism to the smoking habit. Both of them are reactions against what may be described as the anal aspect of dirtiness and disorder. Of smoking, as we have seen, there are many anal aspects, from the colour and odour of the substance used to the conditions under which it is sometimes (though now very rarely) manufactured; and from such the carefully instilled habits of cleanliness of many of us revolt. In some cases the revolt is violent and noisy, but, whether or no, it is designed to enlist the "cleanliness" reaction of people against smoking.

Consider a few out of the hundreds of cuttings I have collected on the subject. Here is one from a pamphlet, *The Smoking Habit*, by T. F. Taylor. He speaks of dining-tables

adorned with ash-trays, an unpleasing addition to the table service, an eyesore among the plates of eatables. Why not spittoons as in the good old days? There is little to choose between contaminating the air in these places with tobacco smoke and scattering dust or other objectionable matter over the food and drink.

Here is another, from a second pamphlet by J. Q. A. Henry, *The Deadly Cigarette*:

The employees of the large manufactories of New York, where most cigarettes are made, are mainly from the lowest and most degraded classes, drabs from the slums and stews of the great metropolis; and these degraded women, filthy in the extreme, and often victims of loathsome diseases, handle most of the cigarettes and cheap cigars made.

The effect of such assertions and revelations is to be seen best in the conduct of the great tobacco manufacturers themselves, whose advertisements during the last few years have

ceased to concern themselves in the first place with the question of the *quality* or relative inexpensiveness of their products, but have concentrated more and more upon the "perfect hygienic conditions" under which their product was prepared.

I will content myself with one more instance only of the strength of the reaction-formation against anal-erotic interests. A Mr. St. John Fytton in an article, "A Smoke-doped World," that appeared as a supplement to *The Plain Dealer*, April 1933, distinguishes

degrees in this filthy practice, ranging from the man who only smokes a few cigarettes daily and retains his self-control, down to the poor devil with glassy, protuberant eyes, a torpid brain, a smoker's heart, and cirrhosis of the liver, sucking his pipe for hours at a stretch with a loathly brown dribbling from a corner of his mouth. There is but a narrow dividing line between all these poor creatures and the opium, morphine, heroin, narceine, codein and cocaine addicts.

I shall now pass on to a consideration of homo-sexuality as the second great motive force in the development of the smoking habit. Let us first consider homo-sexuality itself in a little more detail.

Unfortunately, the word homo-sexuality, like so many which have been carried over from technical use to the language of everyday life, has acquired such an unpleasant significance in the minds of most people as renders it an awkward term for the scientist to use.

Hence I am imperatively called on to remind my readers that the homo-sexuality of which the more scandal-loving of our Sunday newspapers delight to relate sordid instances is only the most physical and primitive manifestation of the homo-sexuality of which I am treating. It is a survival into adult life of an inevitable affective stage in the development of all children. This emotional state is normally restrained in its expression, and although it is sexual in origin it finds satisfactory forms of sublimated expression by the time that adolescence is reached.

Homo-sexuality means a liking for one's own sex—that and no more. The liking obviously may vary in intensity from individual to individual. In extreme cases it becomes what the law regards (at least in the case of men) as a criminal sexual perversion; in other cases it implies no more than that a man is a sociable fellow, fond of his male friends, or that a woman is so towards other women.

Whether this inclination towards one's own sex is strong or weak, it always exists in some degree and its origin is always the same. Nor is that origin obscure. Earlier in this book, I discussed, with closer application to the more formal presentation of the theory of psycho-analysis, the development of the early character of the child and of the tremendous influence which its earliest discoveries about itself and its world were to have upon its adult character.

It is there that we must seek the origins of homo-sexuality; but those origins are neither particularly remarkable nor mysterious. A child's life is very different from an adult's in the tasks it performs and particularly in the dominion it exercises. In the latter connection, we have to remember that the child encounters external forces more indirectly. The child remains in relation always with personal powers—mothers, fathers and nurses—who extend to it certain favours and privileges as tokens of their love, but demands of it certain sacrifices of personal inclinations, enforcing obedience with punishments as tokens of their displeasure.

I have referred earlier to the ambivalent feelings which inevitably appear in the child as a result of this complex situation. He is both grateful and resentful, both filled with love and filled with hate. In consequence, he is faced with the necessity of discovering in relation to each adult person he encounters whether that person is friend or enemy, whether that person will thwart or will aid the satisfaction of his imperative desires. And provided the other represents no threat to those desires, he is disposed to love him.

By this time he has passed out of the simple auto-erotic

stage of development when he loved and regarded only himself, and has reached the stage of allo-erotism when by association of one form or another, he transfers some of the affection he feels for himself to other persons.

As we have seen, the first object of his love is inevitably his mother, but later his father comes also to enjoy a share of this affection. The process in the latter case is made easier by the fact that being of the same sex, that is, resembling the child himself the more, the infant finds less difficulty in leaving the narcissistic stage of development.

It is to be understood that, with slight variation in the time-factors and in small details, exactly the same process applies *mutatis mutandis* in the case of the girl and her mother. But it is simpler to illustrate the development in the case of the male alone and I will continue to speak, therefore, about that sex only.

Soon another factor enters into the conflict which inevitably breaks upon the boy: the question as to whether he loves his mother or his father the better.

His love for his mother is the more physically sexual and in proportion his hate for his father grows, now tinged with jealousy. He wishes to thrust his father aside, to take his place, and this wish brings home to him acutely the sense of his limitations, and of his weaknesses compared with his father.

Those characteristics of strength and power in respect of which he hates his father become therefore the very ones he wishes to possess. He desires, that is, to become more and more like his father; and of this are born imitation and the spirit of emulation. In the process of seeking to achieve equality, to become like his father, to learn from him, to become a man with him, he seeks to be admitted to his fellowship. The result of loving his father, admiring and even worshipping him, means he feels called on to renounce his mother.

The mother, during this phase of development, is seen by the

boy as the obstacle between him and his father's friendship and fellowship, the cause of difficulty between them, the source of weakness and temptation to sin against the father; so that he is ready to turn round upon her, to affirm against her the bond of male kinship and communion which binds him to his father (and other men), and to make common cause with his fellow-males against women as such.

Later on, indeed, when he begins to be what he desired to become, the jealousy and rivalry break out again, now on more or less the same level; though by this time the specific bond with the mother is broken and other younger females take over the sexual element in it, which is now the strongest one (all the early needs and dependences having vanished). But over a long period, from say the fifth to the seventh year, the boy's most powerful drive is towards the male fellowship; his father is his ideal and lodestar, by whom he steers his life. All this is one aspect of the growth of homo-sexuality. It must be remembered that to a boy his father is the wisest and the strongest being he knows, and although later other figures—engine-drivers, soldiers, boxers, footballers—take his place, the father remains for many years the ideal of existence and model of what the child wishes to be when it grows up.

I say that in later life other figures come to symbolize this first hero. In the degree that the father is loved and honoured, these others are apt to be loved and honoured, but in the degree that such feelings are partly mixed with hatred or resentment against the father, other men tend to be hated too. As, in point of fact, we dislike to hold any hostile feelings against our actual father, we are the more disposed to displace all hostile feelings on to someone else.

It is interesting to note, in passing, that the socially invaluable trait of co-operation first arises from this elemental hero-worship. In an endeavour to emulate and to copy his hero, the boy loves to assist his father in trifling tasks, and the girl particularly likes to be known as "mother's little helper." Then a group of children co-operate in the same way, play games

together, and build things together in school. They may even set themselves apart in mutual defence from the crowd of adults who rule them, and who, if they rule too harshly, become the archetype of tyrants.

It is not difficult to see the relation between this set of events and the problem of smoking.

Boys generally learn to smoke in groups. They form a primitive hoard and visit together the seclusion of some place like an old barn in the country, or a back alley in town, and there practise together a number of habits of which probably the two outstanding ones are smoking and masturbation. Mutual masturbation of this sort must, of course, be recognized as a homo-sexual practice, and the fact that the same occasion is selected for practising it and for learning to smoke would indicate that a common motive was finding expression in these two channels simultaneously. In any case, the mental association between the two is formed as from that time onward. Also smoking is indulged in at the start chiefly as a *group* practice.

But whether we stress the physically sexual element or not, it is clear that the desire to emulate adults—a desire which, as we see, is derived directly from childhood homo-sexuality—is the main cause of that otherwise astonishingly heroic and completely incomprehensible perseverance which young boys show in learning—in defiance of natural revulsion—to smoke their first cigarette.

If parents and teachers smoke, naturally the child who loves and admires them will do the same thing. Example here as in most cases is many times more important than precept. The smoking parent licenses the anal-erotic pro-smoking mechanisms which else are to some extent held in check by the precept (preached by parents and nurse) that it is not nice to make a bad smell in public.

The importance of the influence of the like-sexed parent, in the case at least of males, seems established by an investigation made at Antioch College, in Ohio. Dr. J. Rosslyn Earp,

who conducted this investigation, gives us the following two tables:

	<i>Fathers smoke</i>			<i>Fathers abstain</i>	
Sons smoke	124		54
Sons abstain	93		77
<i>Smokers among</i>					
(a) <i>Freshmen</i>		(b) <i>Senior students</i>			
Sons of smoker fathers	57.5 per cent		67.8 per cent		
Sons of non-smoker fathers	36.8		46.7		¹

These figures are sufficiently conclusive. They show the enormous power of homo-sexuality in its relation to the most ordinary behaviour. But it is in itself little cause for surprise; one has only to remember the amount of hero-worship, gross, inelegant, uncouth and frequently utterly ridiculous, that is lavished upon the "great men" of the day, whether it be in one of the innumerable worlds of sport, or in the graver worlds of adventure, such as flying, to realize how persistent is the expression of homo-sexuality, even if it be in a sublimated form.

In this way admired examples become one of the greatest weapons for good or for bad in the hands of popular figures. Teachers and parents can exploit their popularity with tremendous effect. In my own case, for example, I can attribute the fact that I am not a smoker largely to three men toward whom I bore affection and admiration. The first was my grandfather, the second a favourite uncle, and the third, the admired headmaster of the school which I attended during the happiest years of my boyhood.

The good influence of some public men is too frequently offset by the bad example of others. T. F. Taylor, in his pamphlet, *The Smoking Habit*, already mentioned, relates that:

King Edward, as Prince, was one of the first to smoke cigarettes in this country when they were introduced from the East in the year 1858—seventy years ago.

¹ Earp (J. Rosslyn): *The Student Who Smokes*, London, 1927, pp. 53-54.

Ex-Kaiser William had a smoker's throat; and his father, the Emperor Frederick, died of a throat complaint caused by smoking. The late King of Belgium injured his throat by smoking, which was partly the cause of his death; and many other eminent men could be named who have suffered or died from this cause. President Grant died of a throat complaint caused by smoking.

In their respective countries the behaviour of these personages was emulated with meticulous care and in detail by millions of young men and boys. Here is a responsibility of fame which the notable (I do not say the great) are, like most parents and now most teachers, prone to shirk.

Before I leave the subject of homo-sexuality, it is relevant to mention that in it too lies the chief origin of that habit of excessive drinking which, equally with smoking, is a cause of so much harm to our sensory naturalism.

The homo-sexual's weaknesses are apt to lie in too great a tendency to be influenced by persons who have prestige with him, and by the crowd. He finds it more difficult than do less homo-sexual persons to resist herd-suggestion, and is therefore in this respect lacking in strength of character. In particular, he is apt to show a weakness for alcohol. This fact has been pointed out by Freud, Ferenczi and Juliusberger, Glover and Abraham.

Dr. Glover stresses the oral-erotic element but agrees with these others that the intemperate drinker is usually a homo-sexual.

The reasons why homo-sexuality so often leads to intemperance are not difficult to follow. Drink paralyses the propensity to be self-critical. It temporarily releases one from inhibitions. It creates an illusion of potency and of universal good-fellowship into which one retreats happily from ugly reality.

It is surely significant that drinking tends to be carried farthest in a homo-sexual group, and that to have gone on to becoming "a solitary drinker" is regarded as a dangerous sign.

Karl Abraham, in a paper on "The Psychological Relations between Sexuality and Alcoholism," makes the following points:

As is commonly taken for granted, alcoholic drinks dispel resistances to sexuality and increase desire, even if in any quantity they diminish potency.

When drinking, men fall on each other's necks and kiss one another, conduct which when sober they would call womanish.

Corresponding to an obvious assumption that excitation proceeds from semen in men, it is the popular identification of intoxicating drink with semen, as expressed in the phrase "drunk with love."

In the whole world of legend, love-potions play a great part, intoxication being identified with sexual excitation. In folk *lore*, the custom of pouring wine into the laps of maidens in the spring festival is cited, and the universal custom of drinking a man's health (vital energy).

Respect for prowess in drinking is closely bound up with respect for sexual prowess, and drinking is begun at puberty when youths wish to be regarded as men. At this time they brag about their drinking, even as:

"when in later years potency passes away men eagerly grasp at alcohol, the pleasure-bringer, which now becomes the surrogate for the vanishing pro-creative power."

Girls do not turn to alcohol at puberty because the resultant loss of resistances would mean loss in charm in the eyes of men. Consequently, here also a tendency to drink would indicate homo-sexuality.¹

I have said enough in this brief summary to show how various and how inevitably psychological factors enter in the most obscure ways into the development of our character traits. The case of smoking and drinking is only an example. I have no space in which to expand the subject in detail, and most forgo any exploration of the influence which such factors as sociability, fashion, and the like have upon us. I

¹ Published in the *Zeitschrift für Sexualwissenschaft* and subsequently in the *International Journal of Psycho-analysis*, London, 1926, Vol. VII, pp. 2-10.

console myself with the reflection that their operation is much more direct and obvious and for that reason more amenable to alteration. I am concerned with those unsuspected, deep-seated factors with which the generality of mankind has little concern. And in these last two chapters I have tried to show that if we would make our world a cleaner, sweeter, healthier one, we must not be content to try reform from the surface; we must seek, once again with the aid of psycho-analysis, for unconscious motives. Here are the mainsprings of action; in understanding them begins the hope of reformation.

CHAPTER XII

MAN AND HIS KNOWLEDGE

IN the present chapter I shall be illustrating the working of a particular Freudian mechanism in relation to a particular human need. Now the need in this case is the enjoyment of knowledge, and it calls for some preliminary consideration.

We may surely state it as an axiom that a belief in man's *ultimate* rationality is the foundation of all activities designed for the betterment of mankind. I do not intend by this statement to suggest for a moment that man is a wholly rational creature. On the contrary, the purpose of this book is to show that he is not. I only intend to point out that unless in the very long run and in the very last resort man can be influenced by reason, then all attempts based upon rational considerations to persuade him to do X rather than Y are wasted.

Man does what he does for a variety of reasons, many of which I am trying to analyse. He may steal because of a peculiar nursery training to which as an infant he may have been subjected. So diverse as these are his motives, more often infinitely complex than utterly simple; but there are occasions in his life when reason can and does triumph. It is owing to this that he has become persuaded, against the evidence of his senses, that the earth goes round the sun and not the sun round the earth; or to agree that truth is better than falsehood.

So we are in the dilemma that while he is none too often free to exercise his reason, uninfluenced by emotional, non-rational factors, yet only by greatly increasing the number of occasions on which his reason may act freely can we hope for his eventual betterment.

I have said enough elsewhere in this book on the problem of emotions and reason, and I shall not pursue the subject very broadly here. I wish to draw attention to it only in its special relation to the subject under discussion.

Every man, be he philosopher or publican, king or criminal, savant or savage, has some yardstick in relation to which he approves or disapproves of his own or other people's actions. Too often this yardstick is so vague and nebulous that it would disintegrate under the strain of the least scrutiny. But it exists. The native of the Andaman Islands initiates most of his actions in terms of certain local taboos. He contravenes these at his peril. Whenever he does so it implies merely that his egoism or his conception of his own needs has in some temporary cause triumphed over his deep-seated set of precepts derived from what I have described as his fundamental yardstick.

In the same way, a Socrates of fourth century Athens behaves according to the dictates of an ideological conception of what is Right. This conception is reinforced or not, as the case may be, by personal revelations that people such as the historical Socrates described as Inner Voices.

In the same way, too, a modern Christian, Hindhu, Buddhist, or Mahomedan subscribes to a set of precepts, deep-seated and all-pervading. I do not exclude myself. I, too, as I have been at pains to point out, have my yardstick. If any one of us transgresses, it implies, as I suggested above, a temporary breakdown in the effectiveness of whatever governing principles operate.

Now transgressions amongst all types, and whatever may be the principles transgressed, are most astonishingly prevalent; but at the same time, the observance of these principles is prodigious also. Their power for good and evil can scarcely be exaggerated.

This very generalized background is essential to my argument. Were I not to state my position in terms so all-embracing as to include myself, I should be accused in the pages that follow of ventilating a prejudice. In order to avoid that criticism, I have ventured to explain the obvious. Now I may descend to particulars and discuss my concrete case. And that case is this.

If it be generally admitted that the ideological background of each and every one of us is of immense importance, in view of

the enormously powerful influence it may have in affairs, it follows clearly that this background should be above reproach. Reason can make it so, if anything at all can. Emotions and prejudices are disastrous counsellors.

Let me illustrate. Suppose a boy at school, for emotional reasons, believes that his headmaster is the wisest and the best of men. He may, of course, be right—although it is extremely unlikely. But the point is that he believes it without reasonable grounds; he believes it emotionally. Subsequently, it is true, he may *use* his reason to discover or invent factors which *appear* to be reasonable and therefore seem to *justify* his faith.

If this headmaster proceeds to make assertions to the boy about any subject, the boy, because of his attitude, will attach enormous importance to them. He will behave in such a way because "Dr. X says it is manly to behave so." He will avoid such a course because "Dr. X says it is cowardly to behave so." In short, he justifies his actions not in terms of their consequences, but in terms of Dr. X's approval or disapproval.

Clearly the value of his conduct will depend entirely upon the sort of man Dr. X is. If Dr. X is really a sound individual, so much the better. If, as is only too probable, he is lamentably human, so much the worse.

What is necessary here is a proper evaluation of Dr. X. Now we started from the premise that the boy made no attempt to make one. He accepted him as incomparable on purely emotional grounds. How much those grounds can interfere with and even horribly warp a sound judgment anyone who has troubled to follow me so far in this book can have gathered, but the doubters, if there be any, have only to remember what virtues they implicitly attributed to the objects of their first love, and what lack of virtue they found there when the passion had died, for them to appreciate my contention.

Emotions exercised in this way, we may therefore conclude, are dangerous in an extraordinary degree. They blind the performer to the real merits or demerits of the object of his

regard to such an extent as to render him absolutely uncritical of any assertions made by that object.

Modern advertising exploits this weakness to the full. Thus the opinions of football stars—men, that is, whose merit consists in an ability to manipulate a leather ball with their feet—are quoted authoritatively upon what chemicals are best to restore falling hair! And so powerful is the appeal which they exercise over the minds of their devotees that the latter actually are thereby persuaded to buy one form of chemical rather than another or none at all!

Now, in the case of footballers and their fans, the harm done may be comparatively small. In the case of headmasters and their pupils the deplorable effects may, or may not, be limited to him who is directly concerned, and the boy will be slowly disillusioned or may outgrow his fancy. But in the case of such things as political or religious beliefs, the results may be world-wide and may last for millennia. How vital it is, then, that man should be utterly sure of the *reasonableness* of such beliefs. Until he has made himself sure, he ought to be chary of undertaking any action which relies for its approval solely upon the *dicta* of the creed, political or religious, to which he has from habit or loyalty adhered.

I have not space in which to examine even a hundredth part of the political or religious creeds which, at one time or another in the history of man, have claimed his allegiance. And even could I attempt to do so in one case I could never hope to analyse *all* the prejudices, emotions, and other psychological factors which might influence his judgment about that single one.

Hence I shall be selective. In this case, I shall choose religion generally in illustration of my theme, partly because it is so fundamental and so all-pervasive, partly because it furnishes a peculiarly vivid illustration of the work of psychological motives.

Again, in this connection, I shall have to content myself with but a sample. In religious belief the erotisms I have already discussed all play a singularly effective part. But I

shall concern myself chiefly with an analysis of just one—sadism. My reasons for this will emerge later.

In his book, *The Future of an Illusion*, Freud takes the position that there is no single aspect of religious belief which cannot be accounted for in terms of well-defined psychological phenomena. Explaining its basis and its motives is, with him, in fact, equivalent to explaining it away. That is the contention of many reputable scientific workers and laymen. In the modern world, the belief that Freud has knocked the bottom out of religion has found growing acceptance. It has, therefore, been used in some bohemian quarters to justify any and every contravention of morals and social conduct. This is to throw out the baby with the bath-water with a vengeance; indeed, it is for the iconoclast to commit just that folly of judgment the stupidity of which he deplored in the case of the religious credulous.

We need not concern ourselves deeply with such attitudes. I only mention the matter at all in order to illustrate a warning which Freud himself utters in very gloomy tones in his own book. To show that all religious beliefs and observances spring from unsatisfied psychological urges, would still not be to abolish either those beliefs or those urges. The beliefs still might or might not correspond to external realities and the urges would still remain as acute as ever before, while to deny these an outlet which satisfied them would result merely in their finding a substitute.

One of the most interesting and perhaps one of the most pressing problems of the modern world is to discover what that substitute is to be for dogmas that are no longer congruous with known facts, and yet had their use in comforting souls. In the early Victorian days, God and His Heaven were as real and as necessary to the ordinary man and woman as the Queen and her throne. Under the hammer blows of biology, physics, and finally psychology, the reality of the Victorian God and His Heaven alike were shattered, but the early belief in them satisfied, so it was said, a deep-seated spiritual urge. Freud

showed this urge as being merely a psychological disequilibrium. Does a mere change of description make it less vital, less imperative? Clearly not.

So forcibly has this fact appealed to many sociologists that there is a definite movement afoot to restore religion to the eminence from which science tumbled it. "Better the God we know than the one we don't." That attitude manifests itself everywhere, and the recent assertions of a great physicist that the universe shows signs of design are avidly seized upon, not only by churchmen, but also by social moralists as proof positive that God does exist, after all—God of a sort, if hardly the "friend behind phenomena" to whom the distressed can pray. It is clear that neither the mediaeval nor the Victorian God can ever recapture in the minds of intelligent men and women the place He occupied a hundred years ago; but the terrible *malaise* which swept over the cynical, sceptical, irreligious post-war generation, the toll it took in suicide and insanity alone, have given serious pause to many who, in the full flush of an intellectual "Nego," became the proselytes, in the interests of progress, of an unrelenting, scientific rationalism.

What, however, does all this amount to? It is no more than the assertion that religious belief plays a very important part in the lives of most people, and that any interference with that belief involves dangers. Let us agree, but let us also remember that the unquestioned acceptance by vast masses of people, organized into politically ambitious churches, of beliefs and moral codes based on *soi-disant* revelations from deities involves dangers frequently greater.

We have only to remember the use to which religion has historically been put to realize how great those dangers were. There is no crime, no cruelty, however revolting, which it has not on some occasion sanctified. The terrible wars of faith, the ghastly persecutions and tortures to which one set of believers have subjected other sets are graphic instances of its abuse of power. In more subtle ways it has been equally deadly. I need only mention the hideous censorship it has to this day imposed

upon man's thoughts and man's speech. And all this is true in one degree or another, whatever major religion is reviewed, although the Semitic and the Christian cults have been harsher than most of the others.

Let me not lead any reader into thinking I look chiefly for the evil in theology. I am well aware that countless thousands of men have lived lives of unexampled grandeur and nobility under the inspiration of precisely these same tenets and dogmas as have driven other men to dash at each other's throats like so many wild beasts. But the good which faith has done in all its manifold forms does not deny the evil it has done. It will be the part of the sociologist and the psychologist to discover a means whereby the good may be preserved and continued, the evil abolished. In psychological terms we shall have to discover how to give expression to those deep-seated psychological motives in such a way as to harness their enormous power wholly in the service and not at all for the destruction of mankind. Formidable as that task may seem, we need not despair of its achievement. I hope to make this more clear in the last chapter.

Let me introduce the main theme of the present chapter with a preliminary discussion (in quite cursory fashion) of some of the factors which play a part in determining our attitude towards religion in its many forms.

Economic factors are important. Scientific research requires endowment. In capitalist countries, it must look for this mostly to enlightened men of wealth and to great companies which find it profitable to support research departments. In the degree that a country becomes socialized, research is endowed by the State—very generously too in the case of the communist State, Russia. Religion, too, depends on subsidies, but while in the capitalist countries she, or at least some well-entrenched single church, can often look for State as well as private support, in socialist countries this is not so. She is there quite free (I have found in both Russia and Mexico that the claims of "religious persecution" were absurdly exaggerated), but must arouse membership to contribute her expenses.

We may next note that genetic factors play their part. To begin with, there are unquestionably large inherited differences in intellectual capacities—in an ordinary schoolroom the brightest child will do his sums five times as fast as the dullest. Additionally, as Cattell has recently shown from figures compiled in various parts of England, children who come of small families show more intellectual achievement than those from large families. Naturally, parents who have many children cannot spare much time for them individually; they cannot afford to feed nor care for them so well, nor to give them so good an education. In those churches which traditionally oppose birth-control it is notorious that the intelligence of the membership is of the lowest. Or to put it another way, the most over-populated districts support religions of low grade.

I will mention, in the third place, political factors. In a democracy, the general freedom of discussion extends to scientific and religious matters; with the result that science flourishes and religion grows liberal. In the totalitarian type of State university professors lose their posts who will not lend themselves to support the political *status quo* and so research becomes timid; as for religious confessions, they are looked upon as rivals for the enthusiasm of which the State wishes as monopoly unless they can see their way to support the State under some sort of concordat; hence only the more conservative and timid congregations manage to survive, while the liberal and heterodox are crushed. In wartime every country becomes less free; scientific discovery is diverted into the field of destruction and the religions which best fit the times are the crudest ones.

Leaving to the end of our discussion the psychological factors, ethnic ones play the next part. If the customs of a people are such as conduce to the greatest mental vigour, then better scientific work is done, religion becomes liberalized and philosophy advances. But certain customs of our day work in an opposite direction. The series of statistical studies made

in America have shown the negative relationship of tobacco-smoking to good scholarship in schools and colleges. Earp's book, *The Student Who Smokes*, shows with especial clearness that poor intellectual work results in direct proportion to the amount of nicotine consumed. Careful experimental work like that described in Hull's *The Influence of Tobacco Smoking on Mental and Motor Efficiency* largely corroborates these findings.

Having spoken of all these other factors, I come now to that of "pure" logic. Assuming for the moment what is seldom completely true in actuality, that no emotional factors are at work to distort the working of his reason, man has still a difficult task to arrive at the truth about abstract and philosophical matters. Things which are clear to common sense, such as that the earth is flat and that the heavenly bodies revolve around it daily as their centre, are shown to be false by more sophisticated reasoning. And yet are not these unreliable senses the sole basis upon which all knowledge is founded? Some hold that they are not, but must be corrected in the light of a sacred tradition or a personal revelation; but different traditions and different revelations, each with its own special claim to be regarded as divine largely contradict each other. The enquirer who is not naïve is hard put to know how he can accept the pretensions of one while he rejects those of its rivals. Every scientific invention which facilitates travel, communication, and the printing of books encourages the comparative point of view and so makes dogmatism more difficult.

The decks are cleared now for the discussion of the factors which are to be our chief concern in this book—the psychological. Having discussed extraneous pressures, we shall now consider the effect on man's beliefs of his own mental forces.

I begin with ego-satisfactions. We may start from the assumption that it is not by any means easy for the great majority of mankind to secure food, shelter, and leisure, three pressing problems of the individual. It is inevitable, therefore, that wish-fulfilment should begin to play its part. So he addresses supplications to his deity, in the hope that he will

reward his prayers more than the earth rewards his toil. (Of course, the above is an over-simplification of what actually occurs.) The philosopher, Vahinger, in his brilliant essay, "As If," has demonstrated the enormous possibilities latent in this wish-fulfilment psychology.

There are, moreover, many other aspects of the problem which lend themselves most easily to all those whose earthly lives are thwarted and mean. The insignificant person finds great comfort in the belief that hereafter the proud shall be humbled; the lowly, in the thought that the last shall be first.

Napoleon's great dictum about the church and its possibilities is most revealing. Though he himself was a freethinker, he clearly perceived the value to the ruler of the existence of religion; saying, in effect, that it was the only thing which kept the poor man in his place. In that he was largely right. But for the promises held out by religion, why should the poor man tolerate a world in which he shivered and trudged in rags while the Napoleons rode warmly clad in furs; one in which he and his children starved while Napoleons threw away at one meal enough to feed his family for a week? Resentment is inevitably felt by the weak and the oppressed against a world in which might is right and the strong take all, but the hope of heavenly compensations for their sufferings in this world has been found by some to make their lives more bearable.

I need not elaborate obvious facts. Rationalists have stressed them.

Yet religion is not supported chiefly because of having obtained us what have been called the ego-satisfactions, since these actually are much better catered for by science.

It rests upon deeper-hidden psychological needs; and the rationalist, because he has failed to understand these, has failed to dethrone religion, even in its crude forms, from the place it occupies in the hearts of the mass of mankind. Let us consider some of these deeper factors.

Oral-erotisms are reflected in much religious imagery. The paradeses to be attained are described as flowing with milk and

honey, as watered with or built over various rivers, as planted with fruit trees and so on. The lips of the faithful are constantly moving with prayer, and those of the priests are exercised with sermons. Relics and the feet of statues of the saints are covered with kisses.

Anal-retentive erotisms come into play wherever the doctrines preached are influenced by monetary considerations. This, as well as ego-drives, impels the religious emphasis on alms-giving, the banking activities of the ancient temples, the simony of priesthoods, the barter of religious offices for money, the almost neurotic desire of some prophets for wealth or luxuries, and the modification of their doctrines by followers to gain favour with the moneyed class.

Whole books have already been written upon the phallic element in religion. Many of the primitive religions are quite frankly phallic, or implicate as part of their ceremonial the sex act. Phallic emblems, notably the yoni and lingam, are common in the religions corresponding to the agricultural stage of settled civilization. Conventionalized representations of these, such as the ankh and the cross, then appear, while temple, church and mosque architecture tends to run to obelisks, steeples, domes and minarets. The language of deep religious devotion riots in sexual terminology and imagery; ecstasy is a religious state paralleling an erotic one. Coitus seems to be the physiological prototype of pleasure-giving rhythms such as we find in the religious dance, most of the phenomena of religious revivalism, the zikr of Mohammedanism, the chant, the hymn, and the cadence of evangelical sermons.

Narcissism enters into both religious and secular philosophic societies, wherever pride is taken in any features of the organization, its size, its wealth, its aristocratic membership, its buildings—or pride in aspects of the creed, such as its hoariness, its compassionateness, its universalism, its beauty, its esoteric character, its rationality or what-not. Narcissism, also, as the basis of the super *ego*, is one of the factors of the religious conscience.

As for the part played by homo-sexuality, it would be difficult to exaggerate its significance. The gods truly have been made in man's image. The deity becomes the universal emblem of ideals and aspirations; and the nascent enthusiasm, adulation and love for parent, brother, schoolmaster, or leader eventually centre in him. The language in which highly religious persons, the saints and, above all, the Mystics, address the deity, is full of homo-sexual imagery.

In Hinduism, an outstanding exemplar of these tendencies is the holy Ramakrishna.

In Christianity, one could not ask for any more homo-sexual language than that in which Jesus is addressed by St. John of the Cross.

In Islam, read these lines of the thirteenth-century mystic, Jalal ud-Din Rumi:

My heart is as a pen within thy hand,
 Thou canst of both my grief and joy dispose.
 Save what thou willest, what desire have I?
 Thou mak'st to grow from me, no thorn, no rose,
 If thou wouldest have me thus, lo! thus I am;
 If otherwise, thy will I'll not oppose.
 And in the vat where souls their colour take,
 Who am I, what shall Love or Hate disclose?
 From all the world, 'twas thee alone I chose,
 Wilt thou from grieving give me no repose?¹

Besides all this, there is the longing for spiritual union, the urge to hero-worship, the loyalty to a group and so on, all of which can be directly translated in terms of sublimated homo-sexual tendencies.

The catalogue could be continued indefinitely and illustrated indefinitely. But I shall deal with the operation of most of these psychological factors in a forthcoming work, and here I shall concentrate upon another one—sadism.

From the beginning of his existence as a social animal, man

¹ Jalal ud-Din Rumi, thirteenth-century mystic, quoted by Ross (S. D.): in 6d. booklet: *Eastern Art and Literature*.

must have been plagued with problems arising out of his aggressiveness as manifest in sadism and in the working out of the Oedipus complex. For it continually urges him to acts destructive of other values and which consequently are followed by remorse.

It is largely by way of solution of this problem of the aggressiveness from which man so suffers, and of which he is only partly conscious, that religion functions. Freud's own view, as set forth in *The Future of an Illusion*, is that when the supernaturalistic faiths are "found out," the aggressive impulses, which at present they hold in check, will be released and humanity will suffer appallingly. Whether or no this view is justified, the problem of innate aggressiveness remains.

Religion, by incorporating aggressiveness in conscience, reaches at least a partial solution of the problem from a social point of view. Let me trace the process in more detail.

To begin with, we will suppose that a child commits some sadistic act, such as wantonly pinching a companion. His nurse punishes him not only by deprecatory words, but also by slapping. The deprecatory words become part of the child's conscience which is in process of formation, and with them is associated the idea that punishment is considered the proper consequence of wishing to hurt some one. The slapping actually effects an *increase* in the aggressive desires, and is followed by their repression into the unconscious as things which it is dangerous to express when elders are present.

Where do these repressed sadistic wishes actually go? Psycho-analyses have repeatedly revealed that to a large degree they enter into the *super-ego* which is in process of formation and endow it with a tinge of cruelty. Since they cannot safely be expressed against others, they commonly turn against the self and are cruel to that. In short, sadism is converted into auto-sadism.

This is the explanation of that strange fact, to which I have already drawn attention, that conscience often becomes infinitely more harsh than the parental voices of which it is mainly the echo.

Unfortunately, this manner of dealing with sadism by first repressing it and then turning it against one's self, is a neurotic rather than a realistic attempt at solution. As such, it suffers the same incompleteness of success that neurotic solutions generally do. The sadism underlying the religious conscience often leaks out in primitive form when something gives it an excuse for doing so, and "gives the show away."

But then arises a phenomenon very like a "return of the repressed." For sadism proceeds to bias the conscience, sore oppressed by the demands on self, in the direction of believing that a coercion of other persons than the believer himself is, on religious grounds, justifiable. Various rationalizations are readily found or created to hide the fundamentally non-rational nature of the actual motive.

Among primitive people, religion is not yet clearly distinguished from magic. This results in the belief that the following by all the people of a correct ritual imposes of itself an actual *compulsion* on spirits and the forces of nature. On the other hand, incorrect ritual or certain other forms of wrong behaviour put not only the guilty individual but his entire community or locality in danger. To take an analogy from modern warfare, it is as if during a night air-raid a single householder were to disregard the regulations about showing lights; he would subject not only himself but the whole town to danger of bombing. So among primitives the infraction of certain taboos cannot be tolerated as a purely private affair.

At a slightly higher stage, where districts or towns have each its tutelary deity, the expansion of the State through aggressive warfare becomes a means of glorifying the god. This is again and again evidenced in the accounts of the wars of the Assyrians and of the Jews. Eager, from sadistic motives, however unconscious, to butcher and injure their fellow-beings, these people put into the mouths of their deities a *command* that cities should be razed, men slaughtered, and women and children sold into slavery. Thus they feel they are without

guilt in carrying out these acts—for how dare one disobey the gods?

At a later stage in religious evolution come the theories of a saving doctrine, believing in which all men are sure of salvation, but denying which they are condemned to eternal torment. On such premises, inquisitions, accompanied by all the tortures which sadism loves, follow as a logical corollary. For is not a few days' suffering from rack and thumb-screw a cheap price to pay if thereby one is persuaded to recant errors which would have resulted in hell-fire throughout eternity? Even the laying waste of a country by war is a lesser desolation than that its inhabitants should follow mortal lives of ease with inevitable torment hereafter unto eternity for having rejected the only true doctrine. All that is logical—granted the premises.

The notion of hell—which in one form or another has played such a large part in religions—is in itself a vivid indication of how sadism finds gratification in this field. Just as in wartime the non-combatants, who must remain far from the fierce delights of the field of carnage, recompense themselves by retailing atrocity-stories, exaggerating them and wallowing in them, so sadists within the various religions have created a mythology of suffering. Some busied themselves with details of the tortures administered under persecution to martyrs of the faith—what would mediaeval Europe have done without St. Stephen to depict? Others elaborated the refinements of suffering which their God has in store for all who differ in belief from themselves.

Curiously, it is not always among the most primitive of mankind that we find much stress given to discomforts after death. In the view of many “nature-folk,” the future life was much like the present one, with privileges for those who were great personages here, and a low condition or sheer non-survival for humbler men and for all women. The modification of this plan in order to reward the good and punish the evil was elaborate at a later period in the development of beliefs.

With the advent of more complex theologies the after-life

began to be described in more detail, in order to subserve moral purposes. In Egypt the thoughts of the living seem to have been absorbed to an astonishing degree with preparations for meeting successfully the final test when, having made the "negative confession" to the effect that they had not committed a list of sins, their hearts would be weighed against truth in the judgment of Osiris. The good would then go to live with him, whilst the wicked would choke in a world of muck. The Greeks located in Hades the Elysian Fields for the blessed, but Tartarus for the evil; and both Homer and (the Roman) Virgil describe the latter in some detail. The Hindu imagination also has busied itself with details of the various hells described in its mythology. Whoever wishes to see how Brahminism carried fear of the hereafter wheresoever it spread can hardly do better than examine some of the paintings, depicting realistically ingenious tortures, inside the old judgment-hall in a small town in Bali.

The Hebrews lagged strangely behind all this development. They at first held to the view that rewards and punishments are meted out to man in this present life. The Book of Job is a protest against this conception. A belief in the survival of the soul came in gradually, but, up to our own era, Sheol, their Hades, remained an ill-defined place where departed spirits all alike existed tenuously among pleasures and pains less intense than here below.

Jesus definitely mentions hell-fire and threatens the wicked with being "cast into outer darkness." Still we meet with no interest in hell among the early Christians. Then, quite incidentally, St. Augustine mentioned about A.D. 400 that some of the less faithful might be called upon to endure or pass through a "purifying fire" (*purgatorius ignis*). The idea was seized upon with avidity and developed with a wealth of imagination. It is clear that the obvious delight which one early theologian after another found in the elaboration of the tortures awaiting the damned after death can only be explained if it is interpreted as a vicarious expression of a latent sadism.

Phantasy succeeds wild phantasy; Dante's lowest inferno is amongst the least of these pictures in horror. It retains its distinction only because it was described in a language that only Italy's greatest poet could command.

It is unfortunate that Mohammed in his selection of features of Hebrewism and Christianity for imitation should have preferred the latter's version of the after-life. The modifications he introduced were chiefly in the direction of making it more material. One of the punishments of his hell, for instance, is being boiled in a lake of molten lead.

So far, nothing has been said of the lust for that which is the very essence of sadism—power over other living beings. Yet this has always played a major role in forming the practical policy of large religious denominations.

This struggle for power drives the shamans among a savage tribe to band themselves together to the end of upholding the prestige of their profession among the laity. It thus leads them eventually into alliances with the kingship.

When the amalgamation of tribes into a kingdom takes place, or when one city replaces another as the capital, there is an inevitable struggle for power between rival priesthoods. In Egypt, such a struggle can be followed also during the efforts of Aknaton I to introduce the monotheistic cult of the solar disc.

In the ancient empires it is also to be remembered that there were attached to many temples temple-prostitutes and frequently great numbers of slaves. Through the priesthood, therefore, it was possible to rise to a position of dominance over all these human beings—a position to delight the heart of a sadist.

To-day there are several priesthoods which offer careers in which a lust for worldly power can be satisfied. Notable among them are those of Lamaism in the Far East and of Roman Catholicism in the West.

The inward direction given to sadism by early punishment has been described and we may now note some of the consequences. It frequently results in the *super-ego* accepting

punishment as a right and proper affliction on the self of aggressive desires which the unconscious knows itself to harbour. The *super-ego* then deliberately manœuvres the self into situations where it will suffer. To those readers who retain a belief that in spite of some small inconsistencies man does not really wander very far from the rational pursuit of his own happiness, this may seem hard to believe. Yet every psycho-analysis proves the presence of a greater or lesser amount of self-punishing auto-sadism in the patient. There are characters with plenty of ability and energy, but whose career is frustrated at every turn by a devil of auto-sadism which forbids them ever to enjoy success.

Primitive religions most clearly show how this self-tormenting impulse can find an outlet in devotional forms. Among the North American Indians meetings used to be held at which men would have themselves hoisted into the air and swung from trees by means of hooks inserted in the loose skin of their backs.

The belief in spirits is an almost universal means by which primitive peoples torment themselves. These are nearly always thought of as hostile to the living. In Bali, many people are afraid to go about freely at night for fear of a *Liak*. In parts of Africa, some tribes keep themselves in a state of constant panic over spirit influences.

But this auto-sadism comes to fruit in more developed religions. There is scarcely one in which the ascetic is not revered as a saint and all delight to honour the martyr. The more hard is the self-imposed path of the ascetic, the more terrible are the tortures of the martyr, the more these figures are reverenced.

In some religions, particularly in some branches of the Hindu religion, self-torture is a recognized devotional activity. The sufferings of the faithful become appalling to watch. Their intensity is matched only by their stupidity.

Even Buddha first embraced the life of an ascetic; and although his personal intelligence eventually triumphed over

such a course, his followers, particularly the Buddhists of Tibet, have reverted in an astonishing manner to the notions of self-torment and often of self-immolation.

The history of Christianity, I need scarcely point out, is riddled with instances of self-inflicted torture. All too much of it was founded upon the horribly sadistic notion of salvation through pain; and amongst its early followers self-imposed suffering was the keynote of holiness. The astonishing forms in which this idea manifested itself can be most clearly followed in Lecky's *History of European Morals*. There alone is all the evidence necessary to convince the sceptical that historical religion has thrived on suppressed sadism.

Let me conclude this chapter with a brief summary. I have tried to show that the power exercised by our fundamental beliefs is prodigious and that, in consequence, as wise men, it is our duty to make sure that our fundamental beliefs are sound. I have also tried to show that only reason can assure us of their validity, and that even reason is useless unless it be free from all emotional and other psychological factors.

Next I have striven to point out that, in the case of our fundamental beliefs, of which, of course, religion is merely an example, psychological motives are peculiarly significant. I have endeavoured to explain how these work by depicting the role of one typical such factor—sadism.

What may we conclude from this argument? Surely that only by a fuller understanding of ourselves may we expect to reach either "spiritual" or philosophic enlightenment. And if we enquire how that fuller understanding is to be obtained, one answer is clear. Our approach must be *via* the experience and the teachings of psycho-analysis. Whether we are likely to do so, and what are the chances for its success, are enquiries which I seek to answer in the last chapter of this book.

CHAPTER XIII

THE ROAD TO HAPPINESS

IT is not necessary to be a psychologist to realize that the great mass of the inhabitants of this world are extremely odd at times in their behaviour. Everyone, however, who does realize this fact has made a beginning in psychology; everyone who seeks to understand the fact must become a psychologist.

This short argument, self-evident and trite as it may seem, is none the less the basic justification for the claim which I made in the first chapter, and which I repeat here in the last, that without the aid of psychology man will never understand and, therefore, never fully solve his problem.

To what extent man's "oddness" determines and colours his problems I have tried to show in this book. And I cannot choose a more suitable introduction to my last chapter than a very brief summary of what it is that I have said.

Throughout my essay I have had two themes only in mind. The first has been purely sociological; it has enumerated the things man requires. The second has been purely psychological; it has analysed the way man thinks to get them.

In the first place, I explained how a proper understanding of psychology was necessary to any would-be reformer, and then set out on an historical account of the development of the science up to its culmination in the work of Sigmund Freud. I elaborated his theory in all the detail which space permitted. I showed that it offered not only a philosophical theory of the nature of mind, but also an extremely effective instrument for the *detection* and the cure of ills from which mind could suffer. (I should like to call special attention to the word "detection," for its importance is frequently overlooked.)

Having examined the weapon with which I proposed to attack the evils of the world, I turned my attention to them. I stipulated that the reformer must know not only how to

reform, but also in what direction. The question of ends became crucial, and I devoted a chapter to their examination. In it I evolved the yardstick of ethical hedonism and propounded the old dictum that "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" as the only practical guide in any effort to put the world to rights.

With this as a background, I examined the state of the world and from the jumbled maze of contradictory, if thwarted, desires which it manifests, I isolated six general principles. If each of these six principles—forms of happiness, I named them—could be satisfied then man would certainly enjoy more well-being than he can to-day.

How, then, are they to be realized? They fall by their nature into the categories of thought and action which politicians, economists, sociologists, and religious teachers have, from time immemorial, made their own. But the cures which these persons have offered are well known. Some have never been completely tried; many have failed to work.

A new approach seemed to be needed; therefore I subjected each of these forms of happiness to analysis. In each case, I was able to show that man must reckon with man, if he wishes to realize his aims; that, in fact, psychological motives play the chief part in determining man's attitude towards his goal.

The fact that I called the motives I discussed Freudian mechanisms is no reason for suspecting their validity. Labels are, after all, quite unimportant. It would have been enough in one sense had I used the most general terms. I am indeed aware that if I had avoided the specialized language that in fact I did use, if I had omitted such words as anal-erotism, sadism, Oedipus complex, and so on, I should have retained the sympathy of more readers, but I had a definite purpose in view in using such terms. I wished to keep prominently in the forefront of my argument the notion of psycho-analysis.

It was not enough for me that I should discover for my readers how largely the ills of the world were psychological in origin; I wished also to suggest a line of cure. In Chapter III

I set out what road that cure should follow. I stated that it was to begin with the universal and intensive application of the knowledge which the work of Freud and his disciples had placed in our hands.

In this, my final chapter, I shall offer a short justification of the validity of this claim, but I am under no delusion that it will therefore be put into instant use, even if proved to the complete satisfaction of everyone into whose hands this book may come.

The history of early reformers is surely a warning to modern ones. How often did they die embittered by the neglect of the world for which they had thought and schemed so much! How seldom were the valuable suggestions they made ever acted upon!

If ever psychologists should take up in great numbers the job of the reformer, they will at least be spared (unless they are very bad psychologists) a source of disillusion or bitterness that comes to most others. For they will expect very little. They will realize that it is not enough to persuade the world that the remedy you suggest is the right one; it must also be moved to try it with unequivocating will.

This second task is more difficult than the first. I, at least, am not deluded that I shall live to see my remedy tried out. As a psychologist, I realize there are violent urges directed against the adoption of the instruments of salvation.

Psycho-analysis, the science whose wider application I am demanding, is in a peculiar position. The opposition to it is two-fold. Some of it springs from rational though unjustified arguments. More of it arises from deeper-seated, irrational motives. One fundamental objection appears to be at the basis of all so-called logical opposition. In some very real sense of the word, psycho-analysts insist that no one is wholly sane. I discussed this point at the beginning of the last chapter, and it needs no elaboration. The contribution which psycho-analysis has made to the study and cure of more acute manifestations of insanity is equally beyond the need of further comment.

Here it is apposite that I remind my readers of a wilful omission I made. One of the six forms of happiness with which we have been concerned has been called Inner Peace. A number of reasons were given why it was not proposed to make any such detailed examination of this essential to human happiness, as in the use of the other five forms. The chief reason, however, could only be disclosed at the present point.

Inner Peace is, after all, the very beginning and end of the happy life. In my conception of the psychological meaning of the expression (a conception which is now familiar to any one who has followed me as far as this chapter) Inner Peace signifies complete freedom from those devastating complexes and emotions which in one guise or another interfere with every aspect of our lives.

Its complete attainment would therefore automatically free the lucky person who reached that blessed state from those distressing urges and motives whose operations I have outlined in previous chapters.

The problem of its attainment is therefore identical with the problem I have just enumerated; the problem of how to persuade the world to accept the technique which the science of psychology has placed at its disposal.

For this reason I have delayed its consideration until this point. I do not believe that there is any likelihood for many decades of psycho-analysis being intensively applied to the problems of the world, but until it is so applied to the problems of the world, those problems will remain largely unsolved. Let me, in very general terms, state the case as I see it.

The mature self is evolved only at the price of pain in each one of us. During childhood, particularly, the lessons we have to learn, the restraints we have to impose on our desires, the thwartings and punishments we undergo, every one affects us enormously. If the consequences of these factors produced were immediate and obvious, there would be small cause for alarm. Unfortunately, they are neither immediate nor obvious. They may emerge years and years later in a guise that would

defeat penetration by any eye except that of the technically trained psycho-analyst.

Hence we may say roughly that the integration of the self is a task attended by not only the greatest labour but the most lively dangers.

If this integration is fairly successful, what we describe as a normal person results. If it is less successful, he is abnormal. If it fails altogether, he is mad.

Yet this last word begs the whole question. The matter is, after all, only one of degree. There is nothing unique in the problem of madness.¹ Nor is any self wholly integrated; possibly no self can ever be wholly integrated. But, at least, a self can be integrated far more than is normally the case.

If this can be done, then we shall, at one stroke, have swept away the major obstacle to the solution of our problems. We shall be free (psychologically) to exercise our reason upon them and for the first time in man's history he may see clearly the road of salvation.

This last sentence may surprise some of my readers. It is clearly a confession that psycho-analysis in itself is no *cure* for man's totality of troubles. I have never claimed it was. I have asserted only that until it is used man cannot *begin* to work out his salvation.

Let me offer an illustration. Conceive a man flung overboard in a choppy sea. To his back is tied a heavy weight which drags him down. While he is tied to it he cannot rise to the surface, either to swim for the shore or shout for help. In the sea of man's earthly troubles, the weight of psychological factors prevents his tackling them in any effective manner. Analysis is a knife which can liberate him from his burden. It cannot teach him to swim, it cannot tell him how to reach land. Yet, until he is free of his impediment, it is useless to offer him advice on these points.

¹ I must, of course, emphasize that madness resulting from a serious physical injury to the brain, for example, must be placed in a different category.

Is it really a knife which Freud offers, or merely a straw at which the drowning man may grasp? Is the insight and poise which, we assert, come from being psycho-analysed, the surest way of maintaining or regaining the proper integration of the self?

I have discussed this problem at some length in Chapters II and III, and would refer readers to those chapters. To that extent, I strove to meet criticism in advance; but the point is so vital that a restatement of the arguments both for and against seems called for.

For the present purpose I have no need to restate the scientific development of the theory. I shall concern myself with the general objections which are reasonably made against it, and I shall meet them on the same grounds.

The objections to the therapeutic claims of psycho-analysis are manifold. In the first place, many doctors and psychiatrists are still hostile to it. Indeed, many psychiatrists, without even waiting to be asked, warn their patients in advance against trying it. Now doctors and psychiatrists are after all experts in the sphere of nervous or mental disorganization. And if that is the view of the experts (whom the layman rightly consults for a cure of his troubles) must we not be guided by them?

In the second place, almost as a corollary of this first objection, there are the many stories of people who have never benefited from analysis. We have all heard of people who started to be analysed and kept it up for months. Then they could stand it no longer and, feeling they were unhappier than when they began, they at last had the sense to quit.

In contrast, there are other people who have just spent a few hours with some non-analytic psycho-therapist, and thereafter go about singing his praises to all their friends. He knew just how to handle their particular type of case. Sometimes some new religious cult has done the trick for them. Why, it may be asked, should one waste time and money on a laborious process if something easier does better?

In the third place, it is claimed that psycho-analysis is merely another name for suggestion. (Dr. Emile Coué, some few years ago, had a meteoric, if short-lived, success on this very basis.) And it is to be remembered that Freud himself makes the following admission:—

During the analysis . . . ideas have to be suggested to him (the patient) which have not yet occurred to him; his attention has to be adjusted in those directions from which (the psycho-analyst) anticipated that which was to come. . . . But in every analysis one has to proceed like this. Without such hope no one can get on.

Seizing upon this statement, Dr. A. Wohlgemuth,¹ one of the most adverse critics of psycho-analysis, has asserted that here is a complete justification for the view that psycho-analysis is merely suggestion in a subtle form.

He demonstrates his point in detail by quoting a second admission made by Dr. W. H. B. Stoddart in a paper in the *Lancet*, in which he dealt with the analytic cause of sea-sickness. The analytic explanation, Dr. Stoddart said,

will never cure the patient suffering from it. To be effective he must discover the explanation for himself out of his own mind. Otherwise he will simply refuse to believe it.

Wohlgemuth's own comment on this is simple:

Evidently, then, the *believing* is the indispensable prerequisite to the cure—that is, **EFFECTIVE SUGGESTION**. . . . The therapeutic factor in psycho-analysis is *suggestion* pure and simple.

Let us pass this, however. Let us admit, so critics say, that analysis does derive its effective results from the unburdening of the heart and not from suggestion; but why employ an analyst as a recipient of your secret sorrows—and be made to pay through the nose for it? If it is the *telling* which effects the

¹ "Wohlgemuth and his Reviewers," article in the *Journal of Medical Science*, July 1924.

cure, a sympathetic friend will do equally well—or presumably, for that matter, a gate post.

To this Roman Catholics add: go to your priest. Holy Mother Church long ago anticipated all that was of any good in analysis when she instituted the confessional. The Church has had nearly two thousand years of such experience, as compared with two decades of this new fad. Besides, she can assuage the sense of guilt, which even analysts say is at the basis of most of the trouble, by administering what no secular person can possibly administer—namely, the assurance of the forgiveness of God.

Besides this, the *Catholic Encyclopaedia* adds that harm is done not so much by the suppression of impulses as by the imperfect suppression of them; they are still “allowed to lurk in the mind.”¹ After all, suppression is a process which is essential to the normal conduct of life; if it were not, how may we account for the fact that human beings have come by a capacity for it?

Then the analysts themselves tell us that repressed impulses do not in all cases give rise to neurotic symptoms. Instead, some of them become sublimated, or transferred into higher forms of expression, as when, for example, sexual curiosity develops into love of science. Does not this rather obviously imply that the solution of our difficulties is just to help each person find proper *sublimations* for each of those impulses which is giving trouble? Indeed, on the analysts' own theory, we may see that much character is derived from sublimated urges. Frequently the resulting traits are as attractive as the urges were repulsive. To analyse in such a case, is it not to destroy something fine and resuscitate something ignoble and dangerous? Why do it? Let us rather concentrate upon the problem of discovering socially valuable sublimations for our less attractive impulses.

Again, if analysis depends on the physician interpreting to the patient the meaning of his symptoms, and if the physician

¹ *Catholic Encyclopaedia*, art., “Psycho-analysis.”

is dependent on what the patient tells him, what a lot then depends on the patient speaking the truth! But we know that many neurotics are unconscionable liars. Freud admits quite blandly that many of the revelations of childhood experiences, such as that which is called "the primal scene," never happened in some cases outside the child's romancing.

Analysts tell us that a great many of our ideas are only what they call rationalizations. That means that the idea is a presentation of what, *if* it were in fact true, would justify our own feelings. They say that for this reason we also "project" on to others feelings and ideas which are really our own. Well then, must not the psycho-analyst, being human, project on to the patient no end of complexes which are really his (the analyst's) own?

Then there is this recurrent trouble over the sex aspect of psycho-analysis. The history of psychology, we are told, is replete with instances where someone tried to explain all the facts of life upon this planet by recourse to some single human drive—self-interest, the economic motive, the "herd instinct," or what have you. In every case, however, human nature proved too complex to be expressed in any such simple formula. We must, therefore, be profoundly sceptical of any attempt to make of sex a new such explanation.

The other proposed explanations had at least this, to be said for them: that one could discuss them without blushing. But sex is a topic which is "not nice." Must not the psychologist who insists on making it the basis of his system and forcing us to discuss what is so inherently repugnant to us be morbid? And is such a practitioner a really reliable guide for morbid patients?

Finally, there can be no denying that after a patient has for years brought his troubles daily to discuss them with some paternal person, he comes to rely a great deal upon him personally. Can anyone really deny that the patient will not miss his advice profoundly when at last the inevitable hour comes for him to terminate the analysis and to face the

world on his own? Far from helping a man to face his troubles, would psycho-analysis then not seem to make him incapable of dealing with them without elaborate assistance?

Such in brief are some objections made to the practice of psycho-analysis. Some of them contradict others; but in all they make an indictment which in honesty cannot be evaded; and, anyhow, the first commandment of analysis is "Thou shalt not evade."

I will deal with each count by itself. First let us take the objections of doctors and psychiatrists to this new science. The medical profession is eminently conservative, and the few years during which psycho-analysis has been in existence have proved as yet insufficient to win the adherence of medical men. Time and the success of psycho-analysis itself will remove the greater part of this objection.

Moreover, the psychology of medical men as a profession must be remembered. They are generous of their services to the needy, and not as centred on their earnings as other men; but it would be unreasonable to expect them to encourage a science which, if widely practised, would take away many of their patients. Analysis, moreover, is necessarily at this time very expensive, so that its patients would come from those who provide the cream of the fees.

Doctors also in other respects are human beings in spite of all their training, and some of them are as prudish as any other members of the population. In consequence, they object to analysis on emotional and conventionally moral grounds. The second objection similarly dissolves away. Many people who have received no benefit from analysis have not in fact been analysed. To become a qualified analyst takes years of supervised training, but it is unfortunately true that a great many persons have set up as psycho-analysts without further qualifications than that they have a medical degree, have read a few books by Freud, and at most have had a few hours so-called analysis under someone as little qualified as themselves. The victims

of such malpractice have brought their accusations against "analysis" into many a consulting-room.

Others have begun a proper treatment under a qualified person, but, neurotic as they were, have abruptly broken it off during those first months when the revelation of one's weaknesses is so painfully wounding to *amour propre*. The analyst, being given no opportunity to dress, as it were, the psychic wound, the runaway patient remains depressed and bitter until he finds someone who can relieve for a moment his suffering.

A tactful facility for palliating a renegade analytic patient of this kind may earn some other psycho-therapist much thanks and a flattering comparison with the original analyst, especially in respect of the speed of his "cure." The trouble with these other methods is that they are not permanent, and that they are helpless against the more deep-seated cases of nervous disorder. This statement is not really so sweeping as it may sound; for the other methods of therapy, except in so far as they have adopted in diluted form the technique of psycho-analysis, depend for their effects upon overt or disguised forms of suggestion in a way which analysis does not. They ignore the real cause of the trouble, and leave it to recreate the symptom when the novelty of the treatment has worn off or else to create new symptoms to take its place. Suggestion thereby consists in the authoritative imposition of an idea on the patient *ab extra*.

This is the very antithesis of analysis, which consists in the exposure of elements already present in him. In analysis, suggestions of a sort are indeed given, so that one can understand the confusion of Wohlgemuth on this point. But it is vital to note two distinctions: The first is that the analyst does not impose his idea at all, but merely offers it for the tentative consideration of the patient, welcoming his criticism. The second is, that the suggestion is not directed to the future feelings, ideas, or conduct of the patient, as in hypnotic therapy; it is directed to the significance which some experience may have had in reference to the past, *e.g.* "I suggest to you that

we explore the possibility that the twin hills you saw in your dream represent an infantile memory of your mother's breasts." Thirdly, in analysis, suggestion is frankly allowed for, and the influence of the physician himself and the patient's relationship to him come in for more picking to pieces than anything else in the whole analysis. There is, as Freud has indicated, one very good test of the claim that the therapeutic effects of analysis are themselves due to suggestion. Namely, if they were so, then the therapy would be strengthened by dropping out the precautions against suggestion and playing up the authority of the physician for all it was worth, as is done in the most carefully elaborated hypnotic technique. But it was precisely the failure of such methods which led to the development of analysis.

Now let us examine the argument that a sympathetic friend is likely to prove as effective as the analyst. We can admit that "getting things off one's chest" is of immense practical value, but it cannot go very far. For one thing, it is limited to the expression of what the patient is already conscious of. That which is important, however, is to bring up to light not what he is conscious of, but what he is unconscious of. Besides, there is the matter of the time which is needed to secure lasting effects. One could hardly find the friend who had the patience to listen an hour a day for years with sympathetic tact. And if he made criticisms, we know we should not take them easily, however much we asked for them. Consider the case of a man who used to come to me asking for criticism of magazine articles he used to write. This chap prided himself particularly on his willingness to accept criticism—in fact, he would always be asking people to criticize himself and his writing. The typical procedure was this—I would be right in the midst of doing something very urgent; he would plead with me to cease my work in order to read through the article, and I would perhaps do him the favour. When I had read it and said, for example, that it would be better like this or like that, he would invariably retort that such petty rules of composition had always

been overridden by Shakespeare or Thoreau or some other great writer, and that he was pressed for time anyway, and was going to send the article in just as it was.

The religious confessional has undoubtedly been of great help to people. The very fact that it became so important an institution of several religions (including even that of ancient American Indian cultures) indicates that it contributed to some human need. The belief that the priest can forgive sins in the name of God is an advantage that every analyst can envy when it comes to allaying the sense of guilt; but against these facts we must set three serious disadvantages. One is, that not everyone is able to believe in the theology which the priest in question professes. Another is, that for all its long experience, the Church did not discover the region of the unconscious, much less a technique for its unveiling, without which the priest gets little farther than, if as far as, the tactful confidential friend. But the third reason is the most fatal one of all; and that is, that the point of approach of the priest is a moral one—he regards our failures not as symptoms but as sins, and the observed practical effects of that moral attitude is to block the deeper things from coming to light.

The contention that it is the incompleteness of repression which does harm is a theory spun out of the critic's head, and which there will be time enough to meet when he offers real evidence of it. But the more moderate contention, that some suppression is necessary to the conduct of life, is entirely in keeping with psycho-analytic theory, which merely seeks to undo the effects of that which is excessive. It is for this extreme and at the same time unconscious form of censorship that the name *repression* is reserved. Thus if I say to myself: "Much as I covet my neighbour's wife, I see that for the sake of peace in the community and the happiness of both our homes, I must see no more of her," that is commendable *suppression*. But if I declare passionately (and superficially persuade myself) that far from loving her, I hate the woman, this is here a case of *repression*, and so one which will lead to inconsistent

conduct if to nothing worse. The repressed desire represents a certain amount of psychic energy; the effort to keep it repressed represents additional energy; so that both these amounts now become locked up in a "conflict." One or other of the repressed elements may return in the form of neurotic symptoms, or the personality, robbed of more energy than it can afford, becomes listless.

It is true that in some cases primitive impulses which are not free to express themselves directly may do so in the form of sublimations, that is to say, substitute mechanisms which, unlike symptoms, are acceptable in character. Thus, thwarted love of a woman may become devotion to the Virgin Mary or to my Mother Country, but unfortunately it is completely impossible to produce these sublimations at will. We can provide children with a most varied environment, offering them the opportunity of many interests; and we may hope that sublimations will take place; but that is all. Sublimations frequently take place after the completion of an analysis that has released energy from harmful symptoms with which it was bound up. Only the release, however, and not the sublimating is within our control.

Nor need we be alarmed that psycho-analysis will destroy any charming characteristics by revealing their less charming origin. I have yet to meet or hear of a successful analysis which robbed the patient of any of his real attractiveness or of his abilities. Clearly any analysis which did that would not be successful; it would in fact be incomplete. Incidentally, it is as well to note here that analysis makes more use of sublimation than it does of anything else, always with the scientific or humble proviso that it cannot profess to control it.

And so we come to the question of the analyst himself and the ideas which he is said to "project" on to his patient. The real answer lies of course in the proper training of the analyst. If he is a charlatan, such results may happen, but the proper qualification of practitioners is the safeguard against such abuses.

For the rest, the facts about the patient in which the analyst

is interested are subjective, not objective, facts. If the patient believes that when he was a boy his father beat him, that belief is the important thing for the analyst, and not whether in point of fact his father did or did not beat him. Besides, if the patient deliberately lies to the analyst, this fact will inevitably be confessed later (assuming that he seriously perseveres in the analysis) and the whole affair then calls for explanation.

That the analyst may project his own complexes into the patient is a danger so well recognized that the practice, first started by Dr. Ernest Jones, of the prospective analyst first himself being analysed is now universally insisted on. That he should be thoroughly analysed himself is the only way of making the physician so aware of his own complexes that he can keep them out of his interpretations. Other methods of psycho-therapy of course also run a similar risk; and they do not safeguard themselves by this effective precaution.

It is certainly true that the single-motive explanation of all life is hardly likely to be adequate to all its complexities. But it happens that analysis pretends nothing of the sort. Freud explicitly denies that he considers sex the only motive in life. He merely regards the sex instincts (broadly defined at that) as those which in the actual circumstances of social life happen most to come in for repression—repression which underlies neurotic conditions.

In giving to sex the amount of emphasis which he does, Freud has merely followed where the evidence led. His facts are not refuted by calling them repugnant; if some persons find them so, it is no argument against the role they play.

Finally, we come to the question of independence after the analysis is over. Now that, again, is answered by the completeness with which the analysis has been carried through. If it in fact sacrificed the patient's individuality, it would be a lamentable failure. In reality, however, a treatment is not called off until the patient's dependence on his analyst is resolved. Hence the criticism can be dismissed as unreal. It is of the hypothetical

kind, put forward by people without experience of their own, who have met a patient either during the course of the analysis or who have quit without completing their analysis, or have been to an unqualified doctor. Certainly in every analysis a stage has to be passed through when the patient's dependence upon the practitioner is critical. Anyone who meets him in such a condition may be excused for reaching the superficial conclusion that the patient has lost his power to stand on his own feet.

It is possible, therefore, to dispose effectively of these general criticisms which are brought against the science. But it cannot be overlooked that they are loudly asserted. So loudly, indeed, are they asserted by some people who are yet in possession of the evidence to the contrary, that it is impossible to avoid the suspicion that these criticisms are not really due to objective facts at all. May they not be merely rationalizations of deeper-buried objections springing from quite non-rational motives?

This, after all, would not be surprising. Psycho-analysis, to a prospective patient, appears as both a doctrine and a way of life. It demands his intellectual attention and much of his time, just as do his business and domestic duties. And if, as has been shown, all sorts of queer psychological motives enter into his attitude towards his business and family life, is it surprising that we should find them at work again in his attitude towards psycho-analysis?

I have no space left to make a detailed examination, instructive as it would be, of precisely how one or another psychological factor enters into and determines our attitude towards psycho-analysis. I must remain content with the mere enumeration of a catalogue, and hope that by now my method of approach is clear.

Oral fixation with resulting "spoiltness" and anal fixation, with resulting miserly or spendthrift traits, both contribute their quota to the determination of our attitudes. Narcissism, again, with its desire for self-perfection or its fear to see our actual weaknesses, operates most directly, either favourably or

otherwise. So also if we enjoy "showing off" more than we object to being made to expose our inner weaknesses to another's view, that may make us favour the idea of analysis; if the opposite, then, to oppose it. As exhibitionistic love of self-exposure scarcely calls for comment, no more does scopophilia, sublimated as curiosity. Homo-sexuality is, in some aspects of analysis, the basis of the vital factor, transference. The *Œdipus complex*, with its "father-antipathies," I mention last.

Indeed, there is clearly not one of the psychological motives whose operation we have examined elsewhere in this book which does not enter into our attitudes towards psycho-analysis. The irony of the situation remains that in some cases before it would be possible to overcome some people's objections to psycho-analysis, they would have first to be psycho-analysed!

It has been said that the only real cure for the world's ills is education. The remark is as dull as (interpreting "education" to mean more than "instruction") it is true. If man is moved by an impatient desire to reach the millennium, he is likely to reject particularly those policies and doctrines which are sure possibly, but slow certainly. Salvation for the generation after next is but little recompense to offer this generation. And education is one of those policies which comes in this category.

If we could only teach people how to behave, how to think, and how to be effective, we should have laid the foundations of Utopia. Until we have so taught them, chaos and tragedy will stalk the stage of this world, crushing endeavour, blighting hopes, shattering dreams.

It will be a long, wearisome process before man learns how to learn. He has still to suffer while the means of release are within his grasp.

This realization of the pitiful folly of it all has spurred one noble man after another to the most herculean labours. Yet, as the present state of the world bears witness, none has succeeded. We have still to learn how to learn.

It is beyond the province of this book to say how that is to be done. Whatever thought I have to contribute to this topic will be embodied in a separate study. Yet its relation to our theme here is being ever more effectively studied. The last thirty years have seen the appearance of an almost infinite number of books dealing with the whole problem of education from its psychological side. They have witnessed, too, a growing number of experiments in the art of education from the Montessori system to methods based on psycho-analytic discoveries.

For, after all, psycho-analysis is itself an education of an unusually fundamental sort. Over many ancient Greek temples appeared the legend "Know Thyself." That is surely the beginning if it is not the end of wisdom.

What conclusions, then, may we at length draw from this and the preceding chapters? At the start, let the reader dismiss any idea that this book will in the least enable anyone to psycho-analyse himself. Mere introspection is useless. In the second place (reverting here somewhat to the notion of education) one fact above all others stands out clearly. Whatever happens to any of us after childhood, however catastrophic it may seem, is negligible in its effects compared with the apparently trivial things that happen in infancy.

Education in the nursery and the schoolroom, therefore, must be the chief concern of all who seek to make a better world. But by education I mean something incomparably more complex than the mere learning of alphabets and figures. I mean, in effect, the whole business of upbringing.

The responsibility that rests upon parent and teacher cannot be exaggerated. Any bad handling of the child then, however trivial it may seem, is likely (as we have seen throughout every chapter of this book) to result in disaster.

The function of the educator is one which is beyond all gravity, and only those who are both fit for the task and highly trained to perform it should be entrusted with it. That, unfortunately, is a policy of perfection for which there will be no

place in this world for many years to come, but some approach towards it can be made, even to-day.

Immediately, child psychology could and should be taught at all maternity clinics and other centres where parents and nurses are to be found. Presently, facilities should be created and strong pressure brought on kindergarten and primary school teachers to be psycho-analysed. In those families whose children are likely to come into directorships of public affairs, there should be found superior, well-paid nursemaids of whom the same qualification would be expected.

Even if we have to despair of the existing world of adult people, we could do something to ensure that the next generation was given a better chance. Nothing would promote that chance better than an intensive preparation for our educators.

There are many encouraging signs that this is commencing to-day. New schools with new masters and new methods are arising everywhere. Sometimes, of course, enthusiasm has largely to fill the gaps in knowledge; but a start has been made and in its continuance there is much hope.

There are even signs that the national organizations of governments in several countries throughout the world are beginning to realize the necessity for better methods in the school-room.

But the mere instruction of teachers in child-psychology, valuable as it may be as a beginning, is in itself not enough. The teachers should as fast as becomes possible be analysed. This alone will ensure that poise and balance which are vital to anyone who has taken on the pregnant responsibility of bringing up children.

To-day that is still impossible. Psycho-analysis remains like the Ritz Hotels and justice, the prerogative of the well-to-do. It should be the chief social concern of any government to inaugurate a vast system of State-aided clinics where all who chose could come for analysis. If a beginning were made in training colleges it would be something. The annual cost would be rather less than one battleship, and be actually a

better insurance against war, which is generally due in part to public psychopathic misjudgments.

As a great number of trained analysts become available the scheme would be extended. In time, we might hope it could become sufficiently widespread so that anyone could be as sure of securing analysis as he is to-day of securing ordinary medical attention. Against the cost, even if it rose very much above the ordinary cost of National Health Insurance schemes, would have to be offset the enormous savings from the reduction, not only of the number of mental wrecks to be cared for, but of energies diverted from productive channels.

Here, in a nutshell, is the groundwork of a new society, a new world. It is no extravagant claim that thus oppression, cruelty, suffering, and emotional agony could be drastically reduced in our lives. Peace could reign and the stupid anomalies of want in the midst of plenty would disappear.

We should be left with problems enough and to spare; but with reinvigorated energies and sharpened faculties we should be in better case to face and overcome them than ever in our history.

Of this, however, we may be sure. Unless we are prepared to make this effort to understand and to solve the problem of ourselves, to clear away all the dross and the rubbish from our own minds, to master the art of control and of self-knowledge, we may plan and scheme and build, but we shall fail. We shall be beaten by our worst enemies—ourselves; and our lives, compared with what they could and should be, will remain, in the words of the cynic, Hobbes, “nasty, brutish, and short.”

INDEX

Abraham, Dr. Karl, 149, 150, 239, 240
Adams, J. T., 168
Adler, Dr. A., 31, 189
Alcoholism, 183
Alexander, 90
Ambivalence, 120, 121, 126
America, positions held by psychologists in, 16; cults of a shady nature in, 17; orientation courses in universities of, 19; lynching of negroes in, 91, 109-110, 113; third degree, police methods of, 109
American Psychological Association, 15
Amnesia, Plato's theory of, 28
Anal-eroticism, 98, 100, 136, 138, 139, 147, 149, 153, 154, 186
Andaman Islands, 243
Animals, action of, 33
Antioch College, Ohio, 237
Aristotle, 28, 147
"Associationists," 29
Augustine, St., 257
Australia, Roheim's report on his expedition to, 404; primitive peoples of, 192
Aveling, Prof. F., 32

Bakunin, 158
Baldwin, Lord, 90
Bauer, Bruno, 159
Beaglehole, A., 149
Behaviourism, 34, 36
Bell, Clive, 78
Bentham, Jeremy, 61, 62, 63, 74, 147, 158; maxim of, 66, 73; theory of hedonism, 68
Bergson, H., 27
Berkeley, 63
Berlin-Baghdad Railway, 116
Biology, 25; Darwin's work in, 30

Birth-control movement, 84, 135, 178, 179, 180, 181, 184, 186, 187, 194, 197, 199, 203, 206, 249
Blanchard, 190
Blood-sports, 102-104
Brahminism, 257
Breuer, Josef, 36, 37
Bridges, R., 100, 225
Broad, Dr. C. D., 63
Brombert, W., 223
Buddhism, 74, 259, 260

Capitalism, 85, 173
Castration complex, 125, 187, 198, 199, 200, 201, 203, 204; women and, 204, 205, 206, 208
Cattell, Prof., 15, 16, 184, 249
Charcot, J. M., 30, 36
Chase, Stuart, 147
Child psychology, 34-35, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 63, 67, 82, 83, 89, 99, 100, 101, 102, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 127, 129, 130, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 148, 153-154, 164, 165, 171, 183, 187-189, 190, 192, 193, 194, 198, 200, 202, 207, 231, 234; of savages, 44, 192
Circumcision practised by Jews, 198
Communism, 18, 19, 173; Russian, 85
Complexes, 48, 50, 52
Contraception, 84, 178, 180, 181, 184, 186, 187, 194, 197, 199, 203, 206, 249
Copernican theory, 25
Coué, Dr. Emile, 267

Darwin, C., 30
Delinquency, Institute for the Scientific Treatment of, 112

Deprierris, experiments of, on chickens, 183 Descartes, 28, 29 Dewey, Prof. J., 15, 63 Dichotomy, 27 Dreams, 38, 125, 126, 127, 195, 202, 203 Drug addicts, 97 Earp, Dr. J. R., 237, 249 Eddy, S., 148 Ellis, Havelock, 199 Engels, F., 159 Exhibitionism, 118 Fascism, 18, 19; and Russia, 88 Ferenczi, 239 Fink, Bruce, 227 Five-Year Plans, 136; Russian, 156 Fixations, 93, 98, 137, 153, 186, 192, 224 Flagellation, 102 Fleig, 183 Flugel, Prof. J. C., 141 Fourier, 135 Freud, Dr. S., theory of psychology, 24, 26, 28, 30, 31, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41-53, 61, 93, 95, 99, 119, 127, 149, 153, 157, 171, 187, 189, 204, 210, 221, 223, 231, 239, 242, 246, 254, 263, 266, 267, 269, 272, 275 Fytton, St. John, 233 Galileo, science influenced by the work of, 28 Galton, 30 Geocentric theory of the Universe, 25 Germany, anti-semitism of Nazi, 91, 113 Gilmour, A., 111 Glover, Dr. E., 97, 98, 137, 222, 223, 239 Greeks, Hedonism of the, 61; Civilization of the, 78	Green, 63 Groves, 190 Gy, experiments on guinea-pigs, 183 Hammurabi, laws of, 75 Harrison, Jane, 155 Harvey, science influenced by the work of, 28 Hedonism—of the Greeks, 61; two distinct theories of, 61, 62, 63, 66, 69, 71, 72, 262; Bentham's exposition of, 68 Henry, J. Q. A., 232 Herbart, 37 Hetero-sexuality, 119 Hiller, Eric, 229, 230 Hinduism, 74, 253 Hitler, 90, 91, 162 Hobbes, 29, 54, 280 Homo-sexuality, 119, 220, 227, 228, 230, 233, 234 <i>et seq.</i> , 238, 239, 240, 253, 277 Howard League, 112 Hull on tobacco smoking, 249 Huxley, Aldous, 84 Huxley, Julian, 154 Indians, North American, self-torture by, 259 Inquisition, the, 106-107 Isaacs, Mrs. S., 99, 100, 139, 141, 159, 169, 187-188, 191, 225 Islam, 253; five rules of, 75 James, Prof. W., 35, 154 Janet, Pierre, 30 Jewish commandments, 74, 75 Jews: anti-Semitism of Nazi Germany, 91, 113; circumcision practised by, 198 Johann Georg I and II, 103 John of the Cross, St., 253 Johnston, P., 150, 151 Jones, Dr. E., 167, 186, 275 Juliusberger, 239 Jung, 31
---	---

Kaiser, the, 90
 Kant, 15, 34
 Kellogg, experiments of, on rats, 183
 Kok, Dr. W. de, 139, 188, 191, 200
 Kostral, Dr., 183
 Lamaism, 258
 La Salle Extension University, 151
 Laski, Prof. H., 158
 Lecky, Prescott, 110
 Lecky, W. E. H., 203, 260
 Lindsay, Judge Ben, 181, 194
 Loeb, Jacques, 33
 Lynching, 91, 109, 110, 111, 113
 MacCurdy, Prof., 157, 166, 167
 McDougall, Prof. W., 35, 36, 98
 Malinowski, Prof. B., 44, 192
 Malthus, 84
 Man, H. de, 137, 156
 Marx, Karl, 136, 158, 159; Communist manifesto of, 157; his economic theory of value, 163
 Masoch, Sacher, 102
 Masochism, 98, 102, 137, 186
 Masturbation, 190, 191, 201, 202, 237
 Mazzini, 159
 Mechanisms and "Mechanists," 22, 29, 93
 Meiji, Emperor, 75
 Mental disorders, 83, 175, 176
 Mill, J. S., 68, 69
 Mob psychology, 110
 Money-Kyrle, Dr. R., 32, 189
 Montessori system, 278
 Mukerjee, 173
 Mussolini, 90, 162
 Mutrel, Etienne, 183
 Napoleon, 90; his dictum about the church, 251
 Narcissism, 118, 252, 276
 Nazis, 91, 113
 Neill, A. S., 207
 Neurosis, 38, 39, 43, 48, 52, 83, 115
 Nichols, B., 117
 Newton, 25
 Oedipus complex, 76, 89, 94, 119, 120, 122, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 137, 254, 262, 277
 Pavlov, J., 29, 33, 48
 Petit, experiments of, 183
 Phallic emblems, 252
 "Philanthropia," 155
 Philotechnica, 155
 Plato, 15, 28
 Playfair, Dr. 183
 Proudhon, 158
 Psychiatry, 99, 176, 270
Psychological Abstracts, 15
 Rado, 223
 Reece-Jones, Mrs. M., 227
 Reflexes, 33, 34
 Relativity theory, 25
 Religious belief, 79, 245-250 *et seq.*
 Religious confessional, the, 268, 273
 Rivers, W. H. R., 31
 Robinson, H. M., 105-106, 107
 Roheim, Geza, 192, 201; report on Australian expedition, 44
 Roman Catholic Church, the Inquisition and the, 106-107
 Roosevelt, President, 90
 Russell, Bertrand, 181, 191
 Russia, Communist, 85; and Fascism, 88; five-year plan, 156; Soviet, 163
 Rutgers University, 20
 Sadism, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 109, 110, 113, 114, 118, 119, 124, 128, 129, 137, 177, 186, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 260

St. Simon, 135	Taylor, T. F., 232
Sanger, Margaret, 199	Thomson, Dr., 183
Sen-Gupta, 173	Thorndike, E. L., 76, 98, 154
Schilder, P., 223	Tidswell, Dr., 183
Schlesinger, K., 222	Tobaccoism. <i>See</i> Smoking
Sex problem, the, 84, 176 <i>et seq.</i>	Trobriand Islands, 192
Shinto, 75	Tropism, 33
Simeon Stylites, St., 45	Tufts, Prof., 15
Smoking, 116, 134, 135, 209, 215 <i>et seq.</i> , 223, 224, 225-227, 228, 229, 230, 231 <i>et seq.</i> , 237 <i>et seq.</i> , 240, 249	United States. <i>See</i> America
Socrates, 58, 60	University College, London, 19
Socialism, 133, 135, 136, 137, 162, 173	Vahinger, 251
Spearman, Prof. C., "Aids to Academic Success," 19, 20; <i>Psychology Down the Ages</i> , 32	Veblen, T., 172, 173
Stalin, 90	Verworn, Max, 33
Stephen, Dr. Karin, 164, 187, 189, 195, 198, 203	Violence, 96-131
Stephenson, Dr. W., 196, 205	War, 87, 90, 91; war-psychology, 115 <i>et seq.</i>
Stern, W., 143	Watson, F. W., 169
Stevenson, R. L., 170	Watson, Prof. J. B., 29, 34, 220
Stoddart, Dr. W. H. B., 267	Webb (Beatrice and Sidney), 163
Stopes, Marie, 199	Weber, 68
Sublimation, 48, 50, 129	Wells, H. G., writings of, 147
Symbolism, 140, 167, 187, 193, 195, 196, 198, 199, 205, 222, 226	Whitehead, Works of, 27
Syndicalism, 173	Williams, Prof. J. M., 137, 148
Tamerlane, 90	Wilson, President, 145
Taxis-mechanism, 33	Wohlgemuth, Dr. A., 267, 271
	Woods, M., 135
	Wundt, psychological laboratory of, 28, 30
	Zuckermann, Dr. A., 201

OVERLEAF
particulars of publications
of similar interest
issued by



GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD
LONDON: 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C.1
LEIPZIG: (F. VOLCKMAR) HOSPITALSTR. 10
CAPE TOWN: 73 ST. GEORGE'S STREET,
TORONTO: 91 WELLINGTON STREET, WEST
BOMBAY: 15 GRAHAM ROAD, BALLARD ESTATE
WELLINGTON, N.Z.: 8 KINGS CRESCENT, LOWER HUTT
SYDNEY, N.S.W.: AUSTRALIA HOUSE, WYNYARD SQUARE

Sex in Everyday Life

by EDWARD F. GRIFFITH, M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P.

Demy 8vo.

10s. 6d.

"Dr. Griffith has written in this volume a book which is badly needed both by the medical profession and by the intelligent general public."

—*Times Literary Supplement*

Sex, Friendship and Marriage

by KENNETH AND FRANCES BARNES

Crown 8vo.

6s.

"This book covers the subject very well, both on its mental and its physical side."—*New Generation*

The Man Takes a Wife

by IRA S. WILE, M.S., M.D.

Demy 8vo.

10s. 6d.

Doctor Wile presents a book about man, as he seeks satisfaction as a lover, husband, father. Life and love are discussed in terms of man's changing physical, intellectual, and emotional nature, with emphasis upon normal, rather than upon pathological activities. He makes a frank and detailed study of the problems of courtship and marriage and the practical situations involved in fatherhood. The relations of the husband to the wife, the father to the mother, and the children to both of them serve as the basis of an interpretation of the growth and interaction of personalities in family life.

Common Neuroses of Children and Adults

by O. SPURGEON ENGLISH, M.D.

Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, Temple University Medical School
and GERALD H. J. PEARSON, M.D.

Assistant Professor Pediatrics, Temple University Medical School

Demy 8vo.

12s. 6d.

The authors deal first with the formation of personality; its structure, psychophysiology, and psychopathology. Then the neuroses of childhood are presented as they manifest their symptoms in various bodily disorders or in unsatisfactory behaviour patterns. Lastly, the neurotic manifestations in the adult are discussed, following the present accepted classification of adult neuroses. In both sections emphasis is given to treatment possibilities and treatment technique.

Superior Children

THEIR PHYSIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT

by JOHN EDWARD BENTLEY

Professor of Education and Psychology, The American University

Demy 8vo.

12s. 6d.

“Professor Bentley discusses how to discover latent talent and how to educate it. He deals with the physical, mental, social and moral qualities of superior children; youthful genius; precocity; problems of discipline; training for leadership; the special methods of teaching; the right type of teacher; educational usages past and present. . . . His previous treatise on ‘Problem Children’ is good; his new book is even better.”—*Teachers World*

“*Superior Children* is an important contribution to the educational and psychological study of children.”—*Nursery World*

Psychology of Adolescence

by LUELLA COLE, Ph.D.

Demy 8vo.

12s. 6d.

“The book is a comprehensive survey of a difficult period of life, and should be valuable to enable the reader to understand the nature of the problem before attempting its solution.”—*Teachers World*

Children’s Dreams

AN UNEXPLORED LAND

by Dr. C. W. KIMMINS

Late Chief Inspector to the L.C.C.

Author of *The Child’s Attitude to Life, Mental and Physical Welfare of the Child*, etc.

Crown 8vo.

4s. 6d.

“This is an exceedingly interesting book on an exceedingly interesting subject. Dr. Kimmens is to be congratulated on the objective way in which he has tabulated his material, upon the moderation of the deductions he draws from it, on the lucidity of his writing, and, above all, on the way in which he has managed to keep his subject open, without subscribing to any single theory of dream causation.”

—L. A. G. STRONG in the *Spectator*

Psychoanalysis Explained

by DOROTHY R. BLITZSTEN

Crown 8vo.

3s. 6d.

"Dr. Blitzsten has discharged the task most admirably, and her . . . book . . . will banish many bogeys that have haunted the minds of the uninitiated. It can be warmly recommended to anyone wishing to take the first step towards an understanding of his own and other people's mental processes, and to discover whether there is 'anything in' new theories of education, the upbringing of children, and kindred subjects."—*John o' London's Weekly*

Adolescent Psychology

by ADA HART ARLITT

Preface by Dr. Cyril Burt

Crown 8vo.

6s.

"A sound and convincing piece of work."—*Church Times*

Towards Peace of Mind

EVERYDAY PROBLEMS OF MENTAL HEALTH

by Dr. KARL M. BOWMAN

with a Foreword by Professor Cyril Burt

Crown 8vo.

6s.

This book endeavours to present in a simple and understandable fashion the important theories with regard to human behaviour, and to apply these to the practical problems of adult life. The effect of heredity is first considered, and the author points out how heredity affects and limits the possibility of behaviour.

Various physical factors are then dealt with, such as the nervous system, the glands of internal secretion, and physical disease. The role of the instincts and emotions, and methods of dealing with mental conflict are also discussed. Finally, Dr. Bowman discusses a large number of specific problems, such as health, fatigue, relaxation, sleep, tobacco, alcohol, recreation, education, worries, fears, sex, marriage, moral and spiritual failures.

All prices are net

LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.